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Results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on the prevention 
and correction of macroeconomic imbalances 
 
Spain is experiencing macroeconomic imbalances, which require decisive policy action 
and specific monitoring. Spain exited the financial assistance programme for the 
recapitalisation of financial institutions in 2014 and is currently subject to post-
programme surveillance and European Semester surveillance. Despite some 
improvement in the current account rebalancing, risks related to the high levels of 
private and public sector indebtedness and the highly negative net international 
investment position continue to deserve close attention in a context of very high 
unemployment. The need for action so as to reduce the risk of adverse effects on the 
Spanish economy and, given its size, of negative spillovers to the economic and 
monetary union, is particularly important. 
 
Excerpt of country-specific findings on Spain, COM(2015)85 final_SWD(2015)28 final, 
26.02.2015 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1 
The recent overall economic and financial 
developments confirm the stabilisation that has 
been unfolding over the last two years in Spain. 
In 2014 and early 2015, economic growth in Spain 
was supported  by rapid employment creation, 
easier financing conditions, improved confidence, 
and lower energy and oil prices. These factors are 
expected to continue to support growth in the short 
to medium term, despite high private and public 
debt levels continuing to exert a drag on growth. 
Financial markets have stabilised, but the country 
remains vulnerable to sudden changes in global 
investor sentiment. Labour market conditions are 
improving, but unemployment remains very high. 
Social indicators are continuing to deteriorate, 
although the positive evolution of labour markets 
may bring some improvement over the next years. 
Moreover, negative inflation in 2014 provided 
some relief in real gross disposable income for 
households in a context of continued wage 
moderation. Housing prices seem to be close to 
bottoming out.  
In March 2014, the Commission concluded that 
Spain was experiencing macroeconomic 
imbalances that require specific monitoring and 
decisive policy action. In several dimensions, 
adjustment of the identified imbalances has 
advanced, and the return to growth has reduced 
risks. Nevertheless, the nature, magnitude and 
interrelations between the imbalances, in particular 
private and public sector indebtedness, the 
negative net international investment position and 
the various policy challenges in the labour market 
still expose Spain to risks. This Country Report 
assesses Spain's economy against the background 
of the Commission's Annual Growth Survey which 
recommends three main pillars for the EU's 
economic and social policy in 2015: investment, 
structural reforms, and fiscal responsibility. In line 
with the Investment Plan for Europe, it also 
explores ways to maximise the impact of public 
resources and unlock private investment. Finally, it 
assesses Spain in the light of the findings of the 
2015 Alert Mechanism Report, in which the 
Commission found it useful to further examine the 
persistence of imbalances or their unwinding. The 
main findings related to macroeconomic 
imbalances contained in this country report are: 
• Despite a positive development in recent years, 
the current account surplus narrowed 
significantly in 2014. This is caused by the 
slowdown in the main Spanish export markets 
and the rebound of imports linked to robust 
domestic demand. Spain's external sector 
performance is also affected by the high import 
content of exports, Spain's energy dependence, 
the relatively smaller size of Spanish firms, and 
the high sensitivity of exports to changes in 
relative prices and costs.  
• The large stock of external liabilities has kept 
increasing, making Spain vulnerable to adverse 
shocks or shifts in market's confidence. The 
overall high stock of private and public debt, 
both domestic and external, poses risks for 
growth and financial stability. The recovery of 
private sector balance sheets is advancing, 
backed by credit contraction.  
• Job creation has gathered pace, but 
unemployment remains very high. Youth 
joblessness is very high, and long-term 
unemployment risks becoming structural, and 
leading to labour and social exclusion. Labour 
market segmentation remains a challenge. 
• Negative macroeconomic developments in 
Spain would have a significant impact on other 
euro area countries. Structural reforms in Spain 
can contribute to supporting activity in the euro 
area.  
• Boosting private and public investment would 
help Spain further increase productivity growth 
and improve competitiveness. Further 
investment to increase security of supply and 
stimulate competition in energy markets 
remains a priority. Spain's research and 
innovation performance still suffers from i.a., 
inadequate funding and  governance. 
• While the 2014 reform of the personal and 
corporate income tax simplifies the tax system, 
its impact on the achievement of budgetary 
targets is still unclear.  
• Despite progress made, starting-up and 
operating a business in Spain remains relatively 
cumbersome, a fact that could slow the number 
of new firms. A competition-enhancing reform 
in professional services has been on the agenda 
for long to intensify business dynamics and 
contribute to lower consumer prices. A 
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fragmented corporate structure of the Spanish 
economy exacerbates cyclical problems with 
bank financing. 
• Early school leaving is decreasing, but remains 
very high. Combined with relatively low basic 
skills', this can limit Spain's growth potential.  
• The ongoing reform of public administration 
can contribute to efficiency gains and fiscal 
savings. Enhancing the efficiency of the 
judicial system is also an important lever to 
improve Spain's business environment. 
• The recent reforms of the electricity and gas 
sectors will possibly reduce the tariff deficits 
from 2014 onwards. But the effectiveness of 
measures to limit potential liabilities for public 
finances stemming from transport 
infrastructure is still uncertain. 
This Country Report also assesses progress 
towards implementing the 2014 Country 
Specific Recommendations. It concludes that on 
average, Spain has made some progress in 
implementing them.  Most significant progress 
has been recorded on the operationalization of the 
new independent fiscal authority on easing the 
establishment of large-scale retail premises and on 
the reform of the public administration. Spain 
made some progress in the implementation of the 
recommendation on tax reform, improving the 
cost-effectiveness of the healthcare sector, 
conducting a spending review, completing the 
reform of the savings banks, widening SMEs' 
access to finance, removing the remaining 
bottlenecks in the corporate insolvency framework, 
enhancing the effectiveness of active labour 
market policies and promoting labour mobility, 
applying the education reform, putting in place the 
national Youth Guarantee system, increase 
transparency of administrative decisions, 
implementing the law on market unity, facilitating 
business licensing and eliminating the deficit in the 
electricity system.  Only limited progress is 
recorded on the recommendations on social issues, 
combatting labour market segmentation, 
strengthening public employment services, 
implementing the new national strategy for 
science, technology and innovation, enhancing 
cooperation between higher education and 
employers and adopting pending judicial reforms. 
Lastly, there has been no progress on the 
implementation of the recommendation on 
professional services, on creating a state research 
agency and on increasing control mechanisms at 
sub-central government level.  
The Country Report discusses the policy 
challenges stemming from the analysis of macro-
economic imbalances:  
• Re-orientation of the economy towards 
exporting sectors and competitivenessʼ 
recovery is a necessary condition for reducing 
the large stock of external liabilities. Removing 
obstacles to firm growth, supporting SMEs to 
expand their markets and enhancing innovation 
appear key to boosting export capacity, job 
creation, compete more efficiently also in 
internal markets and enhancing overall 
productivity. 
• Ongoing deleveraging pressures continue to 
impact economic growth. The adjustment of 
private sector balance-sheets is advancing, but 
the deleveraging of households is taking place 
at a slower pace. 
• While the public deficit remains on a declining 
path, without further consolidation efforts in 
the medium term Spain would not bring down 
the general government debt.  
• High long-term unemployment and high 
segmentation continue to hamper productivity 
growth and working conditions. Without 
adequate targeting and implementation of 
active labour market and activation policies, 
including re-skilling towards sectors with job-
creation perspectives, addressing the 
unemployment problem remains a challenge. 
• Other policy challenges that Spain faces 
include consistent implementation of reforms at 
regional level, creation of conditions for an 
innovation-friendly business environment, 
improvements in business licensing, reform of 
professional services, completion of measures 
on insolvency; reinforcement of links between 
education and the labour market and 
strengthening of public employment services, 
and improvements in water and waste 
management. 
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After three years of recession, growth resumed 
again in 2014 and prospects for 2015 and 2016 
are on the rise. After having expanded by 0.5 % 
quarter-on-quarter in both the second and the third 
quarters of 2014, economic activity has gained 
further momentum in the last quarter and is 
expected to accelerate further in 2015 and 2016. 
The positive growth outlook is backed by better 
labour market prospects, loosening of financial 
conditions, improved confidence and reduced 
uncertainty about the strength of the recovery, and 
lower energy and oil prices. These factors are 
expected to continue to support growth in the short 
to medium term, although high private and public 
debt levels continue to exert a drag on growth 
through deleveraging pressures.  
Domestic demand, led by private consumption, 
keeps driving growth while the contribution 
from net exports has turned negative again in 
2014. Growth is set to continue to be mainly 
driven by domestic demand, led by robust private 
consumption and investment (Graph 1.1). Strong 
private consumption has been underpinned by 
higher than expected job creation, as well as 
negative inflation in 2014 that provided some 
relief to households for their real gross disposable 
income in a context of continued wage moderation. 
The sizeable drag from the external sector 
observed over the first half of 2014 has been due to 
the slowdown in Spain's export markets and an 
exceptionally robust pick-up in imports that partly 
reflected renewed confidence and temporary 
measures. As these effects phase out, the negative 
contribution of the external sector is expected to 
narrow in 2015 and to turn neutral in 2016. 
Investment was one of the main factors behind 
the recovery.  Some of the factors holding down 
investment in recent years (weakness of private 
demand, financial fragmentation, fiscal 
consolidation, uncertainty) are starting to recede, 
although others (deleveraging, sectorial 
rebalancing) are likely to have a more lingering 
effect. Key macroeconomic indicators covering 
from 2007 to 2016 are summarised in Table 3.2.1. 
Financial markets have stabilised and financing 
conditions for the private sector have loosened, 
but the country remains vulnerable to sudden 
changes in global investor sentiment. A clear 
return of market confidence in Spain was 
manifested in the narrowing of sovereign debt 
yields spreads vis-à-vis the core Member States of 
the euro area, surging stock market prices and the 
resumption of foreign financing. After the 
completion of the programme for recapitalisation 
of the financial sector, balance sheet restructuring 
of the sector continued. These factors have led to a 
greater availability and a lower cost of financing 
for the Spanish private sector. Nevertheless, Spain 
remains sensitive to swifts in markets confidence 
that translate quickly into changes in risk premia.   
Graph 1.1: Real GDP growth and contributions 
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After seven years of correction, housing prices 
seem to be bottoming out. The cumulative fall 
between Q3-2007 and Q1-2014 amounted to 
36.2 % in nominal terms. Some indicators suggest 
that housing prices might have bottomed out in 
2014, and residential investment is foreseen to start 
growing again in 2015. However, the large stock 
of unsold houses limits the potential for fast price 
increases. The housing market and the construction 
sector are discussed in detail in section 3.2. 
Deleveraging by the private sector remains on 
track, but is far from complete. Credit 
contraction continues to be the main driver behind 
the reduction in private sector indebtedness, while, 
contrary to previous years, positive nominal GDP 
growth did not hinder deleveraging in 2014 (Graph 
2.2). Negative inflation did impede a faster 
aggregate adjustment though. Recent data show 
some deceleration of credit contraction and that 
aggregate deleveraging is to some extent taking 
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place selectively, with the financial sector ready to 
fund healthier corporations with positive growth 
prospects. Both households and non-financial 
corporations are expected to maintain positive net 
lending positions (Graph 1.3) even when 
consumption and investment are forecast to keep 
registering relatively high growth rates. 
Graph 1.2: Breakdown of debt by sector (non-
consolidated) 
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While the annual public deficit continues on a 
declining trend, overall public debt will keep 
rising. Public finances continued to improve in 
2014, and, according to the Commission winter 
2015 economic forecast, the deficit for the year as 
a whole would narrow to around 4.5 % of GDP, 
net of bank recapitalisations in both years. Going 
forward, the deficit reduction relies more on the 
improving economic outlook than additional 
consolidation measures. While pension 
expenditure is forecast to continue rising, falling 
unemployment should limit the amount of social 
transfers in the near future. The public debt ratio, 
which increased very rapidly during the financial 
crisis and its aftermath, is expected to continue to 
grow and reach around 102.5 % of GDP by 2016. 
Deleveraging pressures in the private and public 
sectors are also discussed in section 3.2. 
Graph 1.3: Net lending (+)/net borrowing (-) by sector 
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After a sizeable adjustment, the current 
account is expected to have turned negative 
again in 2014, mainly due to weak external 
demand and temporary factors, but is expected 
to post small surpluses in 2015 and 2016. After 
almost two decades of negative balances, the 
current account registered a surplus of 1.5 % of 
GDP in 2013. However, the slowdown of 
emerging economies in the second half of 2013 
added to the deceleration in the EU in the first half 
of 2014, thereby dragging exports. By contrast, 
rising domestic demand fuelled imports, also 
pushed by some transitory factors such as car-
scrapping schemes and retained consumption and 
investment in previous years. This led to a sharp 
deterioration in the trade balance, partly offset by a 
rising surplus in the balance for services. 
Moreover, the balance of primary income was very 
negative due to the large stock of external 
liabilities and rising return of assets in Spain. 
However, the current account balance is set to 
become positive again in the coming years, based 
on a recovery in the trade balance due to a 
combination of higher exports and the decline in 
oil prices.  
Exports are forecast to gain momentum but, 
given their high import content, they will also 
raise imports. The most dynamic demand 
components in 2015 are expected to be exports, as 
a result of ongoing improvements in price and non-
price competitiveness and the projected recovery 
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in Spain's main export markets, and equipment 
investment. As both elements embed a high share 
of imported content, total imports are also 
expected to remain robust.  
Graph 1.4: Breakdown of the change of unit labour costs 
in Spain 
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The process of internal devaluation continues, 
resulting in further progress in price and cost 
competitiveness, but negative euro area 
inflation is hindering the adjustment. The fall in 
domestic demand and soaring unemployment 
experienced during the crisis eased inflationary 
and wage pressures, reversing cost and price 
competitiveness losses that accumulated in the 
boom years vis-à-vis other euro area countries. 
Since 2009, the real effective exchange rates 
(REERs) and nominal unit labour costs have fallen 
by 13.2 % and 4.5 %, respectively. Productivity 
gains, together with ongoing wage moderation 
explain most of progress in restoring price 
competitiveness between 2009 and 2013 (Graph 
1.4). Structural reforms in product and services 
markets are now starting to bear fruit, and have 
contributed to recent improvements in 
competitiveness. However, very low or even 
negative inflation in the euro area might be an 
obstacle for further progress in restoring price 
competitiveness even despite wage moderation in 
Spain. Headline inflation was negative and core 
inflation fell to around zero in the second half of 
2014. Negative headline inflation rates are 
expected to prevail over most of 2015 and to 
remain very low thereafter. 
Spain's export capacity has improved. Exports 
have increased due to both the increase in the 
number of exporting companies, and the value 
exported by exporting company. Considering the 
fixed costs associated with penetration in foreign 
markets, it is unlikely that these gains will be 
reversed easily in the near future. Moreover, a 
noticeable geographical diversification has taken 
place, which helped sustain Spanish exports in the 
run-up to, and during, the crisis. 
Despite the sizeable current account adjustment 
in recent years, the net international investment 
position as a ratio of GDP deteriorated slightly 
more because of negative valuation effects. 
While this reflects increased confidence in the 
Spanish economic outlook, the high level of 
external debt (especially in the form of loans) 
remains a source of concern, as it leaves the 
economy highly vulnerable to negative shocks. 
The external performance and overall 
competitiveness are discussed in detail in section 
3.1. 
Graph 1.5: Share of employment in tradable and non-
tradable sectors 
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The adjustment process has produced a sharp 
change in the composition of employment and 
value added. In relative terms, tradable sectors as 
a proportion of value added have interrupted their 
long declining trend and the same applies when 
looking at total employment (Graph 1.5). The 
change in the sectorial composition of the 
economy was mainly driven by the collapse of the 
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construction sector and real estate development 
and to a lesser extent by the downsizing of the 
financial sector (this mainly in value added terms).  
Employment growth was been stronger than 
expected during 2014, and the unemployment 
rate - although it remains very high - decreased 
in 2014 for the first time since 2007. As the 
Spanish economy gathered pace during the course 
of 2014, job creation responded positively, in part 
due to the increased flexibility introduced by 
labour market reforms enacted in recent years, and 
also to wage moderation. Activity rates increased 
(albeit slightly) for all age groups, including the 
young, and the rate of young people not in 
employment, education or training, remains 
broadly stable (Graph 1.6). However, the very high 
unemployment rate, namely youth and long-term 
unemployment, and elevated segmentation, remain 
major challenges.  
Graph 1.6: Labour market indicators 
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High structural unemployment rates have 
negative consequences on employability, skills 
development, social conditions and wage 
developments. Sustained high structural 
unemployment rates could bring upward wage 
pressures in the medium term, which could reverse 
gains in competitiveness achieved in recent years 
and bring to a halt the necessary external 
adjustment process. Moreover, after a period of 
substantial increases, productivity is only expected 
to record modest increases in the coming years, 
resulting in less a favourable evolution of unit 
labour costs. Therefore, enhancing labour 
productivity growth is essential to preserve 
competitiveness.  
Social indicators have seen a drastic 
deterioration since the crisis, although the 
recent positive evolution of labour markets may 
lead to some improvement over the coming 
years. The percentage of the population at-risk-of-
poverty (1) and at-risk-of-poverty or social 
exclusion (2) rose sharply between 2007 and 2012 
(Graph 1.7). It is estimated that 12.6 million 
people were at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
in 2013. (3) 
Graph 1.7: Poverty indicators in Spain 
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(1) At-risk-of poverty rate (AROP): share of people with 
disposable income below 60 % of the national median 
income. 
(2) People at-risk-of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE): are 
individuals who are at-risk-of poverty (AROP) and/or 
suffering from severe material deprivation (SMD) and/or 
living in household with zero or very low work intensity 
(LWI).  
(3) The methodology on income based indicators (AROP and 
AROPE) changed in Spain in 2013, making difficult the 
comparison with previous years. The indicators on material 
deprivation and people living in household with low work 
intensity are not affected by this methodological change. 
  
7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Box 1.1: Economic surveillance process 
The Commission’s Annual Growth Survey, adopted in November 2014, started the 2015 European Semester,
proposing that the EU pursue an integrated approach to economic policy built around three main pillars: boosting
investment, accelerating structural reforms and pursuing responsible growth-friendly fiscal consolidation. The 
Annual Growth Survey also presented the process of streamlining the European Semester to increase the
effectiveness of economic policy coordination at the EU level through greater accountability and by encouraging
greater ownership by all actors. 
In line with streamlining efforts this Country Report includes an In-Depth Review — as per Article 5 of Regulation 
no. 1176/2011 — to determine whether macroeconomic imbalances still exist, as announced in the Commission’s
Alert Mechanism Report published on November 2014. 
Based on the 2014 IDR for Spain published in March 2014, the Commission concluded that Spain was experiencing
macroeconomic imbalances requiring specific monitoring and decisive policy action, in particular, developments in
the areas of household debt, linked to the high levels of mortgage debt and structural characteristics of the housing
market, as well as unfavourable developments in export market shares. 
This Country Report includes an assessment of progress towards the implementation of the 2014 country-specific 
recommendations adopted by the Council in July 2014. The country-specific recommendations for Spain concerned 
public finances and taxation, financial sector reform and access to finance, labour market reforms, youth policies,
education and training, social inclusion, product and services markets reforms, network industries, and the reforms of
public administration and the judiciary. 
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Table 1.1: Key economic, financial and social indicators 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Real GDP (y-o-y) 1.1 -3.6 0.0 -0.6 -2.1 -1.2 1.4 2.3 2.5
Private consumption (y-o-y) -0.7 -3.6 0.3 -2.0 -2.9 -2.3 2.3 2.7 2.6
Public consumption (y-o-y) 5.9 4.1 1.5 -0.3 -3.7 -2.9 0.5 0.3 0.1
Gross fixed capital formation (y-o-y) -3.9 -16.9 -4.9 -6.3 -8.1 -3.8 3.2 4.7 5.2
Exports of goods and services (y-o-y) -0.8 -11.0 9.4 7.4 1.2 4.3 4.5 5.4 6.0
Imports of goods and services (y-o-y) -5.6 -18.3 6.9 -0.8 -6.3 -0.5 7.7 6.9 6.7
Output gap 1.4 -3.3 -4.4 -5.5 -7.2 -7.7 -6.1 -3.9 -1.9
Contribution to GDP growth:
Domestic demand (y-o-y) -0.5 -6.2 -0.7 -2.7 -4.2 -2.7 2.0 2.6 2.6
Inventories (y-o-y) 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
Net exports (y-o-y) 1.6 2.8 0.5 2.1 2.2 1.4 -0.8 -0.3 0.0
Current account balance (% of GDP), balance of payments -9.3 -4.3 -3.9 -3.2 -0.3 1.4 . . .
Trade balance (% of GDP), balance of payments -5.1 -1.1 -1.3 -0.2 1.6 3.4 . . .
Terms of trade of goods and services (y-o-y) -2.4 5.1 -2.3 -3.7 -1.5 1.5 -0.7 1.8 -0.2
Net international investment position (% of GDP) -79.3* -93.8* -89.1* -91.4* -90.0 -92.6 . . .
Net external debt (% of GDP) 76.2* 88.3* 92.0* 94.6* 91.6* 89.7* . . .
Gross external debt (% of GDP) 153.7* 167.9* 164.0* 166.7* 167.9* 159.7* . . .
Export performance vs advanced countries (% change over 5 years) -4.6 -1.3 -4.4 -0.2 -8.3 -2.6 . . .
Export market share, goods and services (%) 2.1 2.2 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.9 . . .
Savings rate of households (net saving as percentage of net disposable 
income) 2.6 9.5 4.6 6.0 3.5 4.9 . . .
Private credit flow, consolidated, (% of GDP) 11.9 -1.4 0.9 -4.2 -9.9 -10.8 . . .
Private sector debt, consolidated (% of GDP) 196.6 202.4 201.5 195.3 184.8 172.1 . . .
Deflated house price index (y-o-y) -4.8 -5.6 -3.6 -9.9 -16.9 -10.4 . . .
Residential investment (% of GDP) 10.4 8.1 6.9 5.7 5.0 4.3 . . .
Total financial sector liabilities, non-consolidated (y-o-y) -3.2 4.6 -3.7 -1.0 -1.7 -3.6 . . .
Tier 1 ratio1 . . . . . . . . .
Overall solvency ratio2 . . . . . . . . .
Gross total doubtful and non-performing loans (% of total debt 
instruments and total loans and advances)2
. . . . . . . . .
Change in employment (number of people, y-o-y) 0.2 -6.3 -1.7 -2.5 -3.7 -2.6 1.5 2.1 2.3
Unemployment rate 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.3 22.5 20.7
Long-term unemployment rate (% of active population) 2.0 4.3 7.3 8.9 11.0 13.0 . . .
Youth unemployment rate (% of active population in the same age group) 24.5 37.7 41.5 46.2 52.9 55.5 53.2 . .
Activity rate (15-64 year-olds) 72.7 73.1 73.5 73.9 74.3 74.3 . . .
Young people not in employment, education or training (%) 14.3 18.1 17.8 18.2 18.6 18.6 . . .
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (% of total population) 24.5 24.7 26.1 26.7 27.2 27.3 . . .
At-risk-of-poverty rate (% of total population) 20.8 20.4 20.7 20.6 20.8 20.4 . . .
Severe material deprivation rate (% of total population) 3.6 4.5 4.9 4.5 5.8 6.2 7.0 . .
Number of people living in households with very low work-intensity (% 
of total population aged below 60) 6.6 7.6 10.8 13.4 14.3 15.7 . . .
GDP deflator (y-o-y) 2.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 -0.7 0.2 1.0
Harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) (y-o-y) 4.1 -0.2 2.0 3.1 2.4 1.5 -0.2 -1.0 1.1
Nominal compensation per employee (y-o-y) 6.8 4.4 1.1 0.9 -0.6 1.7 0.5 0.7 0.8
Labour productivity (real, person employed, y-o-y) 0.9 2.9 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.4 . . .
Unit labour costs (ULC) (whole economy, y-o-y) 5.9 1.6 -1.6 -1.1 -3.0 -0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.3
Real unit labour costs (y-o-y) 3.7 1.4 -1.8 -1.2 -3.2 -1.1 0.5 0.0 -0.7
REER3) (ULC, y-o-y) 4.4 -1.0 -3.9 -1.3 -6.6 0.2 -0.9 -2.4 -0.4
REER3) (HICP, y-o-y) 0.5 1.1 -4.0 0.4 -1.8 1.5 0.4 -2.3 -0.7
General government balance (% of GDP) -4.4 -11.0 -9.4 -9.4 -10.3 -6.8 -5.6 -4.5 -3.7
Structural budget balance (% of GDP) . . -7.0 -6.2 -3.5 -2.2 -2.1 -2.3 -2.7
General government gross debt (% of GDP) 39.4 52.7 60.1 69.2 84.4 92.1 98.3 101.5 102.5
Forecast
(1) Domestic banking groups and stand-alone banks. 
(2) Domestic banking groups and stand-alone banks, foreign-controlled (EU and non-EU) subsidiaries and branches. 
(3) Real effective exchange rate 
(*) Indicates BPM5 and/or ESA95 
 
Source: European Commission, 2015 winter forecast; ECB 
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Table 1.2: The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure scoreboard 
Thresholds 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
3 year average -4%/6% -9.5 -8.1 -6.3 -4.3 -2.5 -0.7
p.m.: level year - -9.6 -4.8 -3.9 -3.2 -0.3 1.4
-35% -79.3 -93.8 -89.1 -91.4 -90.0 -92.6
% change (3 years) ±5% & ±11% 5.2 4.6 -0.3 -2.5 -5.3 -0.4
p.m.: % y-o-y change - 2.5 0.4 -3.1 0.2 -2.4 1.9
% change (5 years) -6% -13.6 -7.1 -10.5 -8.6 -15.2 -7.1
p.m.: % y-o-y change - -4.9 3.5 -9.1 -0.6 -5.6 4.4
% change (3 years) 9% & 12% 13.7 11.8 5.7 -1.2p -5.6p -4.6p
p.m.: % y-o-y change - 5.7 1.6 -1.6 -1.1p -2.9p -0.6p
6% -4.8 -5.8 -3.6 -10.1 -16.8 -9.9
14% 12.0 -1.4 0.9 -4.2p -9.9p -10.7p
133% 196.6 202.4 201.5 195.3p 184.8p 172.2p
60% 39.4 52.7 60.1 69.2 84.4 92.1
3-year average 10% 9.3 12.5 16.4 19.7 22.0 24.1
p.m.: level year - 11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1
16.5% 2.8 4.6 -2.3 3.1 2.8 -10.2
Internal imbalances
Deflated House Prices (% y-o-y change)
Private Sector Credit Flow as % of GDP, consolidated
Private Sector Debt as % of GDP, consolidated
General Government Sector Debt as % of GDP
Unemployment Rate
Total Financial Sector Liabilities (% y-o-y change)
External imbalances 
and competitiveness
Current Account 
Balance (% of GDP)
Net international investment position (% of GDP)
Real effective exchange 
rate (REER) 
(42 industrial countries - 
HICP deflator)
Export Market shares
Nominal unit labour 
costs (ULC)
Flags: e: estimated. p: provisional.           
Note: Figures highlighted are the ones falling outside the threshold established by EC Alert Mechanism Report. For REER and 
ULC,  the first threshold concerns Euro Area Member States.  
(1) Figures in italic are according to the old standards (ESA95/BPM5).  
(2) Export market shares data: the total world export is based on the 5th edition of the Balance of Payments Manual (BPM5). 
(3) House Price indicator: e = Eurostat estimates. 
 
Source: European Commission 
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The sizeable current account deficits 
accumulated during the expansionary phase led 
to a sharp increase in external debt. Slack 
financial conditions led investment expenditures 
by households and non-financial corporations to 
expand significantly. A great deal of this went into 
residential investment, bringing about a brisk 
increase in the prices of dwellings and a worrying 
housing bubble. Buoyant growth in domestic 
demand coupled with increasing resources diverted 
to non-tradable sectors fuelled imports, while 
exports could not keep pace. At the same time, fast 
growing domestic demand brought about sustained 
wage and price increases which, combined with 
subdued productivity growth, translated into a 
sharp deterioration of competitiveness. 
Nevertheless, the resulting current account deficit 
was easily financed by foreign capital inflows 
(mainly debt) due to the disappearance of the 
country risk premium, despite the large 
accumulation of foreign liabilities.  
Graph 2.1.1: Evolution of price competitiveness in Spain 
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The outbreak of the financial crisis precipitated 
the burst of the housing bubble, while 
prompting a sharp current account adjustment. 
The collapse of domestic demand dragged down 
Spanish imports of goods and services down from 
31.7 % of GDP in 2007 to 28.1 % in 2013. In turn, 
exports of goods and services, which had already 
performed remarkably well in the run-up to the 
crisis despite accumulating price competitiveness 
losses, rose from 25.7 % to 31.6 % of GDP over 
the same period. This was a result of both the 
contraction of GDP and the improvement in 
competitiveness indicators, in particular the drop 
in unit labour costs (Graph 2.1.1).  
Despite the sizeable adjustment in the current 
account, the negative net international 
investment position (NIIP) keeps increasing and 
remains a major risk. From a peak deficit of 
9.6 % of GDP in 2007, the current account turned 
into a surplus of 1.5 % of GDP in 2013. However, 
the adjustment in the current account has not yet 
translated into a reduction of external liabilities. 
The net international investment position 
deteriorated sharply until 2009 and has remained 
since then at around 15 percentage points higher 
than before the crisis (Graph 2.1.2). Despite a 
positive net lending position of the economy vis-à-
vis the rest of the world in 2013 of 2.1 % of GDP, 
the negative net international investment position 
rose further by more than 5 percentage points, to 
above 95 % of GDP as a result of valuation effects 
that partly reflect an improvement of investor's 
confidence.  
Graph 2.1.2: Breakdown of the net international 
investment position 
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A significant negative net international 
investment position is a cause of concern as it 
exposes Spain to adverse shocks or shifts in 
market confidence. Reducing the large stock of 
external liabilities would require Spain to record 
larger current account surpluses than at present 
over sustained periods of time. Even under 
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relatively benign growth and inflation scenarios, 
Spain would still need to achieve a record current 
account surplus of 1.7 % of GDP on average over 
the 2014-24 period in order to halve its NIIP-to-
GDP ratio by 2024. This compares to the 0.1 % 
deficit and 0.6 % surplus forecast for 2014 and 
2015, respectively.  
The adjustment in the current account stems 
mainly from the trade balance of goods. The 
improvement in the current account balance was 
due to both a higher surplus in the balance of 
services and, more importantly, a reduction in the 
trade deficit of goods. Although the trade balance 
of goods remained in deficit, the correction 
between 2007 and 2013 amounted to 7.4 
percentage points of GDP (see Graph 2.1.3).  
Graph 2.1.3: Adjustment in the current account 
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The Spanish exports-to-GDP ratio is similar to 
other large euro-area economies. While still well 
below the figure for Germany, Spanish exports of 
goods as a percentage of GDP in 2013 (22.3 %) are 
in line with those in France or Italy, and above the 
UK. Moreover, at 9.3 % of GDP in 2013, exports 
of services were above the levels in the largest 
euro area economies and stood close to the UK 
(11.9 % of GDP).  
Since the crisis, Spanish market shares of world 
exports have advanced relatively better in terms 
of volumes rather than values, outperforming 
most other major EU economies. The Spanish 
market share of world exports of goods in value 
terms (nominal) decreased by only 0.1 percentage 
points since 2007, to 1.7 %, whereas more sizeable 
declines were observed in most euro area and EU 
economies, including the largest ones. Advanced 
countries’ nominal shares of world exports tend to 
evolve relatively better than real shares. As 
competition in more standard products intensifies, 
these countries usually export more sophisticated 
and high-quality products characterised by higher 
unit-values. This was also the case of Spain before 
2007, where export shares fell more in volumes 
(real) than in value (nominal) terms, partly due to 
increasing export prices. However, since the 
outbreak of the crisis, the world market share of 
Spanish exports in volumes has remained broadly 
constant, indicating that exports in volume have 
behaved relatively better than in values, and that 
there has been an implicit reduction in unit values 
of exports (Graph 2.1.4). This suggests both 
structural competitiveness gains derived from price 
and wage moderation and a trend towards exports 
of products of medium and medium-low quality. 
Despite the overall positive evolution of the 
external sector in recent years, the current 
account surplus is forecast to have turned into a 
deficit of 0.1 % of GDP in 2014. The slowdown 
in the euro area, along with the deceleration of 
emerging economies that started in the second half 
of 2013, has weakened the external demand for 
Spanish exports, despite which exports keep 
registering relatively high growth rates (4.6 % 
year-on-year in Q3-2014). Given that more than 
half of Spanish exports are destined to the euro 
area, with exports to France, Italy, and Portugal 
combined accounting for almost 30 % of total 
exports, negative inward spillovers to the Spanish 
economy from the slowdown of the euro area have 
been significant. At the same time, strong domestic 
demand keeps pushing imports, which grew by 
8.2 % year-on-year in the third quarter. This is due 
to strong growth in private consumption and 
investment, but also to the high dependence of 
Spanish industry on imports of intermediate and 
energy goods and technology, as explained in 
section 3.1.3. Accordingly, the positive growth 
contribution from the external sector turned 
negative again in 2014, resulting in a current 
account deficit of EUR 3.6 bn. until November, 
compared with the EUR 12.3 bn. surplus over the 
same period of 2013.  
  
13 
Graph 2.1.4: Market shares in world exports of goods in 
the main EU economies in volume and in 
value (2000=100) 
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However, the current account is forecast to 
record a surplus again in 2015. Short-term 
prospects are that the deterioration observed in 
2014 could be temporary. According to the 
Commission winter 2015 economic forecast, the 
current account will register surpluses of around 
0.6 % and 0.5 % of GDP in 2015 and 2016 
respectively, based on the envisaged recovery of 
Spanish external markets, which, jointly with 
ongoing competitiveness gains would push exports 
up. Likewise, the fall in oil prices are set to 
alleviate the energy bill, while transitory factors — 
such as some retained demand during the crisis and 
the incentives to buy motor vehicles that explained 
the brisk pick-up in imports in 2014 — should 
phase out. 
Although much of the current account 
adjustment has been permanent, the cyclically 
adjusted current account remains in deficit. In 
cyclically-adjusted terms, the current account 
deficit narrowed significantly until 2013, 
indicating that most of the external adjustment has 
been of a structural nature. This said, the non-
cyclical current account remains in deficit, and 
worsened somewhat in 2014. This fact highlights 
the problem that the Spanish economy typically 
brings about current account deficits in recovery 
and expansionary phases. This trend seems to 
prevail. 
The adjustment in the current account brought 
the economy back to net lending vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world. From a net borrowing peak of 
9.2 % of GDP in 2007, Spain registered a net 
lending of 2.1 % of GDP in 2013. This was in 
parallel with the private sector also moving from 
net borrowing to net lending positions, partly 
offset by the net borrowing recorded by the general 
government.  
Drivers of export performance 
Despite accumulating competitiveness losses 
over the expansion phase, Spanish exports have 
proved quite resilient. The real effective 
exchange rate recorded a sustained appreciation 
between 2001 and 2007. This was due to both 
nominal effective exchange rate appreciation and 
persistently positive inflation and unit labour costs 
differentials. Notwithstanding such price 
competitiveness losses, the loss of export market 
share in real  terms (volumes) was less acute than 
in the main EU economies, as discussed in the 
previous section (Graph 2.1.5), in a context of 
global increases of world trade flows. 
Graph 2.1.5: Changes in share of exports of goods in EU 
economies (volume) 
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Resilience of exports is closely linked to 
progressive openness to international trade 
flows. At the beginning of the previous decade the 
European market was by far the main destination 
for Spanish exports of goods, with 60 % going to 
the euro area and around 12 % to other EU 
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economies. While exports to European markets 
remained the lion's share, this geographical pattern 
started to show significant changes towards a 
higher degree of international diversification 
(Graph 2.1.6) after the outbreak of the crisis. The 
share of exports in value going to the euro area 
declined by some 7 percentage points since 2007 
as other destinations gained prominence. Exports 
to the emerging and growth-leading economies 
(EAGLEs) have been the most dynamic, rising by 
almost 1.5 percentage points since 2007, from 
6.8 % to some 8.2 % in 2014. Accordingly, this 
geographical diversification contributes to 
explaining why Spain benefited from the increase 
in world trade, and managed to partly offset losses 
in price/cost competitiveness in the run-up to the 
crisis. 
Graph 2.1.6: Geographical specialisation of Spanish 
exports 
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Spain has benefited from the growth in world 
trade in recent years. The elasticity of Spanish 
exports of goods with respect to world income 
growth (which is an important factor behind the 
growth in world trade) is above 1, in line with 
estimates for other advanced economies.(4)  In the 
                                                          
(4) Evidence on income and price elasticities of imports and 
exports can be found in: Buisán, A., Caballero, J.C. and 
Jiménez, N., Determinación de las exportaciones de 
manufacturas en los países de la UEM a partir de un 
modelo de oferta-demanda' Boletín Económico, Banco de 
España, (2003) and Martínez Mongay, C. and Maza, L.Á., 
Competitiveness and growth in EMU: the role of the 
external sector in the adjustment of the Spanish economy 
Economic Papers 355, European Economy, (2009); García, 
case of Spain, this is usually associated with its 
opening to international trade flows and its 
reorientation to products with medium-high 
technological content, with typically higher 
income elasticity than products embedding a lower 
technological content. 
Price competitiveness gains during the crisis 
have played a positive but limited role to 
explain recent improvements. Spanish exports of 
goods have a relatively high (negative) long-term 
relative price elasticity compared with other 
advanced economies. Nevertheless, the real 
exchange rate typically explains well below 10 % 
of the variance in (country-specific) exports, as 
opposed to world trade, which explains about 
80 %.(5) The remaining residual at some 10 % is 
deemed to capture other unspecified factors (non-
cost determinants), which may have more than 
compensated the dynamics of relative costs and 
prices. 
The performance of services exports has also 
been positive. Spain's share in global exports of 
services is significantly greater than its share in 
exports of goods (3.3 % against 1.6 % in 2012), 
mainly on account of its large tourism sector. The 
share of Spain in world tourism has been 
decreasing in the last decade as its tourism model 
relies mainly on coastal seasonal tourism, which is 
subject to increasing competition from cheaper 
destinations. However, Spain has been able to 
expand its world share of exports in other services 
                                                                                   
C., Gordo, E., Martínez Martín, J. and Tello, P., Una 
actualización de las funciones de importación y 
exportación de la economía española, Banco de España, 
Documentos Ocasionales, 0905, (2009); Murata, K., 
Turner, D., Rae, D. and Le Fouler, L., 'Modelling 
Manufacturing Export Volumes Equations: A System 
Estimation Approach', OECD Economic Department 
Working Papers, n.º 235, (2000); Ortega, E., Burriel, P., 
Fernández, J.L., Ferraz, E. and Hurtado, S., Actualización 
del Modelo Trimestral del Banco de España, Documentos 
de Trabajo, n.º 0717, Banco de España, (2007); Orsini, K., 
Imports' adjustment in Spain: cyclical or structural?, 
ECFIN Country Focus, European Commission (2015, 
forthcoming).. Hooper, P., Johnson, K. and Márquez, J., 
Trade elasticities for G-7 countries, International 
Economics, 87, Princeton Studies, (2000) provides 
international evidence for these elasticities. 
(5) Crespo Rodríguez, A., Pérez-Quirós, G. and Segura 
Cayuela R., Competitiveness Indicators: The Importance of 
an Efficient Allocation of Resources, Banco de España, 
Economic Bulletin, January, pp. 103-111, (2012). They 
also provide evidence that bigger firms typically export a 
higher proportion of their production. 
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– mainly services to businesses – characterised by 
higher value added and possibly higher future 
growth potential (Graph 2.1.7). The share of 
turnover in foreign markets increased in most 
subsectors related to services to businesses, 
especially in software publishing, computer 
programming, consultancy and related activities, 
engineering activities and related technical 
consultancy. Significant penetration in foreign 
markets also occurred in accounting, bookkeeping 
and auditing activities, tax consultancy and 
management consultancy activities. Whereas the 
increase in the export markets for goods mainly 
occurred in the emerging and growth-leading 
economies, the expansion of export of services was 
concentrated in North America and in the UK. 
Graph 2.1.7: World market shares for Spanish exports of 
services 
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Much of the positive export performance has 
been due to price and cost competitiveness 
developments in the largest firms. The 
distribution of firms by size typically explains a 
large part of the export penetration of a given 
sector, as bigger firms typically export a higher 
proportion of their production than smaller firms. 
Moreover, over the last decade, largest firms have 
witnessed more favourable unit labour costs 
behaviour due to higher productivity growth. The 
recent price and cost competitiveness gains should 
pave the way for further positive export 
developments in the medium term.  It thus appears 
that the behaviour of large Spanish companies has 
in some instances allowed them to overcome 
structural weaknesses vis-à-vis their peers in other 
countries. For example, the proportion of high-
skilled employees is lower in Spanish firms, 
although the presence of managers with 
international experience and of employees 
participating in training courses is high. In 
addition, the proportion of large Spanish firms that 
invest in R&D is lower, but Spain scores better in 
the generation of process innovations.(6) 
The export base is widening but the small size 
of firms acts as a drag on the export capacity of 
the economy. The extensive margin (i.e. the 
growing number of companies exporting) also 
plays a significant role in explaining the resilience 
of exports. The number of Spanish exporting firms 
grew by around 50 % between 2007 and 2013, 
including regular exporters (those that have 
exported for at least four consecutive years). 
Considering the fixed costs of entering foreign 
markets, these trends are unlikely to reverse. 
However, 70 % of them export only occasionally 
and more than 85 % of total exports are undertaken 
by the largest 5 000 companies. Besides, the small 
average size of Spanish firms compared with their 
European peers is a limiting factor affecting export 
capacity (the intensive margin, or the average 
quantity exported by exporting firms), as larger 
firms tend to be more productive and export a 
higher share of their output.(7) Moreover, and 
contrary to their larger peers, Spanish SMEs 
perform below the EU average in terms of product/ 
process innovations, according to the European 
Commission 2014 Innovation Union Scoreboard.  
The high price-elasticity of Spanish exports 
reveals a specialisation pattern skewed towards 
labour-intensive products but with medium-
high technological content. High price elasticity 
is typically associated to a high share of labour-
intensive industries, are usually more sensitive to 
relative price developments. Despite the large 
share of food and primary products, Spanish 
exports of goods are mainly concentrated on 
                                                          
(6) Antras, P, Segura Cayuela, R. and Rodríguez Rodríguez, 
D., Firms in International Trade (with an Application to 
Spain), SERIEs Invited Lecture at the XXXV Simposium 
of the Spanish Economic Society, (2010). 
(7) Altomonte, C., Barba Navaretti, G., di Mauro F. and 
Ottaviano, G., Assessing competitiveness: how firm-level 
data can help, Bruegel Policy Contribution, No 16, (2011); 
Correa Lopez, M. and Doménech R., The 
Internationalisation of Spanish Firms, BBVA Working 
Papers, No 12/30, (2012).  
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intermediate goods, the bulk of which are chemical 
products (around 14 % of total exports), equipment 
goods (transport equipment amounts to some 5 % 
of total exports), and motor vehicles, whose 
importance is on a clearly downward trend (Graph 
2.1.8). Motor vehicles and transport equipment 
account for around 20 % of total exports. While 
Spanish exports in these categories mainly 
correspond to mature demand segments, they 
typically involve medium to medium-high 
technological content (Graph 2.1.9). However, 
when compared to other advanced economies, the 
proportion of exports of high and medium-high 
technology goods, Spain ranks relatively low. 
Moreover, the import content of Spanish exports is 
comparatively high. In sum, the participation of 
Spanish firms in global value chains is lower and 
predominantly passive (as a recipient of inward 
foreign direct investment flows). 
Graph 2.1.8: Structure of Spanish exports of goods 
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Spain is also specialized in exports of medium-
low quality products. Despite their technological 
content, the quality of Spanish exports of goods 
ranks relatively low compared with other EU and 
OECD countries (Graph 2.1.10).(8) Furthermore, 
the average quality of Spanish exports decreased in 
relative terms between 2007 and 2011, with such 
decline being especially striking in exports of top-
quality products (Graph 2.1.11). This reduction in 
average quality is likely to be linked to the 
                                                          
(8) Vandenbussche, H., Quality in Exports, European 
Economy, Economic Papers, No 528, (2014).  
increasing presence of small Spanish firms — 
typically less productive — in foreign markets 
during the crisis, which may conceal 
improvements in overall quality. This 'left-hand 
side- skewed quality distribution resembles 
somewhat those of Portugal, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and 
Lithuania in the EU but also China. Cost 
competition is stronger in low and medium-low 
quality segments, which is consistent with the 
relatively high price/cost elasticity estimated for 
Spanish exports. Hence, in order to safeguard the 
resilience of exports with this pattern of 
specialisation, Spain is forced to rely heavily on 
cost and wage moderation, which underscores the 
need to move upwards along the export-quality 
ladder and increase labour productivity. 
Graph 2.1.9: Breakdown of Spanish exports by 
technological content 
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The deceleration in exports in 2014 is explained 
by the slowdown of external demand, but is 
reckoned to be fleeting. After having grown by 
7.3 % in real terms on the year in the second 
quarter of 2013, exports of goods and services 
started to lose momentum, due to the deceleration 
of emerging economies and followed by the main 
euro area economies over the first half of 2014. 
However, price competitiveness gains continued 
on account of the negative growth of unit labour 
costs and very low or even negative inflation. 
Positive signals are observed though. In particular, 
a significant acceleration was observed in the third 
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quarter of 2014, with exports of goods and services 
growing by 4.6 % on the year compared to 1.5 % 
in the preceding quarter. Looking forward, the 
euro depreciation along with the envisaged 
recovery of Spanish external markets should add to 
previously accumulated competitiveness gains, 
thereby paving the way for enhanced export 
performance in the short-to-medium term. 
Graph 2.1.10: Shares of top-quality exports by country 
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Graph 2.1.11: Share of export products by quality rank 
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Drivers of imports 
The decline in final demand during the crisis 
triggered a sizeable fall in imports, although not 
all of this reduction has been of a permanent 
nature. As the crisis entailed a downward 
adjustment of potential output, part of the 
adjustment in imports is deemed to be permanent. 
Despite the fall in domestic demand, the strong 
export resilience sustained imports due to their 
high import content. In constant prices, total 
imports fell by almost 24 % between 2007 and 
2013, while final demand did so by 10.5 %. These 
figures suggest a long-term final demand elasticity 
of imports above 2 (in line with available estimates 
in the literature), which is high compared to the 
main euro area Member States. However, part of 
the reduction in imports may just obey to cyclical 
factors. Recent developments corroborate this 
assessment, as the increase in imports witnessed 
over 2014 has been driven by the incipient 
recovery and the pick-up in final demand. Insofar 
as the recovery becomes firmer, imports are 
expected to remain buoyant, in line with their 
historical pattern.  
The Spanish industry is highly dependent both 
on imports of intermediate and energy goods 
and on technology, which are less responsive to 
relative price developments. The price elasticity 
of imports is rather low (between -0.02 and -0.6). 
The low sensitivity to prices is consistent with a 
high dependency on imports of intermediate goods 
and the structurally elevated dependence on energy 
products (Graph 2.1.12), in particular oil and gas 
as sources of primary energy. Likewise, Spanish 
imports depend considerably on goods involving 
more advanced technological developments, for 
which income elasticity is typically high while 
price elasticity is low. In general, import intensity 
in manufacturing sectors is almost 20 % higher in 
Spain than in the other main euro area 
economies.(9)  In particular, automotive and 
chemical industries, the main export industries in 
Spain, have very high import content (63.3 % and 
54.8 % respectively), mostly intermediate goods. A 
high demand for imported intermediate inputs 
cannot per se be considered as a sign of 
inefficiency in the national industrial sectors. High 
import penetration of intermediate goods could be 
due to a better integration in international value 
chains and a more efficient use of the comparative 
advantages. However, the difference in import 
content compared with the most advanced EU 
                                                          
(9) Gordo, E., Gil, M. and Pérez, M., La industria 
manufacturera española en el contexto europeo, Banco de 
España, Boletín Económico, March, pp. 33-39, (2003); 
Cabrero, A. and Tiana, M., The import content of the 
industrial sectors in Spain, Economic Bulletin, April, 
Banco de España, (2012). 
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economies is especially salient in manufacturing 
industries grouped under the headings of high and 
medium-high technology (Graph 2.1.13), which 
might suggest a structural shortcoming in domestic 
technology.  
Graph 2.1.12: Energy dependency of the Spanish economy 
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Foreign direct investment and the relative 
weight of subsidiaries of foreign firms in 
production can help explain the high import 
dependency. There appears to be a positive 
relationship between foreign direct investment and 
import intensity, and Spain shows by far the 
highest ratio of stock of foreign direct investment 
to GDP amongst large euro area economies 
(almost 55 % in 2014). This seems to be mostly the 
case for the large automotive industry. 
Despite its limited potential, the process of 
internal devaluation could also foster import 
substitution. In particular, if restored 
competitiveness translates into lower prices on 
domestic markets, import substitution could also 
occur — at least for import goods that are subject 
to higher price elasticity. The impact is therefore 
likely to occur more in consumer goods, typically 
more responsive to relative prices, in spite of their 
limited weight in total imports (Graph 2.1.14). 
Graph 2.1.13: Import content of exports of medium-high 
and high technology products 
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Graph 2.1.14: Spanish imports by broad economic 
category 
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Assessing the evolution of competitiveness 
Average company size in Spain is below other 
European countries. Over 90 % of firms are 
micro-firms (less than 9 employees) (Graph 
2.1.15). More than half of workers in Spain are 
employed in small companies (below 50 
employees) compared to 23 % in Germany and 
32 % in France. This applies to both the 
manufacturing and services sector. Sectorial 
specialisation may partly explain the average firm 
size, but there is evidence that institutional and 
technological factors also influence the size of 
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firms.(10) Indeed, Spanish SMEs provide almost 
three quarters of all private sector jobs and 64 % of 
value added, rates that significantly surpass the EU 
average. This is in particular because of the group 
of microenterprises that account for 40 % of the 
Spanish private sector workforce and 28 % of 
value added.  
Graph 2.1.15: Average industrial firm size in Spain (2011) 
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The small size of Spanish firms plays a decisive 
role in explaining lower productivity. Very small 
companies tend to be characterised by lower levels 
of productivity than larger ones (Graph 2.1.16), as 
the latter invest more in R&D, especially in sectors 
in which scale effects are more important, such as 
manufacturing. Moreover, larger companies may 
also benefit more from investments in information 
and communications technologies. Hence, an 
increase in firms' size could spur aggregate 
productivity growth.  
Economic policy has actively supported, in 
Spain and elsewhere, the creation, survival and 
expansion of small and medium sized 
companies (SMEs). Policy intervention aims at 
addressing market failures for those 
companies, such as difficulties in accessing credit 
and their lack of resources to optimise their tax 
burden. This should not come as a big surprise. 
SME represent a sizeable share of overall business 
                                                          
(10) Kumar, K.B., Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L., What 
Determines Firm Size, NBER Working Papers, No. 7208, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, (1999). 
activity. The employment creation of small firms 
(by both new firms and of small established firms) 
in Spain is much larger than their corresponding 
share in employment, a pattern that broadly holds 
across sectors.(11) However, new Spanish firms 
seem to grow more slowly than in other European 
countries. The high proportion of small firms and 
the low presence of larger businesses might 
therefore reflect two features: start-ups are often 
small and there is a large proportion of more 
mature businesses that do not grow.   
Graph 2.1.16: Labour productivity distribution by firm size 
class (2011) 
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The challenge for SMEs policy is to support 
company creation while at the same time setting 
out the conditions for company growth. To this 
end, easing the barriers for businesses to be 
created, operate and grow, would result in 
increased investment and growth opportunities. 
This would support the ongoing internal and 
external rebalancing process by facilitating the 
reallocation of resources from the non-tradable to 
the tradable sectors of the economy, thereby 
enhancing economic efficiency.(12)  
                                                          
(11) López García, P. Puente, S. and Gómez, Á.L.,, Employment 
generation by small firms in Spain, Banco de España. 
Documentos ocasionales no. 0903, (2009). 
(12) Almunia, M. and D. Lopez-Rodriguez, (2013), Firms’ 
Responses to Tax Enforcement Strategies: Evidence from 
Spain, MPRA Paper, No. 44153, University Library of 
Munich; Garicano, L., C. Lelarge and J. Van Reenen 
(2012), Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity 
Distribution: Evidence from France, CEP Discussion 
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Investment in equipment and other products 
evidences the reallocation of resources towards 
tradable sectors, thereby paving the way for a 
more sustained growth model. In the run-up to 
the crisis Spanish growth relied excessively on the 
production of non-traded goods, especially 
construction and real estate activities, with small 
contributions to overall productivity growth. This 
pattern implied an inefficient allocation of 
resources that precluded funds from flowing into 
activities with a higher value added and hampered 
a more dynamic export performance. The brisk 
adjustment undergone by the housing market has 
entailed an implicit reallocation of resources 
towards tradable sectors (Graph 2.1.17) and to 
investment in equipment and others, as opposed to 
construction, which should underpin export 
performance and external rebalancing 
Graph 2.1.17: Evolution of the share of tradable sectors 
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The cyclical component of the current account 
remains important. Insofar as the fall in demand 
is itself permanent, a part of the corresponding fall 
in imports observed in previous years can be 
considered as permanent. Yet, the output gap 
remains very high, at -6.1 % of potential GDP 
according to the Commission autumn 2014 
economic forecast. Based on these estimates, the 
cyclically adjusted current account balance would 
amount to -1.2 % of GDP in 2014, compared to the 
                                                                                   
Papers, No. 1128, Centre for Economic Performance, 
London School of Economics and Political Science. 
envisaged headline deficit of 0.1 % of GDP (Graph 
2.1.18). These estimates are subject to some 
uncertainty related to the estimation of potential 
output and might therefore underestimate the 
potential for a rebound in imports when demand 
firms up further and/or potential output growth 
reverts to normal values.  
Further reforms aimed at enhancing labour 
productivity are essential for a faster current 
account adjustment. The still underlying current 
account deficit unveils structural weaknesses in 
Spanish competitiveness, linked to high import 
dependency but also to insufficient export 
penetration. Therefore, stepping up the pace of the 
reform agenda in the areas of business 
environment, and in labour and product markets 
would help overcoming such weaknesses, while 
leading to more balanced growth in recovery 
phases. 
Graph 2.1.18: Non-cyclical current account balance 
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Income balance, capital transfers and 
financial account 
Spain has traditionally recorded a negative 
income balance with the rest of the world, 
reflecting a large negative net international 
investment position (NIIP). After peaking in 
2008, the negative contribution of the income 
balance to the current account has decreased by 
three quarters, reaching -0.7 % of GDP in 2013, 
mainly driven by lower return on foreign portfolio 
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investments on Spanish assets in the 2008-13 
period.  
The income balance is expected to deteriorate 
slightly in 2014, to -1.4 % of GDP. This is the 
consequence of several offsetting effects, one 
driven by lower risk premia on Spanish assets, and 
the another driven by higher returns on assets. On 
the one hand, as a large part of Spain's external 
liabilities are made up of debt instruments, lower 
interest rates have reduced the cost of debt 
servicing. Moreover, the overall level of gross 
external debt during the course of 2013 and 2014 
declined. On the other hand, returns on Spanish 
assets have improved throughout 2013 and 2014, 
thereby raising the overall income assigned to 
remunerate foreign financial assets has increased. 
So far, the 'return on assets effect' has prevailed 
over the 'interest rate effect', resulting in a 
deterioration of the income balance in 2014. Over 
the medium term, the evolution of the income 
balance will mainly depend on the returns on 
Spanish assets held by foreign agents (and the 
return on foreign assets held by Spanish agents), 
and the speed of the reduction in the stock of 
external liabilities. 
The contribution of current transfers to the 
current account has also been negative in Spain 
since the early 2000s, and it is expected to 
remain so. This is mainly the consequence of the 
negative net contribution of workers' remittances, 
reflecting the fact that Spain hosts a large foreign 
population. Over the medium term, the 
contribution of current transfers could deteriorate 
slightly, as the net receipts from the EU budget 
will decrease from 2014 onwards, and as the 
labour market gradually improves, potentially 
resulting in increased migrant workers' remittances 
abroad. The balance of capital transfers has 
traditionally been positive, (about 0.5 percentage 
points of GDP between 2008 and 2013) on account 
of capital transfers from the EU. However, these 
transfers are also likely to decline in absolute and 
relative terms in the years to come. 
In 2014, the Spanish financial account recorded 
a positive value of 1.0 % of GDP, reflecting a 
net lending position vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. In terms of lenders, as Spanish financial 
institutions have gradually regained market access, 
private flows have been flocking again into Spain, 
meaning that the reliance of official flows has been 
reduced even further (Graph 2.1.19).  
Looking at the different components of the 
financial account, it appears that the reduction 
in debt instruments has been substantial. This 
reduction comes mainly from the reduction in 
Target II balances, which have been partly 
compensated with net positive private debt 
inflows. At the same time, the pace of equity flows 
has not changed significantly since 2012. 
Graph 2.1.19: Private and total capital inflows 
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Structure and prospects for the net 
international investment position  
Spain's net international investment position 
continued to deteriorate throughout 2013, until 
reaching almost -100 % of GDP in Q1-2014. 
This deterioration has mainly been driven by 
negative valuation effects, as a consequence of 
rising asset prices in Spain, which have increased 
the value of external liabilities. These have been 
partly offset with by a net lending position vis-à-
vis the rest of the world (see 'net transaction 
effects' in Graph 2.1.20). Much of the increase in 
the net lending position has been achieved through 
a reduction in investment, both by corporations 
and households (mainly residential). In terms of 
financing needs by institutional sector, both 
households and corporations have recorded a 
positive net lending position, which has been 
  
22 
partly offset by a net borrowing position for the 
general government (Graph 2.1.21).   
Graph 2.1.20: Contribution to changes in the NIIP 
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A large share of Spain's external liabilities is 
made of debt, which increases the vulnerability 
to external shocks. These instruments are more 
volatile and sensitive to changes in investor 
confidence, and, unlike equity, they have to be 
serviced regardless of the economic situation of 
the debtor. On the positive side, the net level of 
external debt decreased during the course of 2013 
and 2014 in the context of the ongoing 
deleveraging process in the private sector. 
However, part of this decrease was offset by 
growing public sector debt, resulting in an only 
modest reduction of external debt. Over the 
medium term, the net level of external debt is 
expected to continue on a downward trajectory, as 
deleveraging needs in the private sector are 
estimated to be still significant, and as fiscal 
consolidation limits any further increases in public 
sector external debt.  
Although Spain has improved its external 
position in recent years, further external 
adjustment is needed to put the net 
international investment position (NIIP) on a 
downward trajectory. Even under relatively 
benign growth and inflation scenarios, it would 
call for larger current account surpluses than at 
present to reduce the large negative net 
international investment position by 2024 (Table 
2.1.1). For instance, assuming a baseline scenario 
of a 3.9 % nominal  GDP growth on average over 
the 2015-24 period (an average of 2.2 % real 
growth and 1.7 % GDP deflator per year)(13), it 
would be sufficient for Spain to achieve a 3,7 %  
current account deficit to stabilise its net 
international investment position at -95 % of GDP 
by 2024. However, if it were to bring down its net 
international investment position to -50 % of GDP 
by 2024, Spain would need to achieve a record 
current account surplus of 1.7 % of GDP on 
average over 2014-24. This compares with a 
forecast current account deficit of 0.1 % in 2014, 
and an estimated cyclically adjusted current 
account deficit of -1.2 % in 2014. Under more 
pessimistic scenarios, such as a 2 % nominal GDP 
growth over the same period (for instance, an 
average real GDP growth of 1 % and a GDP 
deflator of 1 %), Spain would need to achieve a 
3 % of GDP current account surplus on average 
over the same period in order to bring down its net 
international investment position to -50 % of GDP. 
These simulations illustrate that Spain is still 
vulnerable to changes in economic conditions, and 
that larger external surpluses need to be achieved 
to bring down decisively its large stock of external 
liabilities. 
Graph 2.1.21: Savings and Investment by Sector 
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(13) European Commission, Fiscal Sustainability Report (2012).  
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Inward, outward and euro area spillovers 
Spanish exports rely heavily on markets where 
growth has been weak in recent years. The three 
largest markets for Spanish exports are France, 
accounting for more than 4.5 % of Spanish GDP, 
Germany (3.4 %) and the UK (also 3.4 %). Exports 
to Italy, Portugal and the United States, are also 
significant, implying that inward spillovers to the 
Spanish economy from the slowdown in some of 
these markets have been significant. 
Spain has a large financial exposure to non-
euro area countries, implying that, beyond price 
effects, it is also exposed to exchange rate 
movements.  Spanish foreign financial assets are 
largest in the UK (17 % of Spanish GDP), but also 
the USA, France and the Netherlands (about 8 % 
of Spanish GDP each). However, Spain also has a 
large exposure to Latin American countries, with a 
combined exposure to Mexico, Chile, Argentina, 
and Brazil of almost 12 % of its GDP.  
Foreign claims of Spanish banks are also the 
largest in non-euro area countries. According to 
BIS data, the Spanish banking sector was highly 
exposed to the UK, with claims worth 
approximately 30 % of Spanish GDP, which were 
concentrated on the non-bank private sector. 
Banking sector exposure to the USA, Brazil and 
Mexico is also high. 
However, most of the main investors in Spain 
are euro area countries, which — given the 
recent overhaul of the euro area architecture, 
including the Banking Union — could be a 
relative shield from sudden capital flow 
reversals (Graph 2.1.22). The main gross investors 
in Spain were France (25 % of Spanish GDP), 
followed by the UK (23 %), Germany (19 %), the 
Netherlands (17 %, including large equity 
investments), and Luxembourg (13 %). As regards 
financing specifically from foreign banking 
sectors, the main players are, once more, France, 
Germany and, to a lesser extent, the UK. 
Graph 2.1.22: Spain's funding dependence on partner 
countries (2012) 
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At the same time, the Spain is a significant 
source of trade and financial outward 
spillovers. The Spanish market is an important 
export destination for Portugal, representing more 
 
Table 2.1.1: Current account and net international investment position scenarios (2015-24) 
Low nominal GDP growth Baseline scenario High nominal GDP growth
 (2% avge. 2015-24) (3,9% avge. 2015-24) (5% avge. 2015-24)
NIIP Stabilisation -1.9 -3.7 -4.6
NIIP at -75% of GDP 0.3 -1.3 -2.2
NIIP at -50% of GDP 3 1.7 0.9
NIIP at -25% of GDP 5.7 4.6 4
(1) The table above shows the current account balance needed to achieve different NIIP values by 2024, based on several 
nominal GDP growth scenarios 
(2) NIIP stabilisation implies a NIIP level of -95 % of GDP by 2024 
(3) These simulations do not take into account REER and valuation effects 
(4) Other assumptions are average yields (nominal effective) over the 2015-24 of 3.1 % for domestic yield, and of 3.5 % for 
foreign  yield 
(5) Domestic yield is the long term interest rate (as in AMECO and long-term projections) 
(6) Euro area / foreign yield is the underlying long-term interest rate on foreign assets, and  the spread "external liability-
domestic yield" is based on the median 2004-12 spread between returns of foreign liabilities and the long-term interest rate  
Source: European Commission Calculation 
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than 6 % of Portuguese GDP and 3% of its value 
added. Large share of service exports to Spain are 
also observed in Luxembourg, Ireland and Malta. 
In turn, gross financial exposures to Spain were 
highest in Ireland (36 % of Irish GDP), the 
Netherlands (29 %), Malta (23 %) and Portugal 
(21 %). Specifically, the exposures of the banking 
sectors of EU countries to the Spanish economy 
are largest for Portugal, at close to 10 % of 
Portuguese GDP, and to a lesser extent the 
Netherlands and France. 
Spain is a major funding partner and investor 
in Portugal and Ireland. Debt and equity claims 
amount to 32 % of Portuguese GDP and 25 % of 
Irish GDP, respectively. Spain is also a significant 
investor in the Netherlands, Hungary, Malta and 
the UK. 
Spillovers from simultaneous growth enhancing 
reforms at the euro area level can be significant 
for all euro area Member States. Structural reforms 
lead to higher aggregate demand, which, if adopted 
simultaneously by all Member States, have a small 
effect on the trade balance. However, they have a 
positive effect for output and employment. 
Medium-term prospects for external 
adjustment 
Although a significant part of the current 
account adjustment is likely to be permanent, 
imports are expected to respond to faster 
growth in the short-to-medium term. Exports 
have been quite resilient helped by the growing 
internationalisation of export companies and 
further geographical diversification. Considering 
the fixed costs of entering foreign markets, these 
trends are unlikely to reverse. The narrowing 
current account surplus during 2014 is explained 
by the slowdown in external markets, but also by 
high import growth linked to the pick-up of final 
demand. In particular, the reallocation of resources 
towards tradable sectors, namely manufacturing, is 
likely to push imports as the import content of 
tradable production is higher than in other non-
tradable sectors such as construction or real estate. 
Accordingly, while current account surpluses are 
envisaged in the medium term, their magnitude 
might not be great.  
Large current account surpluses would be 
needed over long periods of time in order to 
bring down the large stock external liabilities. 
The substantial external financial dependence will 
remain a source of vulnerability, both due to its 
size and its composition (mainly debt). The 
ongoing private sector deleveraging process is 
expected to continue over the medium term, as 
deleveraging needs are still considerable. So far, 
all the external adjustment has been undertaken by 
corporations and households, mainly through a 
reduction in investment, having detrimental effect 
on potential growth. The external adjustment will 
need to be supported by cost dynamics, via higher 
productivity and appropriate wage dynamics. The 
process of internal devaluation would also support 
increased import substitution, although its 
contribution could be limited given the large 
dependency on imports of energy and intermediate 
goods, with typically a lower sensitivity to relative 
prices. In particular, the external reliance on 
imported energy products could be mitigated by 
reforms and tax policies geared to reduce energy 
intensity and the high oil dependence.  
Spain needs to preserve price competitiveness 
gains and enhance production of quality goods. 
Spain is mainly active in in market segments of 
mature demand and low quality, where 
competition is stronger than for high-quality 
products and products embedding a high 
technological content. Therefore, is of the utmost 
importance for Spain to keep production costs, 
including labour costs, under control. In this 
respect, Spain would benefit from moving towards 
higher quality segments by promoting innovation 
further. Quality upgrading would help downplay 
the relevance of cost competitiveness, thereby 
delivering higher mark-ups while allowing higher 
wage increases, for which enhancing labour skills 
is key. Moreover, enhancing R&D and innovation 
would help increase the technological content of 
Spanish manufacturing, while reducing import 
dependency. To this end, legal and economic 
barriers to company growth seem to be key factors 
hindering the export capacity of the Spanish 
economy, both in terms of exports volumes, and in 
terms of unit values. 
2.2. INDEBTEDNESS AND DELEVERAGING 
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The household and corporate sectors are 
reducing their debt overhang. Spain's private 
sector considerably increased its debt burden in the 
years before the crisis. Still in Q3-2014, the total 
stock of private sector debt amounted to 182 % of 
GDP in non-consolidated terms (72.4 % household 
debt and 109.7 % non-financial corporations debt), 
some 36.8 % of GDP lower than the peak in Q2-
2010.(14) Most of the reduction is due to the fall in 
debt of non-financial corporations (NFCs) since 
the peak of 24.5% of GDP (Graph 2.2.1). Credit 
contraction has been the main channel of private 
sector deleveraging, with aggregate bank lending 
on a declining path since 2010. Recent data show 
some deceleration in this contraction and confirm 
previous evidence that aggregate deleveraging is, 
at least to an extent, taking place selectively, with 
the financial sector ready to fund healthier 
corporations with positive growth prospects. On 
the household side, deleveraging continues to 
progress more gradually. Gross disposable 
incomes have been stagnating, also to support 
competitiveness of the Spanish economy and its 
external adjustment. 
In contrast to the private sector, general 
government debt has been on an increasing 
trend. In the wake of the crisis, the private sector 
in Spain moved in a short period from a net 
borrowing to a net lending position, at the same 
time squeezing consumption and investment. In 
order to cushion the social effects of the structural 
adjustment in the economy, the public sector ran 
higher general government deficits leading to an 
increase in the public debt of around 60 percentage 
points of GDP compared with 2007. 
Private sector deleveraging has been going in 
parallel with restructuring in the banking 
sector. The implosion of the real estate bubble 
caused a sharp deterioration in banks asset 
portfolios. Systemic concerns about the banking 
sector and the capacity of the sovereign to support 
it came to a head in the summer of 2012. The 
ensuing financial assistance programme for the 
banking sector set the basis for cleaning up bank 
balance sheets in order to provide new lending to 
the real economy and support the economic 
recovery. Meanwhile, after several years of price 
                                                          
(14) In consolidated terms, the non-financial corporations debt 
decreased from 119 % in Q2-2010 to 95.1 % in Q3-2014. 
Financial derivatives are excluded from debt calculations. 
correction the housing market seems to have 
passed the turning point. 
Graph 2.2.1: Breakdown of debt by sector 
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Financial sector developments 
The burst of the real estate bubble and the 
economic recession that followed has altered 
both the quality and composition of bank assets, 
forcing banks to restructure their activity and 
clean up their balance sheets. In the wake of the 
crisis, lending to non-financial corporations 
contracted especially quickly, and has to a certain 
extent been replaced by the holding of government 
securities.(15) Following the return of confidence 
to the Spanish economy, government financing 
from domestic banks declined gently in Q2/Q3-
2014, although the total stock of credit to the 
private sector was still contracting by 7 % year-on-
year in December 2014. In particular, credit to 
households was declining by around 4.7 % year-
on-year while credit to non-financial corporations 
was still shrinking by about 9.6 % (Graph 2.2.2). 
In line with the economic recovery, the decline in 
lending activity has decelerated in recent months. 
In November 2014, for the first time in more than 
four years, month-on-month growth in the stock of 
loans to firms was observed. Banks managed to 
double their pre-tax profits in the first nine months 
of 2014 relative to the previous year due to lower 
                                                          
(15) Spain's Banks: Boom/Bust and Beyond – a Long-Term 
Perspective of the System, IMF, Spain. Selected Issues, 
July 2014. 
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provisioning following an improvement in asset 
quality. Nevertheless, reduced credit volumes and 
an environment of low interest rates exert a 
downward pressure on bank interest income. The 
future development of the real estate market will 
have an important impact on bank profitability. 
Graph 2.2.2: Bank loans to the private sector 
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In some segments of bank lending, notably 
lending to SMEs, new credit is growing, 
supported by declining nominal interest rates to 
firms. As regards the flow of new lending, a 
steady improvement can be noticed in the case of 
credits below EUR 1 million (a proxy of credit to 
SMEs) which have been growing since Q4-2013. 
()By contrast, the dynamic of new credits of above 
EUR 1 million has still been negative and remains 
volatile, because larger companies have 
increasingly resorted to the issuance of corporate 
bonds and external loans. The demand for loans is 
sensitive to the level of lending rates, and bank 
lending rates to firms have been following a 
downward trend,(16) so a further gradual recovery 
in lending is expected. As higher financing costs 
for SMEs in Spain also reflect sovereign spread, it 
is expected that, with sovereign upgrades, 
corporate ratings will also improve, making banks 
less reluctant to lend at lower rates. 
                                                          
(16) The average interest rate for loans to non-financial 
corporations above EUR 1 million dropped by 67 basis 
points to 2.43% as from April 2013 to November 2014, 
whereas the rate for loans below EUR 1 million recorded a 
bigger decline of around 154 basis points to 4.33% over the 
same period. 
After a steady deterioration in the aftermath of 
the crisis, the average quality of bank assets 
started to improve as of late 2013. The non-
performing loans (NPLs) ratio increased steadily 
between 2008 and 2013, reflecting deterioration in 
the quality of loans after the burst of the real estate 
and construction bubble and the recession that 
followed. Non-performing loans ratios varied 
across different types of loans, with doubtful loans 
representing more than one third of the loan 
portfolio to the real estate and construction 
activities in the beginning of 2014. The total 
volume of doubtful loans reached its peak in late 
2013 and has been declining ever since. As the 
volume of the non-performing loans has been 
falling more rapidly than the total volume of bank 
loans, the non-performing loans ratio decreased 
from 13.6% in December 2013 to 12.7% in 
November 2014, a still high proportion (Graph 
2.2.3). 
Graph 2.2.3: Non-performing loans ratio 
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Banks still seem unwilling to engage more 
actively in the restructuring of their loan 
portfolios. Restructured or refinanced loans 
accounted for 14.2 % of total loans to the private 
sector at the end of June 2014, a rate similar to that 
in March 2013.(17) Based on the classification 
                                                          
(17) The proportion was 12% for large firms and 16% for SMEs 
in March 2013: Financial Stability Report 2013, Banco de 
España, p. 27. 
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/Infor
mesBoletinesRevistas/InformesEstabilidadFinancera/13/IE
F_Ing_Noviembre2013.pdf  
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criteria of Banco de España (BdE), 49.5 % of 
restructured or refinanced loans were classified as 
doubtful, 18.7% as substandard and 31.9% as 
performing loans. Similar to the case of non-
performing loans, refinanced and restructured 
loans show a high degree of concentration in real 
estate (23.3 % in construction and 25.5 % in 
mortgages). 
The liquidity situation and the access to funding 
of the banking sector improved further in 2014. 
After the access of Spanish banks to the interbank 
and wholesale markets was severely curtailed at 
the peak of the crisis in July 2012, the situation has 
gradually normalised, including during 2014. Net 
borrowing from the Eurosystem declined to 
EUR 141bn at the end of December 2014, about 
EUR 61bn less than a year before. The total 
amount of deposits in banks was declining at a rate 
of about 2 % year-on-year in December 2014, but 
due to the faster reduction in the stock of loans, the 
loan-to-deposit ratio of the banking sector 
improved substantially to 91.4 %, around 2.1 
percentage points less than year before. The 
decline in household deposits reflects a recovery in 
consumption and a growing preference for 
alternative investment vehicles, such as mutual and 
pension funds, in a context of low bank deposit 
interest rates. Although banks have regained 
access to wholesale markets, their reliance on this 
source of funds declined due to their favourable 
liquidity situation in the context of reduced 
lending. 
Provisioning needs and financial assets 
impairments were weighing on banks’ earnings 
in recent years, but bank profitability started to 
improve again in the first nine months of 2014. 
Financial assets impairments had a particularly 
negative impact on banks profitability in 2012 
when the banking sector recorded a significant 
loss, but they have been declining since. On the 
other hand, since 2012, bank non-interest income 
was boosted thanks to falling sovereign yields, 
which contributed to capital gains on bank 
holdings of government securities. Spanish banks 
increased their profits in the first nine months of 
2014 in year-on-year terms, mainly due to an 
improved profitability in the first quarter of the 
year. Improved earnings were driven primarily by 
a further reduction in financial asset impairment 
compared with the first half of 2013 (Graph 2.2.4). 
Operating income before provisioning was similar 
to the previous year. 
Graph 2.2.4: Bank sector profitability 
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The solvency of Spanish banks was further 
strengthened in 2014. The improvement in the 
solvency ratio is due to both higher capital (the 
numerator effect) and lower risk-weighted assets 
(the denominator effect). Spanish bank capital 
levels rose further during the first half of 2014. 
The common equity tier 1 capital under the new 
capital requirement regulation stood at 11.6 % in 
June 2014. Total regulatory own funds ratio 
increased to around 13.5%. In view of the results 
of the asset quality review and the stress test, and 
in order to shore up further their capital levels, 
some banks have managed to raise equity or other 
non-core capital instruments, such as subordinated 
debt or contingent capital instruments that qualify 
as own funds. In addition to this, BdE extended its 
recommendation on a maximum 25% of paid-in-
cash to be also applied during 2014, leading to a 
strengthening of the core capital of Spanish banks. 
Overall, the comprehensive assessment has 
highlighted that the restructuring that the 
sector has undergone has brought Spanish 
banks back on track. On 26 October 2014, the 
European Central Bank and the European Banking 
Authority disclosed bank-by-bank results of their 
comprehensive assessment of the major European 
institutions, including the 15 most significant 
Spanish banks. The reference date for the 
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assessment was 31 December 2013. As of that 
date, only one former savings bank — Liberbank 
— failed to be above one of the three capital 
thresholds envisaged in the European Central Bank 
methodology, showing a very small shortfall of 
EUR 32 million stemming from the asset quality 
review. However, Liberbank managed to raise 
fresh equity amounting to EUR 637 million 
already during the first half of 2014 and therefore 
needs no additional capital to meet the 
comprehensive assessment minimum 
requirements. The other 14 Spanish banks were, 
after asset quality review adjustments as of 
December 2013, assessed to be well above the 
critical threshold of 8 % for the common equity 
tier 1 capital ratio and remained above 7.5 % under 
the adverse scenario, thus exceeding the minimum 
5.5 % required. Five institutions were above 9 %, 
including BFA-Bankia. The results confirm that 
the restructuring helped to recover solvency of the 
Spanish banking sector at large, which is a 
necessary condition for a resumed growth in 
lending. 
Only a well-capitalised and solvent banking 
sector can reconcile the deleveraging process 
with the provision of new lending to the viable 
part of the economy. The performance and 
resilience of the banking sector have continued to 
strengthen in the wake of the financial assistance 
programme. Nevertheless, shrinking credit 
volumes across the main areas of business are 
putting a potential strain on the prospective 
profitability of banks. Looking forward, unless 
they strengthen further their capital positions, and 
given lack of restrictions on dividends, banks will 
have only a limited margin to support the cleaning 
up of their balance sheets and to provide sufficient 
credit to productive sectors of the economy.  
Adjustment in the housing market 
The correction of the Spanish housing market 
after the burst of the construction bubble has 
been sharp. Spain witnessed a construction boom 
prior to the crisis. The share of residential 
investment exceeded 10 % of GDP each year 
between 2003 and 2008. In the crisis, it fell from 
the peak of around 12.5 % in 2006 to 4.1 % in the 
first half of 2014 (Graph 2.2.5), and is now lower 
than the average for the euro area. Nominal house 
prices have decreased by 36 % from the peak in 
Q3-2007 (Graph 2.2.6). 
Graph 2.2.5: Residential investment as percentage of GDP 
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Housing prices seem to have reached a trough, 
but further movements in prices cannot be 
excluded. While it is difficult to forecast future 
house price developments, on balance, available 
studies suggest that the degree of overvaluation is 
much reduced.(18) Standard valuation metrics 
suggest that housing prices might have reached a 
trough in 2014, registering growth of 0.8 % year-
on-year in Q2-2014 and 0.3 % in Q3. However, 
some long-lasting downward pressure on demand 
for housing might delay price recovery. Despite 
the recent drop, Spain still has one of the highest 
home ownership rates in Europe. According to the 
Spanish statistical institute INE, the annual 
increase in the number of households is projected 
to slow down to around 60 000 in the next 15 
years, compared with much higher increases 
observed prior to the crisis.  
                                                          
(18) Cuerpo, C. and Pontuch, P., Spanish housing market: 
adjustment and implications, Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, Country Focus, Vol. 10, 
Issue 8, December 2013. 
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Graph 2.2.6: Evolution of House Price Index and MFI loans 
for house purchase 
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Recent rental market reforms support the 
adjustment process in the housing market. In 
2013 Spain amended its legislation to create a 
larger and more efficient housing rental market. 
Law 4/2013 on the promotion of the rental housing 
market strengthened the legal rights of owners but 
also provided greater flexibility in ending rental 
agreements. A more flexible and efficient rental 
market should facilitate the conversion of vacant 
units into rental accommodation. Together with the 
elimination of tax-deductible mortgage payments 
from the beginning of 2013, in the long term it is 
expected to reduce the bias towards home 
ownership and the volatility of house prices. 
Drivers of indebtedness and deleveraging in 
the households sector 
Household deleveraging is mainly affected by 
the stock of mortgage loans. The majority of 
household loans are long-term (around 96 % of the 
total stock of loans in household liabilities) and 
related to housing (over 78 % of the stock), 
primarily mortgages. The composition of 
household debt was slightly affected by the crisis, 
as the stock of short-term loans declined by more 
than a quarter after the peak in Q2-2008, while 
long-term loans reached their peak only two years 
later, and have since declined by 15 %. The decline 
in long-term loans was more muted despite the 
prevalence of variable-rate mortgages, which have 
helped to make low interest rates available to 
households and thereby contain their interest 
burden.(19) 
Negative credit flows have been the main driver 
of household deleveraging. Nominal income 
growth has been less supportive than in other 
episodes of house price busts, and GDP growth 
contributed negatively to household deleveraging 
in 2012-13 (Graph 2.2.7). With the pick-up in the 
labour market and increasing economic confidence 
supporting household demand for loans, one can 
expect that negative net credit flows will play a 
smaller role in deleveraging from now on. In Q2-
2014, household debt still remained on average at 
least 10 percentage points of GDP higher than in 
the euro area and should be reduced further to 
reach equilibrium level. 
Graph 2.2.7: Breakdown of year-on-year changes in debt-
to-GDP ratios, households 
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Indebted Spanish households are among the 
most financially fragile in the euro area. 
Indebted households in Spain have one of the 
highest debt-to-income ratios in the euro area (at 
145.9 %), and are particularly sensitive to an 
interest rate shock. As adjustable rate loans prevail 
in Spain, after a hypothetical 300 basis points 
increase in the interest rate, the median debt-
service-to-income ratio of indebted Spanish 
                                                          
(19) Housing Recoveries – Cluster Report on Denmark, Ireland, 
Netherlands, and Spain, IMF Country Report no. 15/1, 
January 2015. 
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households would increase from around 25 % to 
30 %, and 36 % of indebted households would face 
a ratio greater than 0.4. Moreover, a combined 
interest rate and income shock (a 5 percentage 
point increase in unemployment rate) would lead 
to an increase in the proportion of indebted 
households having a positive probability of default 
by more than one third, to 9.1 %.(20) 
Graph 2.2.8: Household leverage in Spain 
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The decline in household debt-to-assets ratio in 
2014 was more pronounced than the decline in 
debt-to-gross disposable income ratio. Since Q2-
2013, the outstanding financial assets of Spanish 
households have been considerably boosted by 
favourable developments in financial markets. In 
Q2-2014, household holdings of equity and 
investment fund shares were back to the levels last 
seen in the beginning of 2008. However, as the 
country remains vulnerable to sudden changes in 
global investor sentiment, one cannot exclude 
some fluctuations in the debt-to-assets ratio in the 
future. Moreover, the debt-to-gross disposable 
income ratio is much higher than the debt-to-assets 
ratio. Since its peak, it has improved to a lesser 
extent given the significant drop in employment 
and wage restraint during the long recession in 
Spain (Graph 2.2.8). 
                                                          
(20) Ampudia, M., van Vlokhoven, H. and Zochowski D., 
Financial fragility of euro area households, Working Paper 
Series, No 1737, ECB, October 2014. 
The authorities oppose further reforms of the 
personal insolvency framework following those 
implemented in 2013, which could already to 
some extent support household deleveraging. 
Following the adjustment in house prices after the 
boom, a significant proportion of households still 
remain in negative equity. Nevertheless, the rate of 
non-performing loans on mortgages has until 
recently remained very subdued, for various 
reasons including conservative credit standards, 
lower original loan-to-values ratios, and the 
environment of low interest rates. Spain does not 
have a personal insolvency procedure in place that 
would force creditors to negotiate a settlement 
agreement or repayment plan with debtors, 
consumers and entrepreneurs, when they are 
unable to service their debts. Some improvements 
have been put in place by the authorities to force 
creditors to enter into such negotiations, such as 
the implementation by banks of the ‘Code of Good 
Practice on protection of low-income mortgage 
borrowers’, which has facilitated several 
agreements (i.e. payment in kind for properties). 
Spain relies heavily on enforcement procedures 
(such as the mortgage enforcement procedure) that 
do not provide the same guarantees and 
possibilities for debtors as personal insolvency 
procedures. In 2013 and 2014, the Court of Justice 
of the EU declared certain Spanish procedural 
rules incompatible with EU law, as they did not 
provide sufficient protection for mortgagors 
against unfair terms in consumer contracts. To 
address the rulings, the authorities have revised the 
mortgage legislation. They are of the view that 
further reforms of the mortgage foreclosure 
legislation at this time could impair the existing 
solid payment culture and should take into account 
the proper functioning of the mortgage market, 
including mortgage-backed securities and the 
stability of the banking sector. Despite the recent 
efforts to improve enforcement procedures, the 
lack of a personal insolvency framework remains 
an obstacle for financially responsible individual 
debtors to receive a fresh start. 
Drivers of indebtedness and deleveraging in 
the non-financial corporations sector 
Seen from a macroeconomic perspective, the 
deleveraging process in Spain has been 
successful so far. The stock of domestic credit to 
non-financial corporations (NFCs) declined by 
more than 35% since the peak in Q1-2009, and 
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total financing to firms (including not only loans, 
but also their other liabilities) decreased by less 
than 25%. This is because firms increasingly resort 
to foreign borrowing and issuing securities. The 
bulk of deleveraging took place in construction 
and real estate sectors, which have been 
responsible for around 75 % of the decline in the 
stock of domestic credit to non-financial 
corporations. 
Graph 2.2.9: Breakdown of year-on-year changes in debt-
to-GDP ratios, non-financial corporations 
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Negative credit flows have so far been the main 
driver of the fall in corporate debt-to-GDP 
ratio. Net negative credit flows can have 
significant knock-on effects on economic activity. 
As in the case of household debt, the reduction of 
the debt-to-GDP ratio resulting from negative net 
credit flows was partially offset in 2012 and 2013 
by contracting GDP (Graph 2.2.9). With the 
turnaround in economic activity, real GDP growth 
started to contribute positively to reducing the 
relative indebtedness of non-financial 
corporations. In contrast, inflation under the 
harmonised index of consumer prices is expected 
to remain negative in the short term; the GDP 
deflator will therefore constitute a headwind for 
corporate deleveraging. 
The remaining deleveraging needs in Spain are 
still high. Despite the fact that Spain has already 
seen a significant reduction in private 
indebtedness, private sector deleveraging needs are 
probably still well in excess of 30 % of GDP, with 
debt liabilities (loans and debt securities) of 
Spanish non-financial corporations  at least 
10 percentage points of GDP higher than the euro 
area average in Q2-2014. The deleveraging 
pressures imply that private debt will continue to 
weigh on economic activity in the years to come. 
 
Table 2.2.1: Distribution of the stock of corporate debt in 
Spain, according to the leverage of firms, 
2013 (1) 
Debt / EBITDA
> 12 8.6 6.8 12.8
6 x to 12 x 14.3 14.8 1.2
< 6x 24.8 16.5 0.3
< 0.7 0.7 to 0.9 > 0.9
Debt / Capital employed
(1) The results on the distribution of corporate debt are 
based on a firm level dataset from the Bureau Van Dijk's 
Orbis database. The data refer to the fiscal year 2013, 
which on the date of the download (December 2014) 
were available in Orbis for a large majority of firms, but not 
for all. Subsidiaries of resident companies with consolidated 
financials were excluded to avoid double-counting. Firms 
operating in finance and insurance, public administration, 
health and social services, and education were excluded. 
Debt is defined as the sum of loans and non-current 
liabilities. Capital employed is the sum of debt and equity. 
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortisation (EBITDA) are directly taken from the database. 
The thresholds for debt/capital employed (70% and 90%) 
and the debt/EBITDA (6x and 12x) are approximately equal 
to the 75th and 90th percentile across the pooled sample 
of firms from fifteen EU countries (which include vulnerable 
and core countries). Reported figures represent the share 
of debt held by firms in a given solvency bucket, as a 
percentage of the total amount of debt. 
Source: Orbis, European Commission 
 
High debt levels have been exerting downward 
pressure on demand for domestic loans. Credit 
supply constraints and the relatively high spread 
on interest on corporate loans compared with the 
core euro area have eased in recent quarters, 
suggesting that negative credit growth in Spain has 
primarily been reflecting weak demand for loans. 
When looking at the entire range of financing 
instruments available to Spanish non-financial 
corporations, the decline in their total financing is 
slowing and is lower than the decline in domestic 
bank financing to non-financial corporations. This 
is because Spanish firms increasingly resort to 
foreign borrowing (the total stock of external loans 
to non-financial corporations increased 
significantly in the first half of 2014, growing by 
11.8 % year-on-year in December 2014), and 
issuing securities (the stock of securities issued by 
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non-financial corporations was 2.4 % higher than 
in December 2013). 
Despite the recent correction, there are still 
pockets of highly indebted firms. A significant 
proportion of non-financial corporations remain 
highly indebted both with respect to their assets as 
well as their capacity to repay debt. Analysis of 
microeconomic distribution of debt suggests that in 
2013 almost 30% of the stock of corporate debt in 
Spain was held by firms for which the ratio of debt 
to capital employed exceeded 90%, or the ratio of 
debt to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation 
and amortisation (EBITDA) was higher than 12 
(Table 2.2.1). Firms which register both a high 
ratio of debt to EBITDA, or debt to capital 
employed, face the highest risk of insolvency. The 
problem of potentially insolvent firms is 
particularly acute in the construction and real 
estate sector, but hotels and restaurants or other 
services are also significantly affected (Graph 
2.2.11). Moreover, the debt of SMEs is potentially 
at higher risk of insolvency than the debt of large 
firms (Graph 2.2.10). Also, aggregate figures on 
debt service capacity hide a growing divergence 
among non-financial corporations, especially 
SMEs, as a large proportion of firms have earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortisation lower than their interest expense 
(Graph 2.2.10). Some of the firms had temporary 
liquidity problems, abating with an improving 
economic environment in 2013, but others have 
become insolvent. 
Several corporate insolvency reforms have 
recently been adopted because small firms 
rarely file for bankruptcy and an excessive 
proportion of firms entering insolvency end up 
being liquidated. The number of insolvencies in 
Spain increased in the wake of the crisis, but is still 
relatively low. Due to the severity of the crisis, and 
the fact that Spanish firms usually delay entering 
insolvency for too long, the firms that ultimately 
initiate the proceedings are on average in a much 
more difficult financial situation than their 
European peers. Spain made some progress in 
removing the remaining bottlenecks in the 
corporate insolvency framework. In September 
2013, the Entrepreneurship Law (Law 14/2013) 
established a new type of out-of-court procedure 
suitable primarily for SME debtors. In March 
2014, refinancing agreements, a pre-insolvency 
procedure suitable for bigger debtors, were also 
subject to considerable reform (Royal Decree-Law 
4/2014, approved by the Spanish Parliament as 
Law 17/2014). Finally, in September 2014, the 
government made the proper insolvency 
procedures more flexible (Royal Decree-Law 
11/2014). If the recent reforms are at least partially 
successful, one should expect not only a higher 
proportion of insolvent firms avoiding liquidation, 
but also a higher incidence rate of pre-insolvency 
and insolvency, as firms will be less reluctant to 
start the proceedings. 
Graph 2.2.10: Distribution of corporate debt in Spain by firm 
size, according to the insolvency risk of the 
firm holding the debt, 2013 (1) 
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table above. 
Source: Orbis, European Commission 
Insolvency reforms should support a 
restructuring of corporate debt. Debt write-offs 
and debt-to-equity swaps have been facilitated; 
however the impact of the reforms on debt 
restructuring was not visible until June 2014, when 
the latest data became available. There are 
concerns whether the out-of-court agreements is 
fully suitable for smaller debtors, the refinancing 
agreements fully attractive for debtors and whether 
the institutional capacity of the insolvency 
framework is at its maximum. The authorities are 
nevertheless convinced that, after the September 
2014 reform, creditors have greater incentives to 
reach agreements in the pre-insolvency phase. 
The overall deleveraging of the private sector is 
accompanied by an ongoing reallocation of 
financial resources. Despite the strong decline in 
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the bank financing of the private sector in recent 
years, a significant proportion of Spanish firms did 
not reduce their bank financing during the crisis. 
Between 2004 and 2007, more than half of firms 
were increasing or keeping stable their bank 
financing. In 2012 and 2013, this proportion fell 
below 40 %, and even to lower levels in energy, 
construction and real estate, the sectors that had 
experienced investment bubbles. The differences 
between sectors point towards an ongoing 
reallocation of financial resources in the 
economy.(21) In line with the incipient economic 
recovery, the proportion of SMEs increasing or 
keeping stable their financing increased slightly in 
2013. The 2013 results for large firms are not as 
clear cut, but need to be treated with caution, as 
those firms have better access to alternative 
sources of financing, such as bonds, equities, or 
foreign loans.  
Most SMEs still face onerous financing 
conditions despite the improving availability of 
bank financing and progress in completing the 
ongoing measures to widen the access to finance 
for firms. A fragmented corporate structure of the 
Spanish economy has been exacerbating problems 
with bank financing during the crisis, as SMEs are 
more affected by cyclical funding conditions, and 
— due to their limited transparency — they have 
problems in tapping capital markets directly. This 
situation is aggravated by long delays in receiving 
payments, particularly from the public sector. 
While the availability of equity and mezzanine 
financing remains limited, new measures have 
been taken to foster venture capital and the credit 
lines of Spain's development bank (ICO) have also 
been strengthened. Currently, a draft law to further 
facilitate the financing of businesses is being 
discussed in the Spanish Parliament. 
                                                          
(21) Martínez, C., Menéndez, A. and Mulino, M., A 
disaggregated analysis of recent developments in lending 
to corporations, Economic Bulletin, Banco de España, 
June 2014. 
Graph 2.2.11: Distribution of corporate debt in Spain by 
sector, according to the insolvency risk of the 
firm holding the debt, 2013 (1) 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Low Medium High
(1) For the definition of the level of insolvency risk see the 
table above. 
Source: Orbis, European Commission 
The debt bias in corporate taxation has been 
partially reduced. In 2014, the gap between the 
effective marginal tax rate on investment financed 
with retained earnings and that financed with debt 
remained wide. The general reduction in the 
corporate income tax rate approved in 2014 will 
diminish the level of the debt bias, and will be 
supported by some additional measures that have 
been adopted since 2012. On one hand, the 
corporate income tax reform maintained the 
general limitation to deduct financial expenses at 
30 % of the earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA), though 
EUR 1 million is deductible without limits. On the 
other hand, to support equity financing, in a given 
year the tax base will be reduced by an amount 
equal to 10 % of the equity increases other than 
partner contributions to the company’s capital. It is 
difficult to ascertain at this stage whether the 
measures adopted since 2012 might have 
contributed to the ongoing deleveraging in the 
corporate sector. Depending on the progress in 
deleveraging, further efforts to reform the tax 
system may be required. 
Going forward, one can expect economic 
growth to be a major driver of the reduction of 
debt-to-GDP ratio, but negative net credit flows 
will still contribute to deleveraging for some 
time. Deleveraging by the private sector has 
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advanced further, but is far from complete. 
Counting from the peak of the debt-to-GDP ratio 
in 2010, the fall in GDP has constituted a negative 
contribution to deleveraging, while the inflation 
contribution has been positive, but almost 
negligible. Due to deflationary pressures in the 
short to medium term, inflation will slow down the 
process. Provided that Spain maintains economic 
momentum, GDP growth should contribute more 
to a gradual deleveraging. In the medium term it is 
possible to reconcile net negative credit flows with 
growth in new lending, as long as credit 
repayments consistently exceed new credit 
activity. 
Effective structural reforms would accelerate 
adjustment. The deleveraging process will 
continue to constrain growth in Spain. In this 
context, the overall assessment of recent structural 
reforms to promote growth and competitiveness is 
positive. By facilitating debt restructuring, the 
reformed corporate insolvency framework has 
created an opportunity for accelerated 
deleveraging, even if recent reforms will play 
mainly a temporary role as a driver of 
deleveraging. Given the high dependence of 
Spanish firms on bank credit, recent measures to 
promote access to non-bank financing have — at 
least partially — improved access to finance for 
firms. Full implementation of these reforms and 
tackling their remaining shortcomings are crucial 
for facilitating the reallocation of resources and 
supporting the ongoing adjustment.  
Public sector debt 
Public debt dynamics were significantly 
affected by the economic and financial crisis. 
The outbreak of the crisis reversed the trend of 
declining general government debt in Spain. The 
collapse of tax bases, surging unemployment and 
the fiscal stimulus in the early years of the crisis 
caused large general government deficits and a 
rapid debt increase, also spurred by the bank 
recapitalisations and contributions to the EU and 
euro area financial assistance institutions. Public 
debt increased from 35.5 % of GDP in 2007 to 
92.1 % of GDP in 2013, and — under a no-policy 
change assumption — it is expected to reach a 
peak of 103.2 % of GDP in 2017. 
Further fiscal consolidation will be needed in 
the medium term to bring down government 
debt. In 2014, inflation had a negative effect on 
public sector deleveraging. The negative effect of 
interest expenditure on the evolution of public 
debt-to-GDP ratio is projected to be on average 
offset from 2015 onwards by the positive impact of 
GDP growth and inflation. Under the no-policy 
change assumption, Spain is projected to register a 
primary general government surplus as from 2018, 
the year when the public debt-to-GDP ratio should 
start its slow decline. Without further 
consolidation measures, the debt would still be at 
95.1 % of GDP in 2025 (Box 2.2.1). 
Graph 2.2.12: EBITDA over interest on financial debt, Spanish SMEs 
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 Box 2.2.1: Long-term projections of general government debt 
The public debt trajectory has been simulated under alternative scenarios. The baseline scenario has been derived
from the Commission’s winter 2015 economic forecast, where short and long-term interest rates have been set to be 
consistent with the forecast implicit interest rate, the shares of short-term and long-term public debt, and data on 
maturing debt. 
This baseline scenario has a number of technical assumptions. First, the structural primary balance is set constant at 
the value of 2016 beyond the forecast horizon. The cyclical component of the primary balance is calculated using
(country-specific) budget balance sensitivities to the cycle over the period until output gap closure is assumed (2019).
Second, the long-term interest rate on new and rolled-over debt is assumed to be 3 % in real terms by the end of the 
projection horizon (2025), while the short-term interest rate reaches an end-of-projection value that is consistent with 
the 3 % long-term interest rate and the value of the euro area yield curve. Third, the inflation rate of the GDP deflator
is assumed to change linearly until it reaches 2 % in 2019 and remain constant thereafter. Fourth, a short-run 
temporary feedback effect on GDP growth is introduced in the consolidation scenario (a 1 percentage point of GDP 
consolidation effort impacts negatively on baseline GDP growth by 0.5 percentage points in the same year). Fifth, the
stock-flow adjustment is set to zero after 2016. Medium-term growth projections are based on the T+10 methodology 
agreed with the Economic Policy Committee and is assumed to average 1.3 % between 2013 and 2020 and to
increase to 1.7 % on average between 2020 and 2025. 
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Standardized (permanent) negative shock (-0.5p.p.) on GDP growth
Standardized (permanent) positive shock (+0.5p.p.) on GDP growth
Standardized (permanent) negative shock (-0.5p.p.) on inflation
Standardized (permanent) positive shock (+0.5p.p.) on inflation
Standardized (permanent) negative shock on the PB equal to 50% of the forecasted cumulative change over
the two forecast years
Draft Budgetary Plan (DBP) scenario
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) institutional scenario
 
 
(Continued on the next page) 
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The 2013 pension reform will help to contain 
long-term pressure on expenditure. Pension and 
healthcare expenditure have an important impact 
on long-term public debt dynamics. The 2013 
pension reform revised the indexation of pensions 
and introduced, as from 2019, the so-called 
sustainability factor, which will be an automatic 
adjustment of future retirees’ new pensions to take 
account of changes in life expectancy. In 
December 2014, based on the new law, the 
government adopted a nominal indexation of 
pensions of 0.25 % for 2015. In the first half of 
2015, the Commission and the Economic Policy 
Committee’s Working Group on Ageing 
Populations and Sustainability will publish an 
updated version of long-term pension and 
healthcare expenditure projections, based on the 
latest demographic and economic assumptions. 
Spain has increased cost-effectiveness of the 
healthcare sector, but challenges remain. The 
most recent reforms build on a comprehensive 
framework that has been developed since 2012 to 
increase the efficiency of healthcare expenditure. 
The reforms include further rationalisation of 
public procurement policy and institutional 
administration, and clearing public arrears. The 
measures implemented since 2012 have already 
helped to reduce expenditure and to increase cost-
effectiveness, but the pace of budgetary adjustment 
has moderated in 2014. Moreover, pharmaceutical 
spending started to grow again, and might rise 
even further due to the the introduction of some 
innovative medicines. In the area of long-term 
care, Spain is one the countries with a higher 
proportion of informal carers but, at the same time, 
the implementation of the Ley de Dependencia has 
led to a large increase in coverage and expenditure 
Box (continued) 
 
Sensitivity tests around the baseline are performed: 
(i) a standardised (permanent) negative shock (-1 pp.) to the short and long-term interest rates on newly 
issued and rolled-over debt; 
(ii) an enhanced (permanent) positive shock (+2 pps./+1 pp.) to the short- and long-term interest rates on 
newly issued and rolled over debt; 
(iii) a standardised (permanent) negative shock (-0.5 pps.) on GDP growth; 
(iv) a standardised (permanent) positive shock (+0.5 pps.) on GDP growth; 
(v) a standardised (permanent) negative shock (-0.5 pps.) on inflation; 
(vi) a standardised (permanent) positive shock (+0.5 pps.) on inflation; and 
(vii) a standardised (permanent) negative shock on the PB equal to 50% of the forecast cumulative change over 
the two forecast years. 
The simulations show that general government debt is likely to peak and then gradually decline in the medium term. 
The debt ratio would be on an increasing path in the baseline scenario until 2017 and then decline thereafter to about 
95 % of GDP in 2025. Favourable assumptions on interest rates and growth would lead the debt ratio to peak at a 
slightly lower value and then to decline to a level close to 90 % of GDP by the end of the projection horizon. By 
contrast, under unfavourable assumptions on interest rates or inflation, debt would peak a year later and not fall 
below 100% of GDP by the end of the projection horizon. 
The ‘Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) institutional scenario’ in the graph assumes that adjustments to the structural 
primary balance are set in compliance with the fiscal efforts recommended by the Council (which imply 
improvements in the structural primary balance by 0.8 % and 1.2 % of GDP in 2015 and 2016 respectively) until the 
excessive deficit is corrected, and thereafter an additional structural consolidation effort is maintained (+0.6 
percentage points of GDP) until the medium-term objective is reached. Under this scenario, the debt ratio would 
start decreasing steeply after 2015 to reach 74 % of GDP in 2025. 
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over the last few years. Extending the formal 
sector may have benefits for the quality of care and 
the labour participation and protection of carers. 
However, the regional financing system does not 
foster the responsibility and efficiency of public 
provisions, and as institutional care is considerably 
more expensive than home care, strategies to 
formalise care and to improve the quality of home 
and community-based services can have a 
significant budgetary impact. 
As regards further improvements in the 
efficiency of health-care, there seem to be 
consensus about the following measures:  
promoting prevention; clinical management and 
career development of healthcare personnel, 
including incentives for mobility throughout the 
entire national health system; e-health solutions; 
integrated clinical approaches to chronic 
conditions; integration of primary, specialised, 
long-term health and social care; and health 
technology assessment to promote effective 
medical interventions and prevent the use of those 
that are less effective or unnecessary. Regarding 
access to healthcare for vulnerable groups, 
according to a recent report of the national 
Ombudsmen, a progressive increase in waiting 
lists has been observed as well as irregular access 
for undocumented migrants. The government 
introduced an insurance scheme for those not 
covered under the healthcare system; a few 
hundred such insurance contracts have been signed 
to date. 
Managing the growing public debt is a 
significant challenge for the Spanish economy. 
Continued reduction in sovereign spreads observed 
since 2012 gave the government a possibility to 
partially refinance public debt at a lower cost, 
thereby containing the interest burden. 
Nevertheless, growing levels of public debt make 
the country more vulnerable to sudden changes in 
global investor sentiment. Public debt is still 
increasing and bringing it back to the 
neighbourhood of 60 % of GDP will require a 
protracted and sizeable fiscal effort. Without 
further progress on fiscal consolidation, there is a 
risk of potential future market sell-offs. Given the 
high degree of decentralisation in Spain, a 
combined effort by all levels of administration will 
be important for the success of fiscal 
consolidation. The risks linked to the overall 
indebtedness of the economy have not evolved and 
still require decisive policy action. 
2.3. LABOUR MARKET 
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Labour market conditions are improving, 
supported by economic activity gaining steam 
and moderate wage developments, but 
unemployment remains very high. (Graph 2.3.1) 
Labour Force Survey data for Q4-2014 report an 
increase in employment (56.8 %) and activity 
(74.5 %) rates. After having grown unabated since 
2008, the increase in unemployment came to a halt 
in 2013 and reductions in joblessness have 
occurred since then, even despite a moderate GDP 
growth (Graph 2.3.1). At the end of 2014, 
unemployment remained at 23.7 %, about 2 
percentage points (or 477 900 unemployed people 
less) below the all-time peak of one year earlier. 
However, with 5 457 700 jobless, unemployment 
remains very high. The fall of unemployment - 
mainly linked to falling separation and slightly 
improving job finding rates - was matched by an 
increase in employment as from the beginning of 
2014. After a cumulative decline of about 18 % 
during the 2008-2013 period, by the end of 2014, 
overall employment had increased by 2.5 % over 
the previous 12 months, supported in part by 
ongoing wage moderation. 
Activity rates are improving, in response to a 
reversal of migration flows, discouragement 
effects, and the fact that young adults are 
staying in the education system longer (Graph 
2.3.2). Since the onset of the crisis, the evolution 
of the activity rate has been particularly favourable 
for prime age (25-54) workers, especially second 
earners (a so-called, added worker effect). 
However, developments in the aggregate activity 
rate also need to be seen alongside the evolution of 
the working age population (the denominator of 
the activity rate), which has been shrinking during 
the crisis, mostly due to a reversal in net migration 
flows. The worsening labour market conditions 
after 2008 also triggered a noticeable withdrawal 
of discouraged workers from the labour force, 
notably young adults.  
Graph 2.3.1: Employment and unemployment evolution 
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Employment gains in manufacturing and some 
service sectors are supporting the reallocation 
of labour towards tradable sectors. Job creation 
in 2014 was mainly driven by industry (4.2 %) and 
services (2.7 %), and the construction sector also 
witnessed its first job gains since the start of the 
crisis (4 %). In contrast, job losses continue to be 
recorded in agriculture (-6.3 %). Overall in 2014, 
there was a net increase of 415 700 posts in the 
private sector, and a net increase of 18 100 posts in 
the public sector. The reallocation of labour 
towards the sectors producing exportable goods 
and services is part of the adjustment necessary to 
guarantee the sustainability of the current account 
and the net international investment position in the 
medium-term. However, this process is still 
marked by cross-regional differences, particularly 
occupational, skills and geographical mismatches. 
Notwithstanding the incipient labour market 
recovery, youth and long-term unemployment 
remain the most urgent challenges. Youth 
unemployment is decreasing slightly, but remains 
the highest in the EU (51.8 % in Q4-2014), 
particularly for the age group 20-24 (48.9 %). The 
duration of the crisis has exacerbated the long-term 
unemployment rate, which extends to 12.9 % of 
the active population; over half of the unemployed 
have been jobless for more than one year. The very 
long-term unemployed (2 years or more) have 
reached about 2.4 million, and represent more than 
35 % of the total number of unemployed (Graph 
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2.3.3). Low job-finding rates and skills 
obsolescence may contribute to explaining the 
duration of joblessness, particularly among older 
unemployed (aged over 50), whose share of long-
term unemployment is already 15 percentage 
points higher than the overall rate, and continues to 
increase rapidly.  
Graph 2.3.2: Activity rates 
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The persistence of long-term unemployment 
contributed to the worsening of poverty 
indicators, particularly among the low-skilled, 
those with no previous working experience and 
the older population. The surge of long-term 
unemployment in Spain has had a direct impact on 
poverty or social exclusion, also as a consequence 
of the increasing number of unemployed 
individuals exhausting their benefits entitlements. 
Indeed, long-term unemployment appears to be the 
most significant driver of severe material 
deprivation and anchored at-risk-of-poverty rates, 
along with income per capita. The persistence of 
unfavourable labour market conditions 
significantly increased the number of people on 
low income after benefits - by more than 642 000 
over pre-crisis years. The numbers of people living 
in jobless households have more than doubled in 
proportion, reaching 15.7 % in 2013. These trends 
have led to poverty rises among the working age 
population, which is affecting more than 6.1 
million people (20.4 %) in 2013.  
Graph 2.3.3: Unemployment by duration 
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Drivers of labour market performance 
High levels of labour market segmentation – 
comprising permanent employees against 
temporary - continue to hold back Spain, in 
part due to the persistent macroeconomic 
uncertainty. After the massive disappearance of 
temporary contracts since 2008, the share of 
temporary employment started to increase once 
again in 2014, reaching 24.6 %, despite the recent 
regulatory reform. Labour market segmentation 
remains thus a feature of the Spanish labour 
market, with greater incidence on some groups of 
workers, namely the young and low-skilled, and 
possible negative repercussions on productivity 
and working conditions. Although new permanent 
employment has witnessed an encouraging 
increase of 19 % over the previous year in 2014, of 
the over 16.7 million new contracts signed during 
2014, the majority (91.9 %) are fixed-term (Graph 
2.3.4). The high share of new temporary contracts 
may be influenced by the broad economic 
uncertainty and the productive structure of the 
country, as it is reflected by the fact that over half 
of temporary contracts are shorter than three 
months. Moreover, the use of new contractual 
forms and incentives to favour open-ended hiring 
seems to be faced with administrative barriers for 
the employers. In this respect, the envisaged 
streamlining of hiring subsidies may have a 
positive impact by increasing transparency and 
reducing information costs for the employers. 
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Graph 2.3.4: Open-ended and fixed-term contracts 
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Part-time employment has broadened its 
presence in the Spanish labour market, but 
remains below the EU average. At the end of 
2014, part-time reached 16.1 % of overall 
employment (EU average: 19.3 %). About half of 
all new open-ended contracts were part-time, 
partly reflecting the use of new tools put in place at 
the end of 2013 to promote stable, part-time 
employment. Part-time contracts tend to be more 
present among low-skilled workers (41 % of total 
part-time workers) and women, and are 
predominantly concentrated in the services sector, 
where part-time represents 17.4 % of the total 
sectoral employment. Besides its potential for job 
creation, the spread of part-time work – which 
seems largely not to be by choice - (22) is also 
accompanied by a higher risk of in-work poverty. 
                                                          
(22) 66.23 % of part-time workers declared to be involuntary in 
2013. OECD Statistics. 
Graph 2.3.5: Wages and unit labour costs 
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Nominal wages have responded to the 
protracted slack in the labour market and 
contributed to supporting job creation. In 2014, 
wage in nominal terms remained subdued, 
declining in the first three quarters of the year at an 
average of 0.1 % with respect to the same period of 
one year earlier. The downward adjustment of unit 
labour costs also continued in 2014 as a result of 
the weak dynamics of wages and improvements in 
productivity, thereby contributing to the absorption 
of external imbalances (Graph 2.3.5). The 2012 
reform and the inter-confederal social partners' 
agreement of 2012-14 contributed to these 
moderate wage developments. The agreed wage 
increase for 2014, calculated provisionally with the 
information available on the collective agreements 
registered up to November 2014, now stands at 
0.57 % (0.43 % for firm-level agreements- 
covering 319 186 workers- and 0.58 % for higher-
level agreements – covering 4 098 945 workers). 
Derogations from collective agreements, mostly on 
wages and working hours, have increasingly been 
used as a way of adapting to the conditions of the 
company and avoiding redundancies.   
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Graph 2.3.6: Negotiated wages 
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Reforms of the wage bargaining system have 
contributed to the responsiveness of wages to 
unemployment conditions. Graphs 2.3.6 and 
2.3.7 depict Phillips curves, relating the 
unemployment rate to the growth of negotiated and 
actual wages, respectively. Before the crisis 
negotiated wages were quite insensitive to changes 
in the degree of economic slack. The wage 
response was driven mainly by a negative wage 
drift (i.e. a compression of the variable 
components of wages). The same adjustment was 
achieved during the crisis years, but the Phillips 
curve flattened in the more recent years at low 
levels of inflation. Such flattening suggests that 
wage growth falls at a declining rate as 
unemployment increases. This could reflect an 
increase in structural unemployment, so that high 
unemployment does not correspond to a more 
intense competition for vacancies among suitable 
workers and to more moderate wage claims. 
However, some fraction of the unemployment is 
likely to be cyclical, even with higher structural 
unemployment. This is corroborated by the 
stronger response of negotiated wages to 
unemployment in the period 2009-2014, which 
was spurred not only by a market-driven 
adjustment related to the sheer size of the 
unemployment shock, but also by wage bargaining 
policy as a result of the 2010 and 2012 labour 
market reforms. 
While wage agreements have been supportive of 
job creation, the persistence of inter-firm 
productivity differentials in the context of low 
inflation may be a challenge for further positive 
developments in 2015. The social partners are 
discussing a new 'Agreement for Employment and 
Collective Bargaining' for 2015-2017, which is 
expected to replace the one in force, which expired 
in 2014. The increase of salaries is on the 
discussion table as evidence of productivity gains 
by companies could give rise to differentiated 
wage increases to promote employment. The 
difficulty of achieving market wage-driven 
adjustments in a low inflation environment 
highlights the importance of wage developments 
consistent with the objective of promoting 
employment. In the meanwhile, the Supreme Court 
has challenged the one-year validity limit of 
expired collective agreements (so called ultra-
actividad) by ruling that agreed wage conditions 
remain valid for incumbents. It remains to be seen 
how the social partners will follow up on this 
decision. 
Graph 2.3.7: Compensation per employee 
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The labour market is also characterised by a 
mismatch of labour demand and supply – both 
from a skills and a geographical perspective. 
Mismatches between labour demand and supply 
are amplified by the adjustment process. 
Underemployment has been fuelled in recent 
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years(23) by the weak employment demand, and 
now stands at 7.2 % of the labour force (the second 
highest in EU28). Four years after graduation, 
about half of young graduates work in occupations 
that do not require their level of qualification, 
evidencing a serious problem of skills mismatch, 
particularly in branches such as social sciences.(24) 
The progressive reform of the higher education 
system may help to counterbalance this problem 
(see chapter 3.2). There is also a high degree of 
cross-regional differences in the incidence of job 
mismatches in Spain. The process of labour 
reallocation from downsized sectors to tradable 
sectors would be accelerated by, among others, 
appropriate developments in labour costs, 
enhanced mobility of workers both across sectors 
and geographically, and enhancing skill-match.(25) 
Policy response and medium-term prospects 
The 2012 labour market reform has contributed 
to the incipient employment recovery, but 
reductions of unemployment and of the two-tier 
labour market remain pressing challenges. A 
two-tier labour market (by imposing lower 
incentives to invest in human capital and skills and 
concentrating the most of hiring and firings on 
fixed-term contracts) continues to negatively affect 
productivity growth and medium growth 
potential.(26) The 2012 reform aimed at favouring 
open-ended contracts, for example by reducing the 
gap in severance costs vis-à-vis fixed-term 
contracts, and subsidising social contributions for 
open-ended contracts. As discussed above, open-
ended contracts have slightly increased, but 
temporary contracts still account for over 90 % of 
the new recruitments. The use of the 2012 open-
ended contract for support to entrepreneurs (SME 
                                                          
(23) According to Dolado et al, 2013, Spain ranks has one of the 
countries with the highest degree of qualification mismatch 
in the EU, showing also great variations in the share of 
over-qualified and non-employed university graduates over 
the business cycle. 
(24) National report on employment rate of university 
graduates, 2014. Against an average share of 44.5% among 
the total graduates, 55.3 % of graduates in social sciences 
and law have jobs not requiring a university degree (23.4 % 
requiring medium level education, 31.9 % have jobs 
requiring low level education or manual abilities). 
(25) Orsini, K. and Vila, S., The impact of the Spanish labour 
market reform on the on-the-job search rate, ECFIN 
Country Focus, Issue 11, Volume 7, European 
Commission, 2014. 
(26) Cabrales, A. et al., Dual Labour Markets and (Lack of) on-
the job training: PIAAC Evidence from Spain and other EU 
Countries, IZA Discussion paper 8649, November 2014. 
contract) diminished slightly to 11.6 % of the total 
open-ended contracts in 2014. Moreover, there is 
no clear, recent evidence about the survival rates 
of jobs formalised with the SME contracts after the 
one-year probation period, the legal conformity of 
which to the EU Charter of Social Rights has 
recently been challenged.(27)  
The current system of hiring incentives still 
presents some efficiency barriers impeding the 
promotion of stable employment. Spain has 
traditionally relied on an extensive set of 
incentives to stimulate new recruitments and the 
conversion of temporary contracts into open-ended 
contracts. The system was streamlined in 2012, but 
the structure of incentives applying to different 
contractual forms remains very complex and 
increases the administrative burden for employers; 
and their actual effectiveness has not been proved 
in all cases. To ease the use of hiring incentives, 
the existing work contracts have been divided into 
4 types (open-ended; fixed-term; training and 
apprenticeship; and traineeship contract), with 
various contractual options remaining unchanged. 
This is a step in the right direction; yet, this change 
has not been accompanied by further 
rationalisation of existing hiring incentives. 
Moreover, in 2014, a new incentive was 
introduced consisting of an employer's EUR 100 
flat contribution (the so- called tarifa plana) 
applying to each new open-ended contract signed 
until March 2015. (Box 2.3.1) 
                                                          
(27) The resolution of the Constitutional Court 119/2014 of 16 
July confirmed the constitutional conformity of the major 
parts of the Law 3/2012 (Labour Market reform), but there 
were three  votes disagreeing on the constitutionality of the 
12-month probation period of the SME contract on the 
grounds of its disproportionality. On 27 November 2014 
the Juzgado de lo Social no. 1 of Toledo, stated that the 
one-year trial period is not in line with the EU charter on 
Social Rights, or the national law, as it is estimated to be 
too long for some types of professions. The impact of this 
Court resolution on the application of the SME contract is 
still to be evaluated by the national authorities once the full 
argumentation is made available.  
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Spain has strengthened the strategic orientation 
of activation policies and their link with income 
support, but training and re-skilling could 
make a bigger contribution to reducing the 
large share of long-term unemployment. The 
2014-16 Spanish Strategy for Activation and 
Employment sets new short-term and long-term 
objectives, while consolidating the result-oriented 
allocation of public resources distributed to the 
Autonomous Communities (60 % of total funds in 
2015). However, the 2014 Annual Employment 
Plan (PAPE) – which is to set annual objectives- 
prioritises hiring incentives it its  expenditure on 
active labour market policies, accounting for over 
one third of the total resources allocated for 2014. 
In the 2015 Budget, hiring incentives and rebates 
in Social Security contributions make up for 44 % 
of the total budget allocated to promoting insertion 
and employment stability. Following the tripartite 
agreement signed in July 2014, a new activation 
 
 
 Box 2.3.1: The tax reform and its impact on the tax wedge 
 
In November 2014, the Spanish parliament adopted a tax reform, with a focus on personal income taxation 
and corporate income taxation. The personal income taxation reform includes a widening of the amount of income 
exempted from tax, which will go up to EUR 12 000, and a lowering of rates. The number of tax brackets is lowered 
from 7 to 5 and many taxpayers, especially at the lower end of the scale, will benefit from a lower average tax rate 
(See Graph 3.1.1. in chapter 3.1., on fiscal framework and taxation). The government estimates that the average tax 
cut will amount to 12.5 % and that 20 million taxpayers will enjoy higher disposable income as a result of the reform. 
In due course, the tax cut is expected to lead to higher employment. The fact that the tax cut is focused on low-
income earners makes it likely to have a bigger impact on employment than a more evenly distributed tax cut would 
have had, as labour demand elasticity are higher for low-skilled workers and elasticity of labour supply tend to be 
lower amongst low-income households (in the majority composed of low skilled workers). (1) When fully 
implemented in 2016, the cuts in personal income tax are expected to have a total impact of about EUR 4.5 billion on 
government revenues (about 0.4 % of GDP). 
The temporary and non-targeted nature of recently introduced social security contribution rebates may 
reduce or retard their impact on employment creation. This is because nominal wages tend to adjust more slowly 
downwards as a result of nominal rigidities. Recently, the government extended by three months the temporary flat 
rate of EUR 100 in the employer’s contribution to social security for new permanent contracts, a measure that was 
introduced in February 2014 and originally due to expire at the end of that year. New indefinite contracts, and 
temporary contracts converted into indefinite contracts are eligible, and it applies to all firms (regardless of their 
size), (2) all workers (irrespective of age) and all types of indefinite contracts (full time and part-time). The flat rate 
applies for two years, provided the hiring is maintained for three years (otherwise, the amounts saved by the company 
will be recovered, totally or partially). The measure, which does not affect the benefits to which workers are entitled, 
does not form part of the tax reform as such, but is introduced more or less in parallel with the latter. By the end of 
December 2014, about a quarter of all new indefinite contracts signed since the introduction of the measure, or 177 
731 contracts, had benefited from the flat rate. Being a flat rate, its magnitude rises with income, which could make it 
a relatively expensive way to promote employment for the reasons outlined above. (3) The government expects a 
positive impact of 0.3 % on both GDP and employment in the first year, and projects that the measure will be 
budgetary neutral. 
 
(1) See NIESR Discussion Paper No. 404, January 2013:  
http://niesr.ac.uk/publications/modelling-demand-low-skilledlow-paid-labour-exploring-employment-trade-offs-living-wage  
(2) Micro firms may benefit from an additional reduction of 50 % of the standard social security contribution once the application 
of the flat rate has expired. 
(3) See European Commission Country Focus, February 2014:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/country_focus/2014/cf-vol11_5_en.htm  
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programme for employment for the long-term 
unemployed was adopted.(28) The programme 
targets the long-term unemployed who have 
exhausted unemployment benefits and who are no 
longer covered by the other support programmes 
(PREPARA, PRODI or the active insertion 
income). It combines a financial support of EUR 
426 during six months with an individualised 
pathway for labour integration and it will cover 
around 400 000 people, at a cost of about EUR 1 
million. Beneficiaries will be assigned an 
individual tutor for individual assistance to 
activation. The commitment for activation of this 
programme is greater than in other policy 
measures addressed to the long-term unemployed 
as these will have to accept an adequate offer of 
employment made by the Public Employment 
Service. Moreover, it will be possible to combine 
the financial support with work, yet only up to a 
maximum of 5 months. While the precise targeting 
of the measure at the long-term unemployed goes 
in the right direction, the effectiveness of the 
linkages with activation measures strictly depends 
on the actual administrative capacity of national 
and regional employment services to design and 
offer integrated pathways to the beneficiaries.  
In the medium term, implementation of the 
reforms tackling shortcomings in Spain's 
education systems will be also important. Early 
school-leaving remains very high (see section 3.2) 
and Spain is still far from converging with the EU 
as regards the population with higher secondary 
education, mainly vocational education and 
training. In the long term, skill mismatches can 
only be fully addressed by reforms in the education 
and training systems, and flanking labour market 
measures. The ongoing reform of the vocational 
education and training system (including the 
development of a dual vocational training system) 
and the reform of the higher education system have 
a key role to play in this regard (see also chapter 
3.2). 
 
                                                          
(28) Royal Decree Law 16/2014 of 19 December. 
3. OTHER STRUCTURAL ISSUES 
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Fiscal framework 
Spain’s independent fiscal authority (AIReF) is 
now operational. Its legal framework is virtually 
complete. AIReF’s recruitment of staff, other than 
its managing board – i.e., president and three 
directors – took place during the summer of 2014, 
eight months after its establishment. However, this 
has not prevented the authority from publishing 
various reports and opinions, including on the 
macroeconomic and budgetary forecasts for 2015. 
Recommendations given by AIReF in its reports 
and opinions are not legally binding on addressees. 
However, if the addressee of an AIReF report 
decides to ignore its advice, it must explain why. 
Nevertheless, the effectiveness of AIReF’s 
recommendations is weakened by the lack of an 
explicit legal obligation on the addressee to 
publish such explanations, as recommended by the 
common principles on national fiscal correction 
mechanisms. 
The implementation of the budget stability law 
at regional level was softer than in 2013. Despite 
visible deterioration in regional public finances 
throughout 2014, none of the preventive measures 
set out in Spain’s Budgetary Stability Organic Law 
were enforced on regions at risk of non-
compliance. This was in spite of Spain’s 
independent fiscal institution (AIReF) 
recommending to the central government the 
activation of such measures in early December 
2014. In addition, compared with 2013, the 
adoption of corrective measures was slow, with the 
majority of the economic and financial plans only 
approved at the end of 2014. Admittedly, the 
Budgetary Stability Law sets out a two-year period 
– i.e., the current and subsequent year – to achieve 
compliance with the targets, and earmarked 
revenues to regional governments under the 
current financing system have increased in 2015. 
However, any deviation in the budget outcome will 
carry over on to 2015, thus making it difficult for 
regional governments to comply with a demanding 
deficit target of 0.7 % of GDP. Against this 
backdrop, in December 2014 the central 
government adopted measures to improve 
financing conditions for sub-central 
governments.(29) These measures will help 
regional governments reach their 2015 deficit 
                                                          
(29) Royal Decree Law 17/2014, to ease liquidity to regional 
governments.  
targets, but they risk weakening fiscal discipline 
and creating moral hazard on them. 
The enforcement of Spain’s legal provisions on 
late payments has started with the publication 
of comparable data on public sector commercial 
arrears. Late payments have detrimental effects 
on the business environment, by exacerbating the 
burden of already financially-constrained firms 
which can ultimately push them out of 
business.(30)  To that end, throughout 2012-2014 
Spain’s central government implemented a scheme 
to repay regions and local entities' commercial 
arrears (i.e., the suppliers' payment scheme). An 
additional scheme (the regional liquidity fund), 
still in place, was set up to help regions' meet their 
public deficit financing needs. Spain’s stability law 
was also amended in December 2013 so that all 
general government subsectors comply with the 
30-day average payment rule for commercial 
transactions set out by Directive 2011/7/EU, in 
force since March 2013.(31) The amendments, 
whose implementation is currently being evaluated 
by the Commission services, mandate all 
administrative bodies to publish regularly on their 
website their average payment period and set out a 
procedure to monitor compliance by the Ministry 
of Finance. The first data for average payment 
periods calculated according to a standard 
methodology and covering all general government 
sub-sectors was published in October 2014. This 
publication triggered the launch of the procedure 
to ensure compliance with the above-mentioned 
legal obligation, albeit more than ten months after 
the entry into force of the law. According to the 
latest published data referred to November 2014, 
Spain’s social security administration boasts the 
lowest average payment period of all general 
government subsectors, followed by the central 
government. Local entities have on average shorter 
payment periods than regions, although both of 
them are well above the 30 day limit. Other private 
sector institutions publish data measuring the 
length of public sector payments.(32) Discrepancies 
                                                          
(30) European Economy, The economic impact of late 
payments. Economic papers 531. September 2014.  
(31) Directive 2011/7/EU of of 16 February 2011 on combating 
late payment in commercial transactions. 
(32) These include i) CEPYME (Spanish SMEs business 
organisation) via a late payment report carried out with the 
collaboration of the Spanish Ministry of Industry; ii) ATA 
(self-employed association); iii) Plataforma multi sectorial 
contra la morosidad (confederation of business 
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with official data are due to methodological issues, 
namely the fact that official figures report average 
payment delays in excess of the 30 day legal limit. 
Complying with the 30-day average payment rule 
remains a challenge, in particular, at sub-central 
government level.     
The government set up in June 2014 a taskforce 
looking into expenditure reduction in Spain’s 
regions. The working group has looked into ways 
to further rationalise spending in areas such as 
healthcare, education, social spending and public 
administration. To be effective, measures have to 
be agreed at the meeting of the Financial and 
Fiscal Policy Council (a forum gathering 
representatives from the regions and central 
government’s finance departments), and then be 
legislated. At the time of writing, measures had 
been identified but these have not been published 
and no agreement has been reached at the 
Financial and Fiscal Policy Council on their 
adoption.  
Despite improvements, several features in the 
region’s budget process fall behind best 
practice. Transparency of budget execution has 
increased considerably in Spain. This follows the 
publication of more systematic and higher-
frequency regional and local government 
budgetary data, both in terms of cash and national 
accounts and the creation of the Ministry of 
Finance’s database gathering budgetary and 
economic information. However, there is 
considerable room to improve budgetary practices 
and transparency at regional level. Firstly, several 
mandates of Spain’s Stability Law have not been 
observed at that level. To illustrate, some regional 
governments(33) still do not prepare their 
respective multiannual budget frameworks, with 
among other things, specification of revenues and 
expenditures for the years covered. Moreover, 
virtually all regions keep failing to include in their 
draft budgets and general accounts information on 
the entirety of entities coming within the scope of 
the stability law. Furthermore, the 2015 draft 
budgets of regional governments did not contain 
                                                                                   
associations); and iv) Intrum Justitia (credit management 
company). 
(33) Andalusia, Asturias, Extremadura, Galicia and 
Madrid.http://www.minhap.gob.es/Documentacion/Publico
/PortalVarios/FinanciacionTerritorial/Autonomica/Proyect
oPresupuesto/Resumen_ejecutivo_presupuestos_2015.pdf  
enough relevant information to allow verification 
of compliance with the expenditure rule and public 
debt targets.(34) Secondly, a greater degree of 
convergence of budgetary and public accounting 
practices at region’s level would facilitate the 
comparison and the consolidation of budget data 
for all public administrations, in particular as 
regards the economic classification of expenditure 
and revenue items and the classification by 
expenditure programmes.(35) Lastly, there is a case 
for tightening the conditions governing the use of 
extra-budgetary accounts (such as the 413/409 
account) at sub central government level, in the 
interest of transparency and to avoid cumulating 
public sector commercial arrears.  
Taxation 
Spain has made its tax system more conducive 
to growth and job creation, but failed to make it 
contribute more to the preservation of the 
environment and the stability of revenues. The 
2014 tax reform is centred on corporate income 
taxation, where a broadening of the tax base is 
more than compensated for by a lowering of tax 
rates, and on personal income taxation, where rates 
are reduced across the board. The reform, which is 
planned to be phased in over 2015-16, is not fully 
funded. Spanish authorities estimate it will involve 
an ex ante fiscal cost of some EUR 9 billion (0.9 % 
of GDP) by 2016, falling to EUR 6.7 billion ex 
post when (quite significant) estimated second-
round effects on growth and employment are 
accounted for. Although many of the elements of 
the reform constitute steps in the right direction, 
the reform could have been more ambitious, better 
targeted and more supportive of Spain’s efforts to 
revamp its economy and meet its fiscal 
consolidation requirements. 
The reform of personal income taxation lowers 
the tax burden primarily for the individuals 
with very low or very high income. The reform 
                                                          
(34) 
http://www.airef.es/system/assets/archives/000/000/394/ori
ginal/Report_on_the_Draft_Budgets_and_Main_Budgetary
_Lines_of_the_General_Government_2015.pdf?14223502
98  
(35) Opinion on changes in the budgetary cycle, Autoridad 
Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal - AIReF, July 
2014. 
http://www.airef.es/system/assets/archives/000/000/058/ori
ginal/opinionaboutchangestobudgetarycycleprocedures-
140721121648-phpapp02.pdf?1412180958 
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takes into account some social concerns, e.g. 
through higher allowances for children (Box 
3.3.1). The number of personal tax rates will be 
lowered from 7 to 5 and many taxpayers will 
benefit from a lower average tax rate. The 
government estimates that 20 million taxpayers 
will enjoy higher disposable income as a result of 
the personal income taxation cuts. The changes to 
marginal tax rates, however, present a less 
consistent picture, with marginal tax rates falling 
most for those individuals earning either very low 
or very high incomes (Graph 3.1.1). The lowest tax 
rate drops from 24.75 % to 20 - % in 2015 and then 
to 19 % from 2016. The highest tax rate drops 
from 52 % to 47 % in 2015 and then to 45 % in 
2016. Although middle-income earners benefit 
from lower average income tax rates, those earning 
between EUR 20 200 and 33 000 a year actually 
face a temporary increase in the marginal tax rate 
from 30 % to 31 % in 2015, before the rate falls 
back to 30 % in 2016, which is two percentage 
points higher than the pre-crisis marginal rate. 
Whereas individuals earning more than EUR 
175 000 a year see their marginal tax rate falling 
back to where it was before the crisis, income 
earners in the EUR 60 000-175 000 range only see 
a partial reversal of the 2012 tax hike. 
The personal income tax reform goes some way 
to reduce the tax wedge on labour. The tax 
wedge is reduced by exempting income up to EUR 
12 000 from personal income tax and by lowering 
rates. However, a bigger and more immediate 
impact on employment would probably have been 
achieved if the still relatively high employer social 
security contributions had been reduced instead. 
Recently, the government extended by three 
months the temporary EUR 100 flat rate employer 
contribution to social security for new permanent 
contracts, a measure it had originally introduced 
for the period end-February 2014 to end-December 
2014. The rate is applicable for two years provided 
the hiring is maintained for three years. By the end 
of December 2014, the flat rate had been applied to 
177 731 new indefinite contracts (approximately 
25 % of all such contracts signed between end-
February and end-December 2014). The measure 
is not targeted at any particular group and, being a 
flat rate, its incentive effect rises with income, 
which could make it an expensive way of 
promoting employment.  
The savings income tax schedule is gradually 
reverting to the rates prevailing before the 2012 
tax hikes, with the exception of incomes above 
EUR 50 000, which will be taxed at 23 % as from 
2016, i.e. two percentage points above the pre-
crisis rate. Thus, some of the increased 
progressiveness introduced in 2012 is maintained. 
The higher-than-pre-crisis rate should also be seen 
in connection with the reduction in the corporate 
income taxation rate, which implies a shift of 
taxation from the corporate to the individual level. 
In corporate income taxation, the statutory rate 
is lowered and the base is broadened. The basic 
rate of corporate income taxation is reduced from 
30% to 28% on 1 January 2015 and to 25% in 
2016, a rate close to the euro area average. This 
could increase competitiveness, as in 2014 Spain 
had one of the highest marginal effective tax rates 
on new investment in the EU (both for investment 
financed by debt and equity). The lower rate will 
also reduce the debt bias in corporate taxation. To 
broaden the base and to reduce the relatively high 
debt bias, the deductibility of impairments losses is 
reduced and the limit on financial costs 
deductibility is maintained. 
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Some progress has been made in reducing the 
high level of tax expenditure in direct taxation. 
Tax expenditure in personal income taxation is still 
high at 37.4 % of estimated revenues. The main tax 
benefits are the deduction for labour income, the 
deduction for families, the transitional 
arrangements for the housing tax credit and the 
deductions for contributions to pension plans. The 
housing deduction is, however, being phased out 
and the tax reform reduced the ceiling for pension 
plan contributions. Tax expenditure in corporate 
income taxation amounts to about 10 % of 
estimated revenue, the main drivers being the 
reduced rate for SMEs, the R&D tax credit, the 
deduction for SME reinvestment of profits and the 
reduced rate for new companies. The reform has 
repealed some of the SME tax advantages — e.g. 
the 25 % preferential tax rate as a consequence of 
the reduction in the general statutory rate and the 
accelerated depreciation in case of reinvestment in 
assets — and a number of tax credits — e.g. 
reinvestment of profits and staff training. 
Boosting productive investment remains a 
challenge. One of the objectives behind the tax 
reform was to stimulate investment and 
competitiveness given that Spanish capital 
formation contracted sharply during the crisis. The 
general reduction of the statutory tax rate will 
reduce the cost of capital and could contribute to 
enhancing investment. Some tax incentives, in 
particular the R&D tax credit, are also tax features 
aimed at supporting productive activities. The 
uptake of the R&D tax incentives in the past has 
been low due to complexity and uncertainty, while 
the scheme has been very generous.(36) The 
changes introduced with the Entrepreneurship Law 
in September 2013 go in the right direction to 
facilitate access, in particular for younger and 
smaller companies, but the efficiency of the 
instrument is yet to be seen. 
The overall reductions in direct taxation have 
not been accompanied by any significant 
increases in indirect taxation. This could 
jeopardise the scheduled achievement of fiscal 
consolidation targets, hamper the necessary 
rebalancing of growth away from domestic 
demand, and limit the improvement in efficiency 
of the Spanish tax system. Apart from some minor 
technical changes to VAT, prompted by 
infringement procedures launched by the European 
Commission, such as the exclusion of notary 
services from VAT exemption and the application 
of the standard rate to some medical equipment, 
                                                          
(36) Bravo-Biosca, A., C. Criscuolo and C. Menon, 2013, What 
drives the dynamics of business growth? OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Policy Papers 1. 
Graph 3.1.1: Tax rates in personal income taxation 
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not much has been done to broaden the base in 
indirect taxation. The VAT revenue ratio in Spain 
remains among the lowest in the EU.  
Spain remains among the Member States with 
the lowest proportion of environmental taxes in 
GDP. While a number of environmental taxes on 
electricity, nuclear energy and fluorinated 
greenhouse gases had been introduced in 2012 and 
2013, and a hydroelectric royalty created, the tax 
reform is expected to imply only a limited change 
to environmental taxation. Spain is expected to 
remain among the countries with the lowest 
environmental taxation.(37) In particular, taxation 
on motor fuel did not increase in 2014. Energy 
taxation seems to be underused as a growth-
friendly revenue source(38) especially in the 
context of falling fuel prices which have eroded 
the incentive for efficient energy use. However, it 
must be said that in December 2014 the 
government has submitted to parliament a draft 
law including new taxes on the exploration and 
production of hydrocarbons. Equally, no progress 
has been made to shift property taxation from high 
— and relatively distortionary — transaction-
based taxes to less distortionary recurrent property 
taxation.  
Spain has adopted new measures aimed at 
fighting tax fraud and evasion. Lists of tax 
evaders will be made public, the tax haven list will 
be updated annually, and more flexibility has been 
introduced in the assessment of taxes in cases of 
tax crime, so as to avoid tax evasion becoming 
embroiled in lengthy procedures. In the context of 
the reform, there are new legal rules on corporate 
income taxation. They limit the deduction of 
financial costs linked to elusive intra-group 
transactions, address hybrid mismatches leading to 
double non-taxation, and broaden the scope of the 
legislation on foreign-owned companies to capture 
new tax avoidance schemes. In personal income 
taxation, there has been a reduction in the scope of 
business activities where the tax base is estimated 
by referring to parameters such as the size of 
facilities, number of employees or others, which 
                                                          
(37) In 2012 environmental taxes in Spain amounted to 1.6 % of 
GDP against an EU average of 2.4 %. See also: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/
taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_papers/taxation_
paper_48.pdf. 
(38) E.g. Spain taxes diesel used as propellant at the EU 
minimum level. 
reduces the chances of fake invoicing. Some anti-
fraud measures in the field of VAT have also been 
taken, e.g. a reduction of the scope of the 
exemption for goods in tax warehouses, a wider 
application of the ‘reverse charge mechanism’ for, 
for example, mobile phones and electronic devices, 
and new inspection procedures. According to the 
Spanish Ministry of Finance, the tax collection 
arising from the fight against fraud has increased 
steadily in the last ten years, the amounts collected 
in 2014 - €12.3 billion - being twice as large as 
those in 2006. The Inland Revenue does not 
estimate the tax gap as an indicator of the tax 
revenue forgone due to, among others, tax evasion 
and fraud. Estimates of the tax gap can be useful 
tools to monitor and evaluate the operational 
performance of tax administrations. In spite of the 
recommendation from the Committee of Experts 
for the tax reform, no new data matching tools 
have been put in place; notwithstanding that, the 
Spanish authorities refer to a number of reporting 
obligations approved in the last years (which 
should contribute to an improvement of the fight 
against fraud) and to specific tax control activities 
linked to the legislation limiting payments in cash 
(more than 4000 tax inspection interventions 
which led to 1034 sanction procedures). In its 
latest report referred to years 2010 to 2012 the 
Spanish Court of Auditors pointed out that the 
Inland Revenue has scope to improve its strategic 
planning, coordination and systematization of the 
auditing plans. Notwithstanding that, the report 
acknowledges that the results of the fight against 
fraud grew significantly year after year and that 
outcomes were better than expected. 
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Some progress has been made in fighting 
undeclared work. Complementing the ‘Plan 
against undeclared work and fraud’ (adopted in 
April 2012), the government created in January 
2014 a special unit that will collaborate with and 
support tribunals and the General State Attorney in 
the fight against undeclared work and social 
security fraud. As a result of measures taken, the 
working situation of 320 000 workers had been 
regularised by November 2014, of which 200 000 
had not even been registered in the social security 
system. Reinforced actions to fight undeclared 
work have also unveiled that during 2014, 
infringements of agreed working hours between 
employer and employee were found in 60 % of the 
cases investigated, meaning an increase of 20 
percentage points from 2013. It is important to 
monitor the effect of these measures closely. 
Progress has been slow in removing tax-related 
obstacles to the smooth functioning of Spain’s 
internal market. A minimum tax rate of 0.03 % 
has been introduced for the bank deposits tax, 
which could improve harmonisation of taxation 
among the Autonomous Communities. However, 
no specific measures have been adopted to address 
the wide differences in taxation that still remain 
throughout the regions such as in wealth-related 
taxes. 
 
Graph 3.1.2: Environmental tax revenue by type of tax (2012, percentage of GDP) 
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Labour market 
The benefits of the incipient employment 
recovery have only marginally benefited the 
more disadvantaged groups, such as young 
people and women. For the first time since 2008, 
youth unemployment has started to decline, 
although it remains at exceptionally high levels. As 
of Q4-2014, the unemployment rate for the 15-24 
age group stood at 51.8 %, down from 54.9 % in 
2013, and a more consistent decrease of 
unemployment has been recorded for the 25-29 
age group. However, unemployment continues to 
particularly affect young people with low 
education attainment (60.4 % in Q4-2014) (Graph 
3.2.1). In addition, the rate of young people not in 
education, employment or training remained stable 
during 2013 and 2014, with more than 71.2 % of 
them actively looking for a job, and 35.5 % 
declaring themselves not to be registered in the 
employment services. The employment rate of 
women has increased to 50.1 % (Q4-2014), albeit 
with a wide differentiation across education levels. 
Female employment in Spain continues to be 
predominantly characterised by part-time work, 
although far from by choice, in particular due to 
difficulties to reconcile work with family life. 
Moreover, the recently adopted tax reform is 
already being implemented, and fiscal 
disincentives for low-income second earners to 
enter the labour market remain, as joint 
declarations are still an option for couples. (39) 
                                                          
(39) Joint declarations have a special tax relief (EUR 3 400) and 
are favoured through the 'incomes accumulation' scheme. 
When both individuals work, their incomes are added and 
the second earners (generally women) are taxed with 
increasingly higher marginal rates. In fact, the sustainment 
of the EUR 3 400 deduction is proportionally lower in a 
context of a generalized tax rates decreases (especially for 
low-earners). Moreover, the increase in the exemption of 
labour income earners with income below EUR 12 000 
(previously: EUR 11 162) is only expected to affect 3 % of 
total contributors.  
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New hires, in particular young people, have 
borne a substantial part of the brunt of 
adjustment through the erosion of earnings 
from work. Recent labour market reforms have 
increased internal and external flexibility and 
enhanced the responsiveness of wages to 
prevailing market conditions; in addition, several 
new measures aim specifically at facilitating the 
entry of young and unqualified workers into the 
labour market. Nevertheless, evidence suggests 
that wage adjustment has been achieved initially 
for young people employed with temporary 
contracts to a large extent through wage cuts at 
moment of renewal of new temporary contract. 
Between 2008 and 2013, the first salary of full-
time new hires has dropped in real terms by 17 % 
for men and 13 % for women. For part-time 
workers, their decrease of first salaries in real 
terms is double: 23 % and 16 % for men and 
women, respectively. Among young people, the 
entry salary has dropped from EUR 1 210 in 2008 
to EUR 890 in 2013 (-35 % in real terms).  
In-work poverty continues to affect 10.5 % of 
the working population, particularly among 
women, the low-skilled and temporary workers. 
In terms of labour market status, recent years 
marked a significant increase in poverty amongst 
the adult unemployed and an increase in poverty 
rates amongst the employed, the latter partially 
explained by decreasing earnings and the spillover 
of the household's labour market status. Some 
19.6 % of young workers (aged 18-24) were at risk 
of poverty in 2013 (10 percentage points more than 
in 2007). Gender also plays a role, mostly owing to 
the incidence of part-time work: in the same age 
group, women faced an increased risk of poverty, 
5.8 percentage points more than men. The in-work 
poverty rate is higher most notably for employed 
single parents with dependent children, low-skilled 
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and temporary workers, and workers with a part-
time contract (Graph 3.2.2).   
Graph 3.2.2: In-work poverty 
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Self-employment has maintained similar levels 
as in 2013, supported by the steady use of 
incentives. On 31 December 2014 there were         
3 078 000 self-employed workers in Spain, an 
increase of 1.4% year-on-year. The majority of 
self-employed workers are not employers (67 %). 
Young self-employed are also increasing, partly 
due to the measures introduced in 2013 to promote 
entrepreneurship and self-employment among the 
young. According to data from the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security, the flat rate in the 
contributions to social security for new, young 
self-employed has benefited more than 300 000 
people, of which more than 100 000 are aged under 
30. The government is weighing the possibility of 
broadening the scope of the beneficiaries of the flat 
rate to those already constituted self-employed that 
create a first job hiring a young worker under 30, 
as long as he/she maintains the level of 
employment for the whole period in which he/she 
will benefit from the flat rate. The measure may 
also be extended to self-employed that constitute a 
trading company. 
The geographical labour mobility of workers 
remains comparatively low and concentrated 
among particular groups such as young people 
and migrants. Labour mobility picked up in 2014, 
but remains predominantly concentrated among 
young people (with 4.4 % of employed people 
aged between 16 and 34, more than 200 000 
people) and workers of foreign origin. The positive 
labour market effects of inter-regional mobility are 
hindered by the overall low mobility of the 
unemployed, as 81.4 % of the jobless have been 
living in the same municipality for at least five 
years and only 14.1 % of them has moved to 
another region to search for a job.  
The modernisation of the public employment 
service is still lagging behind and risks having 
negative effects for the implementation of 
activation policies. Spain has taken a number of 
actions to coordinate the functioning and offer of 
the Public Employment Service across the regions. 
The 2015 budget has increased the investment on 
the modernisation of the Public Employment 
Service by EUR 85 million over 2014. Spain has 
started to implement a new coordination system 
between regional employment services and 
consolidated the allocation of resources to the 
regions based on performance indicators. 
Moreover, a common services catalogue (still to be 
effectively implemented by the regional 
employment services)(40) and a best practices 
exchange programme among the national and 
regional public employment services are set, to 
promote mutual learning and guarantee minimum 
service standards across the country to all 
unemployed. To improve the circulation of job 
vacancies across the country, the Single job portal 
has been operational since July 2014, although 
posted job vacancies have not seemed to be 
expanding significantly since the start-up phase. 
Cooperation of public employment services with 
private placement agencies has also been 
strengthened. With a budgetary allocation of EUR 
30 million for 2014 and EUR 110 million for 2015, 
the Public Employment Service funds private 
agencies providing intermediation services.(41) 
Moreover, law 18/2014 of 15 October broadened 
the scope of the intermediation activity of 
placement agencies and temporary work agencies. 
It includes extending their functions to the 
provision of training services for professional 
qualification, counselling and human resources 
consulting services. Nevertheless, administrative 
inefficiencies risk halting the full roll-out of the 
public-private cooperation, as evidenced by a 
recent court case. No plans to evaluate placement 
agencies' performance have been announced for 
the time being. Furthermore, the overall reduction 
                                                          
(40) Royal Decree 7/2015 of 16 January 2015 
(41) The private agencies will receive between EUR  1 000 and 
EUR 3 500 for each unemployed person they place in 
employment for, at least, 6 months. 
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of staff reduction between 2011 and 2014 may 
undermine the ability of regional employment 
services to provide individualised assistance to 
jobseekers remains at risk and might have a 
negative impact also on the implementation of the 
Youth Guarantee, and the newly adopted 
programme for activation of the long-term 
unemployed.  
The national Youth Guarantee system still 
needs to demonstrate its effectiveness in 
stimulating youth employment. Spain deployed a 
number of measures between 2013 and 2014 under 
the 2013-16 Youth Employment and 
Entrepreneurship Strategy. According to national 
data, until December 2014 almost 365 000 young 
people benefited from the actions developed under 
the Strategy, most of them from employment 
subsidies. In parallel, the national Youth Guarantee 
system was set up in July 2014,(42) but since then 
only limited numbers of the target population have 
registered in the system. Although some actions 
have been taken at regional level to improve 
outreach to non-registered young people not in 
employment, education or training and regional 
employment services are expected to scale-up their 
involvement, delays in the implementation of these 
measures raise strong concerns about the coverage 
of the national Youth Guarantee system. 
Additionally, the lack of complementary national 
funding to the European Social Fund and the 
European Employment Initiative could undermine 
the implementation of the Youth Guarantee in the 
medium and long-term.  
The training and apprenticeship contract saw 
encouraging results in 2014. The use of this 
contract increased by 31.8 % between 2013 and 
2014, (+33 763 contracts). Further measures were 
adopted in January 2015 to incentivise employers 
to finance training costs and the tutoring of young 
workers in the context of the Youth Guarantee 
(while specifying the functions of the company's 
tutor) and making public funds available for 
complementary training needs. 
The reform of the professional training system, 
which promotes market unity in training 
services, is on-going. It envisages a single training 
model for all the competent (national and regional) 
administrations. In 2014, the national Public 
                                                          
(42) Law 18/2014 of 15 October.  
Employment Service launched a pilot call for 
tenders for professional training, which included 
already some of the innovations that are provided 
for in the reform, such as the allocation of 50 % of 
funding open to competitive tendering (compared 
with 20 % in 2013) and the sectorial orientation of 
the training courses. The draft reform also includes 
some positive elements, such as the definition of 
effective training on the basis on a multiannual 
forecast and prospective analysis of the labour 
market. However, the enhancement of a 
coordinated information system, and permanent 
evaluation of its effectiveness through the capacity 
to track an individual’s training record (the 
'training account', introduced by the 2012 labour 
market reform) seems to be a major challenge.  
Education and training 
Early school-leaving and the mismatch between 
the education and training programmes and the 
labour market continue to be two of the main 
challenges facing education and training. Spain 
maintains one of the highest rates of early school- 
leaving, although it has continued to decrease – 
with substantial regional differentiation - from 
23.6% in 2013 to 22.3 % in Q3 2014 (Graph 3.2.3).  
Graph 3.2.3: Early school leaving in Spain, break-down by 
macro-regions 
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The decrease in early school leaving can be 
attributed, inter alia, to the effectiveness of 
specific regional programmes. Further positive 
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developments are expected through the 
implementation of a two-year initial vocational 
training (Formación profesional básica FPB) set 
up by the Organic Law for the Improvement of the 
Quality of Education. This new approach adds 
flexibility to the educational pathways, and intends 
to upgrade the quality of basic vocational 
education and training, compared with the former 
vocational programmes for which the 
abandonment rate was over 50 %. Only nine 
regions have developed the relevant legislation to 
implement the basic initial vocational training, 
resulting in a provisional enrolment of 34 684 
students in the school year 2014/2015, far below 
the government's initial expectations. The 
withdrawal and retention rate at the beginning of 
next school year will provide critical information 
to assess the real impact of this new scheme. 
The low level of basic skills has negative 
impacts in the quality of education and remains 
an obstacle for the employment prospects of 
young people. The performance of Spanish 15-
year-olds in basic skills (mathematics, reading and 
science) remains below the EU average, and with 
further significant geographical disparities. The 
situation is also worrying for the older cohort 
among adults. In addition, in some study areas, 
increasing of the labour market relevance of the 
programmes continues to be a challenge for Spain. 
To tackle shortcomings in skills development, 
the implementation of the new Organic Law for 
the Improvement of the Quality of Education 
(LOMCE) during the present school year will 
be crucial. The Organic Law for the Improvement 
of the Quality of Education has set up new 
curricula to improve basic skills in primary, 
secondary and vocational education and training. It 
also foresees the reinforcement of cross-cutting 
skills, particularly, language, entrepreneurship and 
ICT skills, at all education levels, which calls for 
specific training for teachers. Central and regional 
expenditure on education policies in the 2014 
budget represents an increase of 10.6 % compared 
with 2013. However, the replacement of retiring 
teachers, which has been a challenge since 2009 
and which dramatically increased the turnover of 
interim teachers at school level, remains an issue 
of concern.  
Some progress is being made to increase the 
labour relevance of skills through actions at 
secondary level and in lifelong learning. 
Participation in vocational education and training 
increased by more than 12 % in one year and 
almost by 30 % over the last two years, with a 
particular interest for the dual modality. However, 
the definition of the roles and responsibilities of 
each of the stakeholders (vocational education and 
training providers and firms) in dual vocational 
education and training remains unclear across the 
different regions. This can complicate the design 
and implementation of the tutor training at 
company level. Moreover, to address adults' skills 
shortcomings, Spain has elaborated a Strategic 
Plan for Lifelong Learning that aims at improving 
the quality of training, with an ultimate goal to 
upgrade the professional, social and personal 
skills. The use of ICT tools is promoted and 
supported, to allow citizens to reconcile training 
with their personal and work life.  
Spain is devising a National Skills Strategy, led 
by the Ministry of Education. The exercise, 
together with the OECD and the European 
Commission, brings together seven different 
ministries and hosts a multi sectorial dialogue 
between the government, the regions and the social 
and economic stakeholders on how to improve the 
quality and labour market relevance of education 
outcomes to support economic growth. 
The reform of the higher education system  
aims to improve the excellence, innovation, 
competitiveness and internationalisation of the 
Spanish universities. The reform, to be 
progressively implemented from 2015,  envisages 
the effective implementation of the National 
Qualification Framework, encouraging universities 
to focus on particular fields of expertise, reforming 
the access to the teaching profession and 
increasing the campus autonomy to establish the 
amount of credits dedicated to a degree. However, 
some critical issues, such as the dispersion of the 
offer against the quality remain yet unaddressed.  
Social policies 
Despite the recent improvements in the labour 
market, a high number of people remain at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion in Spain. More 
than 12.6 million people were at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion in 2013. In addition, Spain was 
among the EU countries where income inequality 
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registered higher figures in 2013(43) and the 
poverty gap had increased substantially since 
2007.(44) Children and young adults remain the 
groups most affected by poverty,(45) and single-
parent households face also a higher risk. The 
number of people suffering from severe material 
deprivation has increased to 6.2 % in 2013 from 
5.8 % one year earlier (+154 000). The situation of 
specific groups traditionally more affected by 
poverty and social exclusion (such as migrants, 
Roma population and people with disabilities) has 
significantly worsened during the crisis. In the case 
of non-EU migrants, unemployment rates reached 
38.1 %, 54.1 % were at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, and severe material deprivation for this 
group was 11.5 pp higher than for the overall 
population in 2013. In this same year, 72 % of the 
Roma population were in a situation of social 
exclusion and 54% in severe exclusion, more than 
double the figure of 2009 (26 %).  
The social protection system remains 
challenged in terms of coverage and efficiency 
and shows limited redistributive effects across 
income groups. In the back of the persistent 
unemployment, the number of households with no 
income has reached 740 500 in Q2-2014 (almost 
double than in 2008). There has been some 
improvement, but the impact of social protection in 
reducing poverty, in particular child poverty, 
remains low in Spain (27.6 % as compared with 
41.3 % for the EU in 2013). In Spain, the average 
spending per child increases with household 
income. This regressive distribution of benefits is 
partly due to the focus of the measures on new-
borns and young children, who tend to be over-
represented in higher income quintiles. 
Affordability and availability remain obstacles in 
accessing early childhood education and care.  
Moreover, the allocation of income support 
schemes and benefits are scattered across many 
                                                          
(43) S80/S20 income quintile share ratio stood at 6.3 in 2013, 
the fourth highest in the EU. 
(44) EU Employment and Social Situation Quarterly Review 
(supplement September 2014): Real incomes in the first 
and second quintiles have declined the most and remain 
almost 20 and 10 points lower than in 2003. Real median 
incomes of individuals in richer quintile groups have also 
declined, but not as much and are no lower than in 2003. 
Also the population share in households in the lowest 
income quintile reporting financial distress (45.8 % in Q2-
2014) has increased by 7.7 percentage points in one year, 
the highest increase in the EU. 
(45) 27.5 % amongst children aged up to 17 and 28.2 % 
amongst people aged 18-24. 
different institutions and levels of government, and 
unified criteria and a national information database 
are lacking. In the case of regional minimum 
income schemes, the varied eligibility criteria and 
systems, combined with difficulties to transfer 
rights between regional systems may both impact 
negatively on incentives to take up work and on 
labour mobility.  
Limited progress was made in ensuring an 
integrated approach between social protection 
and activation strategies. The National Action 
Plan for Social Inclusion 2013-2016 aims at 
fostering inclusion through the employability of 
those further away from the labour market through 
measures such as the provision of individualized 
integrated pathways; ensuring an income scheme 
system to financially support those facing bigger 
difficulties and ensuring the provision of basic 
services, with a focus on vulnerable groups in the 
case of social services, education, healthcare and 
housing. However, there is still uncertainty on its 
effective implementation and no evaluation or 
impact assessment has been made available. In 
addition the plan needs to be complemented by the 
Integrated Family Support Plan (PIAF), announced 
in the 2014 National Reform Programme. 
Limited progress has been made on 
strengthening coordination between 
employment and social services for adapting 
active labour market policies to those at risk 
and to support transitions between social 
protection and the labour market. The July 2014 
agreement signed by the government and the social 
partners sets out the intention to assess, together 
with the Autonomous Communities, the various 
models of income schemes in terms of coverage 
and their link to employability. If translated into 
concrete measures, the agreement could be a basis 
for boosting the efficiency of the social protection 
system in order to overcome the challenges related 
to coverage and adequacy. An activation 
programme was set up for the long-term 
unemployed. It targets the long-term unemployed 
who have exhausted unemployment benefits and 
are no longer covered by assistance schemes.(46) 
                                                          
(46) The PREPARA programme provides financial support for 
long-term unemployed people who have no further right to 
unemployment benefit or insurance, and who are receiving 
job-search-related training and guidance related to job 
search. The Temporary Unemployment Protection and 
Insertion Programme (PRODI) launched in 2009, provided 
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The programme combines a financial support of 
EUR 426 during six months with individualised 
pathways for labour integration. While highly 
necessary, this new programme adds on an 
additional layer to the already highly fragmented 
system of existing schemes of income support, 
thereby reducing the effectiveness of the social 
protection system.  
Finally, limited progress has been made to 
improve the situation of low-income households 
with children, despite some modest initiatives. A 
special allocation of EUR 17 million was included 
in the 2014 national budget intended to tackle 
severe material deprivation of families with 
dependent children, including Roma. The budget 
of the 2nd National Strategic Plan for Infancy and 
Adolescence 2013-2016 (PENIA II) adopted on 5 
April 2013 has been increased by 20.5 %  for 2015 
and a specific new allocation of EUR 32 million 
for combatting child poverty has been included in 
the 2015 budget. Also the recent tax reform 
includes changes in the personal income tax such 
as tax reliefs for large families (deductions have 
increased particularly for families with five or 
more children) and other groups facing specific 
needs (such as people with disabilities). However, 
these measures do not represent a comprehensive 
framework to counter the persistent high levels of 
child poverty. 
                                                                                   
for an economic support to the unemployed having 
exhausted their benefits. Finally the Active Insertion 
Income (RAI) provides financial support to people aged 45 
or more, who are unemployed for at least 1 year and have 
exhausted their benefits and/or the unemployment subsidy 
and who lack income of more than 75 % of the minimum 
wage. 
3.3. PRODUCTS AND SERVICES MARKETS 
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Business environment 
Reforms in product markets are crucial to 
foster the reallocation of resources towards 
more productive and sustainable sectors. The 
challenge facing Spain’s product market reforms 
consist of removing obstacles to competition, 
including on professional services, addressing 
regulatory fragmentation, reducing red tape and 
barriers to business growth (see section 2.1) and 
putting in place innovation-friendly framework 
conditions. These policies are also needed as a 
complement to the labour market reform, to avoid 
that competitiveness gains from wage moderation 
are diluted by rising profits in competition-
sheltered markets.  
The implementation of the law on market unity 
is behind schedule. The law aims at removing 
measures that may directly or indirectly obstruct 
the free movement of goods and services and the 
establishment of economic operators throughout 
Spain.(47) It addresses regulatory fragmentation in 
Spain’s internal market, originating from 
disparities in central and sub-central government 
legislation governing access to and exercise of 
economic activities. As of September 2014, all 
articles of the law had entered into force. The law 
sets a period of six months to amend provisions in 
sector-specific legislation that are in direct 
opposition with it. However, this deadline has not 
been met and around 400 proposals for 
amendments (covering mostly regional legislation 
on tourism, agriculture, manufacturing, health, 
social services and gambling) were still being 
processed at the time of writing. This delay raises 
concerns about the effective and timely 
implementation of this law. In parallel, 20 sectoral 
conferences - i.e., bodies with central and regional 
government representatives working to adapt 
regulatory frameworks to principles of the law on 
market unity- had been convened. 34 technical 
                                                          
(47) See Market reforms at work. European Economy 5/2014, 
September 2014. This report estimates the potential impact 
of selected reforms in Spain Italy, Portugal and Greece. It 
shows that reforms implemented by mid-2013 are 
estimated to boost labour productivity in the sectors 
affected by the Directive by around 5.7 % in Spain. Given 
that the directive covers an average of 40 % of GDP in the 
four countries, the full economy-wide effects should be 
considerable. Similarly, an ambitious implementation of 
the law on market unity, which is broader in scope than the 
Services Directive and on which it is modelled, could have 
a positive effect on productivity growth.  
groups on specific policy areas reporting to them 
have been created and tasked with the review of 
regional authorisation schemes and the 
requirements for access to and exercise of 
economic activities. The findings and proposals of 
the working groups have to be discussed and 
agreed at the corresponding sectoral conferences, 
and then, be legislated by the central and regional 
governments. However, no such agreement had 
been reached at sectoral conference level at the 
cut-off date of this report other than in the area of 
gambling. Moreover, with regional legislatures 
coming to an end in the first half of 2015 and 
lengthy decision-making processes, the outcome of 
these conferences remains uncertain. While the 
Council for Market Unity, a central-government 
body for monitoring the application of the law, 
agreed in late January 2015 on measures to speed 
up its implementation, further delays cannot be 
excluded.  
In spite of recent progress, it is still relatively 
cumbersome to start up a business in Spain. 
Several measures have been adopted in recent 
years to simplify business start-ups. Combined, 
these changes have helped to improve Spain’s 
position in international rankings on company 
creation. The 2015 edition of the World Bank’s 
Doing Business report ranks Spain at 74th position 
for the ease of starting up a company (it was 115th 
in the 2014 edition). Despite considerable 
progress, it is still more cumbersome to start a 
business in Spain than in other European countries 
sharing similar legal systems, a fact that could 
translate into lower firm dynamics.(48) Other 
measures have been adopted to ease business 
licensing, such on environmental permits. With 
these measures now in force, the focus is on 
implementing them, including at regional level. A 
forthcoming study measuring the ease of getting 
licences shows that time needed, costs incurred 
and number of permits required to carry out 
selected economic activities is relatively high in 
                                                          
(48) Business dynamics and red tape barriers European 
Economy Economic Papers 532, September 2014. The 
study aims at estimating the impact of changes in the 
administrative cost of starting a business and/or exporting 
on entry dynamics in 17 European countries over 2004-
2011. It shows that the higher the level of red tape barriers, 
the lower entry dynamics. In the case of Spain, the 
decrease in the cost to start a new firm over the period 
2010-2014 is predicted to increase start-up rates from 
7.9 % to 9.2 %. 
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Spain, thus underpinning the case for sustained 
simplification efforts.(49) 
Some measures have been taken to reduce 
administrative burdens, but it is early to assess 
their impact. An excessive administrative burden 
is a significant impediment for businesses, 
particularly SMEs due to lower resources and 
internal expertise than larger companies to face 
compliance costs. Most recently available data 
point to government regulations in Spain being 
more burdensome than in the EU average.(50) 
Recent measures in this field include the signature 
in June 2014 of an agreement between the 
government and the two major business 
associations (CEOE, Cepyme) to cooperate in the 
identification and elimination of administrative 
burdens. The draft law amending Spain’s 
framework law on administrative procedure (see 
section 4.5) provides for an ex-ante evaluation of 
administrative burdens imposed by draft 
regulations within regulatory impact assessments. 
Lastly, the implementation of the ‘one-in one-out’ 
principle for administrative burden reduction set 
out in the September 2013 entrepreneurship law 
has started, albeit recently, following the approval 
of guidelines by the Spanish cabinet at the end of 
January 2015. Its application can cap the level of 
burdens and avoid that unnecessary ones are 
inadvertently added.  
There has been no progress in the 
implementation of the 2014 country specific 
recommendation on regulated professions. The 
implementation of the Services Directive in Spain 
reduced barriers to the access and exercise of 
various services activities, including for regulated 
professions (see Graph 3.3.2). However, this does 
not weaken the case for reforming professional 
services still further. Firstly, some professional 
activities are protected from competition by rights 
to provide services to the exclusion of other 
services providers with relevant professional 
qualifications. Secondly, a reform is overdue from 
a legal perspective. Law 25/2009, applicable since 
                                                          
(49) European Commission (forthcoming), Study on the 
compliance by Member States on the time needed to get 
licences and permits to take up and perform the specific 
activity of an enterprise as from beginning of 2014 
(50) See page 8 at  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-
analysis/performance-review/files/countries-
sheets/2014/spain_en.pdf  
end-December 2009, calls on the Spanish 
government to submit to Parliament -within the 
twelve months following its entry into force- a 
draft law spelling out which professions require 
membership in the relevant professional bodies. 
This internal legal requirement has not been 
observed to date. Thirdly, there is scope for 
improving the allocation of labour resources within 
the professional services sector. The Allocative 
Efficiency index(51) for Spain’s professional 
services stands on average at -12 % (see Graph 
3.3.2). This implies that average labour 
productivity is 12 % below the benchmark and is 
suggestive of factors hindering competition, such 
regulation or rent-seeking. Lastly, professional 
services are inputs for business, with their quality 
and competitiveness having considerable spill over 
effects across the whole economy. Given relatively 
high forward linkage effects, the price moderating 
effect through profit margin compression(52) of a 
competition-enhancing reform in professional 
services is likely to benefit the rest of the 
economy. A first draft law to reform professional 
services and professional associations was 
published on 2 August 2013. The draft law aimed 
to: i.limit the number of professions with 
mandatory membership to cases where this is 
justified and proportionate; ii.ensure that 
registration and membership fees to those 
professional associations do not create barriers to 
competition; iii.increase the transparency and 
accountability of professional associations vis-à-
vis consumers of professional services and its own 
members; and iv.ensure market unity in the access 
to and exercise of professional services in Spain. 
                                                          
(51) The Allocative Efficiency (AE) indicator compares labour 
productivity and market shares of firms in different size 
classes. A positive (negative) number for AE means that 
resources are allocated in a more (less) efficient way 
relative to the baseline, which assumes that market shares 
of the firms in the various size classes are uniformly 
distributed.  
(52) The Economic Impact of Professional Services 
Liberalisation European Economy Economic Papers 533, 
September 2014. The study evaluates the effects of 
regulatory barriers in four professions - legal, accounting, 
architectural and engineering- in the EU over 2008-2011. It 
concludes that regulation that is less strict improves their 
allocative efficiency in the professional services sector and 
reduces its larger-than-average profitability through 
intensified business dynamics. In the case of Spain, the 
decrease of OECD Product Market Reform indicator from 
2011 to 2013 increases the degree to which resources are 
efficiently allocated (allocative efficiency index) by 1.89 
percentage points and decreases profit rates by 1.78 
percentage points in legal services and by 0.99 in 
architectural services.  
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However, submission to parliament of the reform 
of professional services keeps being delayed. As 
the current legislature nears its end, these delays 
raise concerns about the timely adoption of this 
law.  
The July 2014 retail reform aims to facilitate 
the opening or expansion of retail trade 
establishments. In addition to capping the fees 
charged on the use of credit and debit cards, the 
reform increased by ten the number of cities with 
designated areas of total freedom of opening hours 
for all types of retail establishments (the so-called 
areas of large tourist turnout). Moreover, it eased 
licensing requirements by further limiting the 
number of instances where public bodies can 
condition the establishment, sale and expansion of 
a retail outlet on the granting of a permit, by 
setting out the principle of single authorisation and 
by halving the length of the licensing procedure. 
The amendments therefore go in the right 
direction. As in other policy areas, smooth 
implementation at sub-central government level 
will be crucial for these actions to deliver the 
expected results. The reform does not challenge 
other potential hurdles to retail trade (and other 
business) activities originating from land use and 
land classifications under applicable urban 
planning rules.(53) Tackling these restrictions 
would in any case require a separate legal 
intervention beyond retail trade policy.  
 
 
                                                          
(53) Problemas de Competencia en el mercado del suelo en 
España. Comisión Nacional de Mercados y de la 
Competencia – CNMC-, 2013.  
Innovation policy 
In spite of progress made, insufficient funding 
and structural weaknesses in the research and 
innovation system keeps limiting Spain’s 
growth potential. The latest performance 
indicators, albeit coming with a certain lag, show 
falling R&D intensity over time for all sectors of 
performance,(54) lower creation of start-ups and 
technology-based SMEs,(55) fewer SMEs in R&D-
intensive industries and knowledge-intensive 
services,(56) fewer firms introducing 
innovations,(57) lower employment rates for 
highly-skilled researchers and total business 
spending on R&D not being commensurate with 
the generosity of R&D tax breaks. 
Available evidence also points to relatively weak 
cooperation between the public and business R&D 
sector, to duplications and gaps between national 
and regional research and innovation programmes, 
and generally speaking, to a lack of innovation-
                                                          
(54) Total R&D intensity fell to 1.24 % of GDP in 2013. 
Business R&D intensity stood at 0.67% in 2013, down 
from 0.72 in 2008. 
(55) Venture capital investment fell to 0.14 % of GDP in 2012, 
with an average annual decrease of -12.5% since 2007. The 
European Knowledge Transfer Indicator Survey 2011-2012 
(UNU-MERIT) estimates 1.4 start-ups per 1 000 research 
staff in 2011 (1.7 for EU average, 2.4 for NL, 4.7 for SE).  
(56) 2014 Small Business Act fact sheet for Spain, European 
Commission 
(http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-
analysis/performance-review/files/countries-
sheets/2014/spain_en.pdf). 
(57) The Survey on Technological Innovation carried out by the 
National Statistics Institute in 2013 shows that in 2010-
2012 the number of innovative firms in Spain –i.e., 
companies having introduced product or process 
innovation- was 20 815 (13.2 % of the total number of 
firms with 10 or more employees). This number is less than 
half of the stock of innovative firms (49 415, or 25.3 % of 
total) in 2004-2006. 
Graph 3.3.1: Allocative efficiency in selected professional services and countries, 2011 
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friendly framework conditions. Spain’s research 
and innovation system needs greater financial and 
human resources. However, these would also have 
to be accompanied by structural reforms ensuring a 
more effective and efficient use of these resources. 
To that end, a recent independent review of 
Spain’s research and innovation system(58) 
revealed that its functioning has been inhibited by 
various factors. These included institutional 
rigidities in public research institutions and 
universities coupled with an insufficient use of 
performance criteria in fund allocation decisions, a 
low use of international panels to evaluate projects 
and weak incentives for science-industry 
cooperation. The review also pointed to weak 
coordination between national and regional 
research and innovation strategies and the lack of 
an effective system of impact evaluation at policy, 
programme and institutional levels. So far, the 
government has not presented a concrete follow-up 
response to the recommendations of the review. 
The latest R&D policy developments include an 
increase (from 10 % to 50 %) in the replacement 
rate of publicly employed researchers in 2015 and 
new programmes to support human resources such 
as 'Predoctoral fellowships in excellence centres’. 
Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart 
Specialisation (RIS3) have been adopted at central 
and regional government level. However, there 
still remain overlaps, and monitoring mechanisms 
and proper coordination are not optimal. The 
government is also set to implement the national 
strategy for science, technology and innovation, 
but funding in the 2015 budget is insufficient.(59) 
Moreover, the creation of the central government’s 
research agency keeps being delayed. Lastly, 
adequate funding and the implementation of 
                                                          
(58) The report can be found at 
http://www.mineco.gob.es/stfls/MICINN/Prensa/FICHER
OS/2014/140801_final_report_public_version.pdf  
(59) The 2015 central government budget law increases R&I 
financial and non-financial spending by 4.8 %, giving EUR 
291 million more than in the 2014 budget, of which EUR 
263m are additional financial assets (chapter 8) and the 
remaining EUR 29 million are additional non–financial 
spending (chapters 1 to 7). A substantial share of that 
increase is due to military R&I spending (up by EUR 220 
million vis-à-vis 2014) while another amount is earmarked 
to cover the second and third year arrears of R&D project 
grants (of three-year duration) committed in previous 
exercises. In practice, this leaves only a small portion of 
the public R&I budget increase to support the national 
strategy for science, technology and innovation. 
reforms are preconditions for ensuring  an efficient 
use of available EU funding(60).  
 
Graph 3.3.2: Existing restrictions before and after the 
implementation of the services directive 
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(60) Under the Partnership Agreement with Spain on using EU 
Structural and Investment Funds for growth and jobs in 
2014-2020, adopted by the Commission in October 2014, 
some EUR 4.6 billion from the European Regional 
Development Fund and the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development will be invested in strengthening 
research, technological development and innovation in 
Spain.  
3.4. NETWORK INDUSTRIES AND ENVIRONMENT 
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Energy 
Spain’s high dependence on imported energy 
sources has a significant impact on its current 
account. In 2012, Spain imported 73 % of its 
energy sources, but its security of energy supply is 
mitigated by the country’s well-diversified energy 
mix and the large set of countries from which 
Spain imports fuels. Oil, which is entirely 
imported, represents the largest source of energy 
used in Spain (accounting for 42 % of gross inland 
consumption), reflecting a very high share of road 
transport in the modal split. In 2013, Spain’s 
energy trade deficit amounted to 3.4 % of GDP 
and was larger than the EU average. The high 
share of energy products in trade exposes Spain to 
energy price shocks, even if the significant 
improvement in primary and final energy 
consumption over recent years has contributed to 
reducing Spain’s energy dependence. According to 
the latest data available, Spain is on track to meet 
its national energy efficiency and renewable 
energy targets, although there are risks as 
economic growth picks up. The completion of 
electricity and gas interconnectors with France 
is crucial to increase security of supply and 
stimulate competition in energy markets. The 
low interconnection capacity between the Spanish 
and French gas systems has been identified as an 
important infrastructure bottleneck, impeding a full 
integration of the Iberian gas market into the 
Western European market. A new underground 
electricity interconnector between France and 
Spain (Baixas-Santa Llogaia) has doubled the 
existing connection capacity between these 
countries, but it is still far away from the minimum 
interconnection capacity threshold necessary for 
integration of the Spanish, Portuguese and French 
electricity markets. Higher capacity would 
improve the security of electricity supply, exert 
downward pressure on electricity prices, and 
enable a better integration of renewable energy 
sources into the network, giving households and 
businesses from other Member States a better 
access to clean electricity from Spain. 
Graph 3.4.1: Evolution of the electricity tariff deficit in 
Spain, 2000-2013 
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The 2013 reform of the electricity sector helped 
to contain the tariff deficit, and the 2014 deficit 
should be smaller than in previous years. 
Energy policy choices in Spain over the last 
decade have resulted in an increase in regulated 
costs of the electricity system (Graph 3.4.1) and 
have been, to a large extent, passed on to 
electricity consumers. The electricity tariff deficit 
(i.e. the gap between the levies paid by consumers 
and various regulated costs — including 
distribution costs and subsidies for renewable 
energy production) reached EUR 3.54bn in 
2013,(61) and the accumulated tariff debt amounted 
to EUR 28.5bn at the end of 2013, almost 3 % of 
GDP. The increase in levies and the reduction in 
various costs of the electricity system applied with 
the 2013 reform helped to bring the system closer 
to balance in 2014. The energy regulator, CNMC, 
expects that, in 2014, the system was closer to 
equilibrium in structural terms than in previous 
years, but a cyclical deficit cannot be excluded as 
demand for electricity was still decreasing and 
consumers were contracting less power to reduce 
their costs. The final deficit outcomes in 2014 are 
still to be seen. New concerns about the 
competences of the energy regulator have 
emerged, notably in the light of amendments to the 
                                                          
(61) In December 2012, the government adopted Royal Decree 
1054/2014 which provides that the five major electric 
utilities will finance the 2013 deficit. 
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Electricity Law introduced in December 2014 as 
regards the setting of access tariffs.  
In June 2014, the authorities adopted a new 
remuneration scheme applying to existing and 
future renewable energy sources (RES), a 
major outstanding element of the 2013 
electricity reform. While the new remuneration 
scheme has been in force since July 2013 (the date 
of entry of the Royal Decree-Law 9/2013), 
renewable energy operators have only known since 
June 2014 which remuneration standards are 
applied to their particular installations, and what 
remuneration they can expect. There is a pressure 
on the authorities to act carefully to re-establish 
investment confidence in the medium and long 
term and to promote the most cost-efficient 
renewable energy technologies, also with the view 
of achieving the 2020 national renewable energy 
target. Clarity regarding the regulatory regime for 
cost-effective development of self-consumption or 
distributed generation (i.e. renewable energies, 
cogeneration, waste-based) is, however, missing. 
There competition in the wholesale and retail 
electricity markets is not yet sufficient. The 
national competition authority claimed that the 
degree of competition in the wholesale electricity 
market has been insufficient,(62) despite the fact 
that the measure of concentration in the market 
(the market power of generators with more than 
5 % market share) has followed a decreasing trend 
since 2009. Nevertheless, the cumulative share of 
smaller players in the market (the so-called ‘other’ 
ordinary regime players) has been reduced 
compared with 2009. Similarly, the retail 
electricity market is still highly concentrated and 
the number of retailers decreased from 459 in 2008 
to 121 in 2012. As a result, the cumulative market 
share of the main suppliers (with more than 5 % 
market share) remained very high (89 %), even if 
the switching rate increased from 5.2 % in 2009 to 
12.1 % in 2012. 
In July 2014, the government adopted a reform 
to prevent gas price increases for consumers 
and to reduce the potential liability for public 
finances stemming from the gas tariff deficit. 
Weak demand for gas and the need to maintain an 
                                                          
(62) CNC, IPN 103/13 Anteproyecto de Ley del sector eléctrico. 
The report pointed to some structural weaknesses 
preventing competition in the Spanish electricity market. 
extensive gas network have recently pushed up the 
gas tariff deficit (i.e. the gap between the network 
access tariffs paid by consumers and the regulated 
costs of the gas system). According to the energy 
regulator, CNMC, the accumulated deficit was 
equal to EUR 326 million in 2013, and would have 
reached EUR 800 million by the end of 2014, if no 
action had been taken.() The Royal Decree-Law 
8/2014 proposed that, at the end of 2014, the 
accumulated deficit be recognised as a system debt 
and that gas companies will recover it from 
customers in the next 15 years, with annuities 
appearing in the system’s costs. Looking forward, 
the law intends to halt the increase in the debt by 
revising downwards the remuneration of regulated 
activities (system costs), and by introducing the 
principle of system sufficiency. According to the 
energy regulator, the overall annual savings under 
the law could amount to EUR 230 million, and 
should put the gas tariff deficit on a decreasing 
path. 
Transport 
The authorities are taking some steps to use the 
stock of transport infrastructure more 
efficiently. First, the gradual process of opening 
railway passenger services to competition has been 
launched, but the effects — in terms of better use 
of the extensive infrastructure stock — still have to 
be seen. From 2015, a licensed provider will be 
able to compete with the incumbent operator Renfe 
Operadora on the network between Madrid, 
Valencia, Alicante and Murcia. After seven years 
of licence validity, the corridor will be fully 
opened to competition. For the moment, there is no 
official schedule to open other parts of the network 
with a significant passenger potential. In 
December 2014, a railway safety agency was set 
up and will be also responsible for granting 
licences to providers of rail services. Second, in 
July 2014, the formation of a fund to improve land 
accessibility of seaports was announced. The fund, 
based on obligatory contributions from port 
authorities, is to improve land accessibility of ports 
by road and rail. But the regulatory framework of 
the fund still needs to be developed. In addition, 
the maximum length of port concessions will be 
extended from 35 to 50 years to promote 
investments in ports. 
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Graph 3.4.2: Features of the motorway network in Spain 
compared with other Member States, 2011 
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The effectiveness of mechanisms to limit 
potential liabilities for public finances stemming 
from transport infrastructure is uncertain. An 
over-sized transport network is creating liabilities 
for public finances (Graph 3.4.2). When selecting 
transport projects, Spain seems to have given 
higher priority to increasing geographical cohesion 
than improving efficiency, and investment plans 
still include high-speed railway lines and 
motorways in areas with negligible traffic. 
Investment policies have been focused on 
extending infrastructure rather than on 
maintenance, and have favoured an extended 
network for passenger transport to the detriment of 
better connectivity of production poles with 
consumption/export sites and interconnectivity 
with bordering markets. Following the creation of 
an Observatory of Transport and Logistics, as a 
tool for a more efficient diagnosis, the government 
has started to set up an advisory council on future 
infrastructure projects. Given that reports from the 
council will be based on data coming from the 
Ministry and will not be binding, it is doubtful 
whether the council will be able to assess 
effectively any infrastructure projects with 
potentially overoptimistic traffic estimates. 
Some obstacles to the development of air 
transport have been identified and the 
government is proceeding with the privatisation 
of airport infrastructure. The costs of airport 
services in individual airports operated by AENA, 
the operator of the network of 46 airports and two 
heliports, are not transparent. Some progress has 
been made with the setting up of an independent 
regulator and a more independent slot coordinator, 
but enforcement will be crucial. In July 2014, by 
the Royal Decree-Law 8/2014, the government 
announced that a 49 % stake in AENA would be 
sold to private investors. In particular, 21 % of 
shares have been offered to strategic investors and 
at least 28 % will be placed on the stock exchange. 
In October, the privatisation plans were postponed 
until 2015. 
The government is exploring ways to minimise 
the negative impact of unprofitable motorways 
on public finances. Operators of toll motorways 
with low traffic flows and which have been 
declared insolvent represent a non-negligible 
contingent liability for the state. In mid-October, 
the government presented an official proposal to 
bail out the insolvent motorways in concession, 
thus requiring the negotiating parties to reach an 
agreement, which should subsequently be 
approved in court. 
The digital economy 
Insufficient levels of digital skills, unequal 
coverage and high costs limit the benefits from 
information and communication technologies 
(ICT). Coverage of high-speed fixed basic 
broadband is above the EU average in Spain as a 
whole, but quite unequal between regions, ranging 
from 94 % in the Basque Country to 22 % in 
Extremadura. Moreover, broadband subscriptions 
continue to lag behind due to the high cost of 
broadband connections for users. E-commerce is 
often disregarded by Spanish firms, particularly 
SMEs, and take-up by the Spanish population of e-
commerce is also much lower than the EU 
average. ICT skills are still insufficient, with 37 % 
of the labour force having no or only low digital 
skills. Coordination between digital strategies set 
up at different levels of administration is crucial to 
guarantee interoperability between the 
implemented systems. 
Climate change and environment 
Spain risks missing its greenhouse gas emissions 
target. Under the Europe 2020 strategy, Spain 
committed to reduce its emissions not covered by 
the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) by 10 % 
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below 2005 levels by 2020. According to the latest 
national projections based on existing measures, 
non-ETS emissions will decrease only by 2 % 
between 2005 and 2020. In the case of no further 
mitigation measures in the buildings, transport and 
agriculture sectors, the 2020 target would therefore 
be missed by 9 percentage points.(63) 
Spain also faces considerable challenges in the 
areas of water and waste management and air 
quality. Spain is a water-stressed country, 
meaning that water demand exceeds the available 
water resources under sustainable conditions. An 
adequate water-pricing policy to recover the cost 
of water services, together with promotion of 
wastewater reuse, higher transparency of prices 
and subsidies or modernisation of irrigation 
systems, could all harness water saving potential, 
especially in agriculture, the major consumer of 
water. Moreover, desalinisation plants built 
primarily on the Mediterranean coast with EU 
funding support have clearly been underused. 
Also, the opportunities for waste prevention and 
recycling are not yet fully developed in Spain, and 
a still high proportion of incinerated and landfilled 
municipal waste is preventing transition to a 
circular economy. Finally, personal transport 
exacerbates seasonal problems with air quality and 
traffic congestion in the major Spanish cities, 
leading to health and economic costs. 
 
                                                          
(63) Kyoto Progress Report COM(2014) 689. 
3.5. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
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Public administration reform   
The efficiency of public administration is an 
important factor for firms' productivity and 
growth and Spain is gradually implementing a 
public administration reform. The reform aims 
to achieve efficiency gains and fiscal savings. It 
does so by i. reducing duplicated administrative 
structures within the central government and 
between central and regional governments; ii. 
reducing administrative burdens; iii. streamlining 
overheads; and iv. rationalising the central 
government’s ‘institutional’ administration.  
As at end-December 2014, 129 of 222 public 
administration reform measures had already been 
implemented (58.1 % of the total), while 61 others 
were at an advanced stage of implementation. The 
remaining 32 were, with a few exceptions, at an 
intermediate degree of implementation, with 
measures to remove duplicated administrative 
structures accounting for the lion’s share and 
presenting greater difficulties for their adoption. 
As the current legislature is nearing its end, there is 
a risks related to the implementation of the 
remaining actions. Moreover, a considerable 
number of public administration reform measures 
target the sub-central government level. Ownership 
of the reform at this level of government is 
therefore critical to its success.  
 
Despite progress made in previous years, 
Spain’s law-making process falls behind best 
practice. Available data points to a relatively low 
use of ‘evidence-based instruments’in Spain’s 
lawmaking process. Moreover, there is no legal 
requirement to publish regulatory impact 
assessments (memoria del análisis de impacto 
normativo) and these fail to pursue a proper 
analysis of policy options linked to objectives, 
including by carrying out cost-benefit analyses of 
alternatives. Furthermore, while stakeholders are 
given the opportunity to provide their input in the 
drafting of some legislation, this is not done 
systematically for all relevant regulations, and 
certainly not early enough in the process.(64) 
                                                          
(64) OECD Better Regulation in Europe: Spain OECD 
publishing, 2010, and   OECD Spain: from administrative 
reform to continuous improvement, OECD public 
governance reviews, OECD publishing, 2014. 
Lastly, there is little ex post assessment of enacted 
legislation, although the impact of some flagship 
policy interventions (e.g. the 2012 labour market 
reform) has been evaluated. This is particularly 
important as attention now shifts to the 
implementation of reforms adopted recently. 
Against this backdrop, Spain’s Council of 
Ministers adopted in early January 2015 a first 
draft law (anteproyecto de ley) amending Spain’s 
framework law on administrative procedure. It 
aims, among other things, to set out a common 
regulation at all government levels covering annual 
legislative planning, common commencement 
dates for legislation, ex-ante regulatory impact 
assessments (including for the first time an SMEs 
and competitiveness test), ex post legislative 
planning evaluations and public consultations. The 
planned amendments are a step in the right 
direction, although they address only in part the 
above-mentioned shortcomings.  
Transparency of administrative decisions  
Steps have been taken to improve transparency 
of administrative decisions, but challenges 
remain. The 2014 Country Specific 
Recommendations called on Spain to strengthen 
control mechanisms and increase the transparency 
of administrative decisions, in particular at 
regional and local level. The main recent 
legislative development in Spain was the entry into 
force in December 2014 of the 2013 law on 
transparency, public access to information and 
good governance at central government level. The 
transparency portal provided for by the law was set 
up and the Council for Transparency and Good 
Governance, which is in charge with monitoring 
the implementation of the law took office. 
Moreover, two draft bills announced in 2013 in the 
framework of the package of measures for the 
‘revival of democracy’ were adopted by the 
Government in February 2014 and were still being 
discussed in Parliament at the time of writing. A 
third set of measures, also before Parliament, 
relates to the revision of the Criminal Code, most 
notably by criminalising illegal party funding and 
extending the statute of limitations for corruption-
related crimes. These initiatives are complemented 
by a significant increase in the activity of the 
Special Public Prosecutor’s Office against 
Corruption and Organised Crime. In 2013, the 
number of allegations received doubled, and the 
number of investigations started, indictments and 
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final sentences with convictions also went up 
compared with the previous year.(65) The trend 
appears to have continued in 2014 with several 
high-profile cases initiated involving a high 
number of defendants.  These developments go in 
the right direction, although there are other areas 
of improvement, on which there has been no 
progress. These include addressing corruption 
risks, enhancing transparency and control 
mechanisms in public procurement and urban 
development processes at regional and local level. 
The number of cases of alleged wrongdoings 
relating to public procurement has increased 
considerably over the past few months. These 
cases affect the central, regional and local levels. 
The most frequent breaches of EU public 
procurement rules are the illegal modifications of 
contracts, the artificial splitting of contracts and 
the abusive use of urgent procedures and public-
public cooperation mechanisms. These are 
indicative of defective control mechanisms during 
the tender and the execution of public contracts 
and after their performance, with the current 
sanctioning arrangements failing to deter either the 
contracting authorities or the economic operators 
concerned from their deviating practices.   
Judicial reform 
Improving the efficiency of the judicial system 
is an important path for increasing cost-
competitiveness and economic performance in 
the Spanish economy.(66) Table 3.5.1 shows that 
reforms leading to reductions of average 
disposition time and case backlog are positively 
related with business dynamics (as measured by 
sectorial entry and churn rates)(67) and with net 
inflows of foreign direct investment. However, 
Spain has made limited progress in implementing 
                                                          
(65) See Spain’s General Public Prosecutor Office’s 2014 
Annual Report  
https://www.fiscal.es/memorias/memoria2014/FISCALIA_
SITE/index.html.  
(66) European Economy 5/2014, Market Reforms at Work in 
Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. European Commission. 
DG Economic and Financial Affairs. To note: improving 
efficiency is not the sole objective of judicial reforms, as 
these should also target enhanced quality and independence 
of the system. 
(67) The entry rate is defined as the ratio of new firms to the 
total number of firms in a sector. The churn rate is defined 
as the sum of the entry rate and the exit rate (ratio of firms' 
deaths to total firms in a sector). The latter can be 
considered as a proxy of businesses’ turnover.  
the 2014 Country Specific Recommendation on 
judicial reform. The announced reform on the 
structure of the judiciary and on the judicial map 
has not yet been adopted. In April 2014 the 
government approved a first draft bill to modify 
the structure of the judiciary to ensure a more 
efficient division of workload, in particular 
through the creation of the ‘tribunales provinciales 
de instancia’. Further to the opinions of 
consultative bodies and to the change in political 
leadership of the Ministry of Justice, a revised 
draft bill is expected to get government approval in 
the first quarter of 2015. Information received 
indicates that the revised draft may be more 
limited in scope than the original one. Other 
legislative work includes proposals for amending 
the rules governing the management of the legal 
aid system and non-litigious cases, currently 
before Parliament. The government is also 
preparing a revision of the criminal procedural 
rules to render them more effective. A first draft 
organic law amending the Code of Criminal 
Procedure was adopted by the government in first 
round on 5 December 2014 and is now under 
consultation. In parallel, the Oficina Judicial, a 
common pool of resources to assist judges, which 
was created in 2003, continues its gradual 
implementation throughout Spain. Efforts to 
progress in the digitalisation of justice and to 
develop better links between the electronic case 
management systems of regions to avoid problems 
of interoperability have also been pursued. On the 
duration of judicial proceedings, national statistics 
available to the public(68) show that there was a 
general improvement as regards the length of 
proceedings in the first three quarters of 2014, 
notably in first and second instance for most type 
of cases (except for first instance labour cases). 
However, the perception of the independence of 
justice in 2014 has worsened according to World 
Economic Forum data, where Spain compares 
unfavourably with most euro area countries.(69)  
 
                                                          
(68) Indicadores clave del tercer trimestre 2014 a nivel 
nacional, www.poderjudicial.es. The Spanish authorities 
did not provide data to the Council of Europe’s European 
Commission for the Efficiency of Justice to complete the 
replies to questions collected for the 2015 EU Justice 
Scoreboard, nor to other questionnaires submitted directly 
by the Commission for this exercise. 
(69) The Global Competitiveness Report 2014 – 2015, World 
Economic Forum. To note: WEF data measures citizen’s 
perceptions of independence and not independence per se. 
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Table 3.5.1: Out-of-sample predictions for the impact of 
efficiency-enhancing judicial reforms on 
business dynamics and FDI 
2010 2012 % change 2010 2012 change
Spain 289 264 -8.1 0.86 p.p. 3128.4 2720.1 -408.3
Disposition time Backlog ratioImpact on 
entry rate
Source: European Economy 5|2014, 'Market Reforms at 
Work in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece'. European 
Commission.  
 
Management of European Structural and 
Investment Funds (ESIF) 
The implementation of the European Structural 
and Investment Funds (ESIF) in Spain is 
impeded by deficiencies. In the period 2007 – 
2013, Spain has benefited extensively from 
investments financed through Structural and 
Cohesion funds (total of EUR 35.2 billion), 
however, implementation of these funds has been 
suboptimal. Over the past few years recurring 
deficiencies in the management and control 
systems of several Operational Programmes 
persist. As a consequence a significant number of 
programmes, covering considerable amounts of 
funding, are subject to procedures of interruption 
or suspension of payments. Problems have been 
identified at all levels of implementing bodies and 
authorities, originating from a complex multi-
layered system resulting in weak accountability. 
Throughout the 2014-2020 programming period, 
Spain will receive EUR 37.4 billion from the four 
ESI Funds, but the adoption of programmes is 
lagging behind and negotiations are still ongoing 
in 2015.  
ANNEX A 
Overview Table 
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Commitments Summary assessment(70) 
2014 Country specific recommendations (CSRs)  
CSR 1: Reinforce the budgetary strategy as of 2014, 
in particular by fully specifying the underlying 
measures for the year 2015 and beyond, to ensure the 
correction of the excessive deficit in a sustainable 
manner by 2016 through achieving the structural 
adjustment effort specified in the Council 
Recommendation under the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure. A durable correction of the fiscal 
imbalances requires a credible implementation of 
ambitious structural reforms to increase the 
adjustment capacity and boost growth and 
employment. After achieving the correction of the 
excessive deficit, pursue a structural adjustment 
towards the medium-term objective of at least 0.5 % 
each year, and more in good economic conditions or 
if needed to ensure that the debt rule is met in order 
to put the high general government debt ratio on a 
sustained downward path. Ensure that the new 
independent fiscal authority becomes fully 
operational as soon as possible and ensure a full 
implementation of the preventive, corrective and 
enforcement measures in the Budgetary Stability 
Organic Law at all levels of government, including 
on the elimination of public sector commercial 
arrears. Carry out by February 2015 a systematic 
review of expenditure at all levels of government to 
underpin the efficiency and quality of public 
spending going forward. Continue to increase the 
costeffectiveness of the healthcare sector, in 
particular by further rationalising pharmaceutical 
spending, including in hospitals and strengthening 
coordination across types of care, while maintaining 
accessibility for vulnerable groups. Adopt by the end 
of 2014 a comprehensive tax reform to make the tax 
system simpler and more conducive to growth and 
job creation, preservation of the environment and 
stability of revenues. To that end, shift revenues 
towards less distortive taxes, such as consumption, 
environmental (e.g. on motor fuels) and recurrent 
property taxes; remove inefficient personal and 
corporate income tax expenditures; consider lowering 
Spain has made some progress in addressing 
CSR 1 of the Council recommendation. This 
overall assessment of CSR 1 excludes an 
assessment of compliance with the Stability 
and Growth Pact. 
Substantial progress was achieved in ensuring 
that the new independent fiscal authority 
becomes fully operational as soon as possible. 
AIReF is now operational. 
Limited progress is recorded in ensuring a full 
implementation of the preventive, corrective 
and enforcement measures in the Budgetary 
Stability Organic Law at all levels of 
government: the majority of Economic and 
Financial plans for regions having not 
complied with the 2013 deficit target were 
adopted late in 2014: in July 2014, the Fiscal 
and Financial Policy Council (FFPC) 
approved the Economic and Financial Plan of 
Aragón only. On 23/12/2014, it approved 
those of Catalonia, Valencia, Murcia and 
Cantabria and Castilla-La Mancha. Moreover, 
no preventive measures were taken last year 
on regions at risk of non-compliance with the 
2014 deficit target, despite visible 
deterioration in regions' budget execution. 
Some progress is recorded on elimination of 
public sector commercial arrears: on 
25/11/2014, the Ministry of Finance published 
for the first time data on average payment 
periods covering all general government 
levels. 
Some progress was made in the systematic 
review of expenditure at all levels of 
government. Proposals to review healthcare, 
education, social and public administration 
regional spending have been discussed in 
                                                          
(70) The following categories are used to assess progress in implementing the 2014 CSRs of the Council Recommendation: No 
progress: The Member State has neither announced nor adopted any measures to address the CSR. This category also applies if 
a Member State has commissioned a study group to evaluate possible measures. Limited progress: The Member State has 
announced some measures to address the CSR, but these measures appear insufficient and/or their adoption/implementation is 
at risk. Some progress: The Member State has announced or adopted measures to address the CSR. These measures are 
promising, but not all of them have been implemented yet and implementation is not certain in all cases. Substantial progress: 
The Member State has adopted measures, most of which have been implemented. These measures go a long way in addressing 
the CSR. Fully addressed: The Member State has adopted and implemented measures that address the CSR appropriately. 
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employers' social security contributions, in particular 
for low-wage jobs; continue to tackle the debt bias in 
corporate taxation; take measures to avoid that 
taxation hinders the smooth functioning of Spain's 
internal market. Step up the fight against tax evasion. 
 
 
2014 at the Financial and Fiscal Policy 
Council meetings. The spending review has 
not been published, though.  
Some progress was made in increasing the 
cost-effectiveness of the healthcare sector. 
Reforms to increase the efficiency and 
monitoring of healthcare expenditure 
continue, since 2012, in addition to public 
administration reforms that contributed further 
to rationalise the sector and to improve its 
efficiency. 
Some progress was achieved as regards 
comprehensive tax reform to make the tax 
system simpler and more conducive to growth 
and job creation. The tax reform was adopted 
on 20/11/2014, covering personal income 
taxation and corporate income taxation, to be 
implemented from January 2015 onwards. 
Some progress was also made as far as the 
fight against tax evasion is concerned, but 
there was no progress in the area of 
environmental taxation. 
CSR 2: Complete the reform of the saving banks 
sector, as regards the adoption of secondary 
legislation and complete the restructuring of state-
owned savings banks in order to accelerate their full 
recovery and facilitate their return to private 
ownership. Promote banks' efforts to sustain strong 
capital ratios, monitor the asset management 
company Sareb's activity in order to ensure timely 
asset disposal while minimising the cost to the 
taxpayer. Complete the ongoing measures to widen 
SMEs access to finance, in particular by finalising the 
ongoing measures to improve non-bank financial 
intermediation. Remove remaining bottlenecks in the 
corporate insolvency framework, in particular by 
enhancing the expertise of insolvency administrators 
and the capacity of the judicial system to handle 
insolvency cases, and develop a permanent 
framework for personal insolvency, paying due 
attention to balanced creditor/borrower rights and 
financial stability considerations. 
 
Spain has made some progress in addressing 
CSR 2 of the Council recommendation. 
Some progress was made as regards the 
reform of the savings bank sector. A new 
solvency law approved on 4/06/2014, and 
discussion on the first draft of the act 
implementing the savings banks law started in 
October 2014. 
Substantial progress was made in promoting 
bank efforts to sustain strong capital ratios. 
Some progress is recorded in monitoring the 
activity of the asset management company 
Sareb. Sareb continues divesting its assets at a 
moderate pace, concentrated in key areas, 
such as Barcelona, Madrid, Malaga and 
Alicante. A draft law on a new system for the 
restructuring and resolution of credit 
institutions was adopted by the government on 
28/11/2014. 
Substantial progress was made in completing 
the ongoing measures to widen SMEs access 
to finance. The plan for growth, 
competitiveness and efficiency, (including 
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measures to boost credit lines of Spain’s 
development bank, ICO, in 2014 and to 
improve SME access to finance by 
strengthening bank guarantees managed by 
ICO) was adopted on 6/06/2014. The Royal 
Decree that sets out the regulation of the so-
called internationalisation bonds was adopted 
on 4/07/2014. Furthermore, the government 
adopted a draft law on promoting corporate 
financing on 3/10/2014. 
Some progress was made in removing the 
remaining bottlenecks in the corporate 
insolvency framework. Royal Decree-Law 
11/2014 on urgent measures in the area of 
insolvency was adopted on 5/09/2014 (a 
special working group will monitor its 
implementation and will issue annual reports). 
On 30/09/2014, Law 17/2014 was adopted 
revising pre-insolvency proceedings and 
enhancing the system of insolvency 
administrators. 
CSR 3: Pursue new measures to reduce labour 
market segmentation to favour sustainable, quality 
jobs, for instance through reducing the number of 
contract types and ensuring a balanced access to 
severance rights. Continue regular monitoring of the 
labour market reforms. Promote real wage 
developments consistent with the objective of 
creating jobs. Strengthen the job-search requirement 
in unemployment benefits. Enhance the effectiveness 
and targeting of active labour market policies, 
including hiring subsidies, particularly for those 
facing more difficulties in accessing employment. 
Reinforce the coordination between labour market 
and education and training policies. Accelerate the 
modernisation of public employment services to 
ensure effective personalised counselling, adequate 
training and job-matching, with special focus on the 
long-term unemployed. Ensure the effective 
application of public-private cooperation in 
placement services before the end of 2014, and 
monitor the quality of services provided. Ensure the 
effective functioning of the Single Job Portal and 
combine it with further measures to support labour 
mobility. 
 
Spain has made some progress in addressing 
CSR 3 of the Council recommendation. 
Spain has done limited progress pursuing new 
measures to reduce labour market 
segmentation to favour sustainable, quality 
jobs. On 25/02/2014, the Government 
introduced a temporary reduced form of 
employer contribution to social security for 
net indefinite employment, and extended it on 
26/12/2014 until 31/03/2015 (Royal Decree-
Law 17/2014). No other relevant measures 
have been taken. 
Some progress was made in continued regular 
monitoring of the labour market reforms. 
Some progress is recorded promoting real 
wage developments consistent with the 
objective of creating jobs. At the cut-off date 
for this document, the new multi-annual 
agreement on employment and collective 
bargaining for 2015, 2016 and 2017 was not 
yet adopted by the social partners. 
Some progress was made strengthening the 
job-search requirement for unemployment 
benefits. The 2014-2016 Activation Strategy 
adopted on 5/09/2014 intends, among other 
  
72 
things, to improve the links between active 
and passive labour market policies by 
enhancing the activation requirement of 
unemployed receiving an unemployment 
benefit or subsidy.  
Some progress was made in enhancing the 
effectiveness and targeting of active labour 
market policies. A new temporary programme 
of activation and support for the long-term 
unemployed was adopted on 19/12/2014 
(Royal Decree-Law 16/2014). 
There is limited progress in reinforcing the 
coordination between labour market and 
education and training policies. The new basic 
vocational education and training is being 
implemented, and the government is currently 
working on broadening the dual vocational 
training framework. 
Limited progress is recorded in accelerating 
the modernisation of public employment 
services. The 2014-2016 Activation Strategy 
adopted on 5/09/2014 envisages common set 
of services to be provided to all unemployed 
by the Public Employment Service, which was 
set by Royal Decree adopted on 16 January. 
Some progress is recorded in ensuring the 
effective application of public-private 
cooperation in placement services. The 
framework agreement with private agencies 
was formalised at the end of 2014. Bilateral 
agreements are now to be signed by regional 
and national public employment services with 
employment agencies. The agreement between 
the national Public Employment Service and 
private agencies related to the beneficiaries of 
the PREPARA programme was signed at the 
end of 2014, but the process is likely to be 
delayed due to a recent administrative court 
judgement. 
Substantial progress was made ensuring the 
effective functioning of the Single Job Portal. 
This is  operational since 17/07/2014 
(www.empleate.gob.es). However, a 
continuous update of vacancies is not effective 
in all regions yet. 
CSR 4: Implement the 2013-2016 Youth Spain has made some progress in addressing 
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Entrepreneurship and Employment Strategy and 
evaluate its effectiveness. Provide good quality offers 
of employment, apprenticeships and traineeships for 
young people and improve the outreach to non-
registered unemployed young people, in line with the 
objectives of a youth guarantee. Effectively 
implement the new educational schemes to increase 
the quality of primary and secondary education. 
Enhance guidance and support for groups at risk of 
early school leaving. Increase the labour-market 
relevance of vocational education and training and of 
higher education, in particular by enhancing the 
cooperation with employers and supporting the 
training of trainers and tutors. 
 
CSR 4 of the Council recommendation. 
Some progress was made in implementing the 
2013-2016 Youth Entrepreneurship and 
Employment Strategy and evaluating its 
effectiveness. Most of strategy's short-term 
measures are already implemented; however 
many of the medium and long- term measures, 
and the first evaluation, are still pending.  
Some progress was achieved in setting the 
national legal framework for delivery of the 
Youth Guarantee.  
Limited progress was made in providing good 
quality offers of employment, apprenticeships 
and traineeships for young people and 
improving the outreach to non-registered 
unemployed young people, in line with the 
objectives of a youth guarantee. 
Some progress was done implementing the 
new educational schemes to increase the 
quality of primary and secondary education. 
The Law on Quality of Education (LOMCE) 
is gradually being implemented, starting from 
the 2014/2015 school year, including  the new 
basic course  for vocational education and 
training (designed also as a measure to address 
early school- leaving), and the new evaluation 
of pupil performance. 
Limited progress is recorded in enhancing 
guidance and support for groups at risk of 
early school-leaving. 
Limited progress was done in increasing the 
labour-market relevance of vocational 
education and training and of higher 
education. A specific committee has been set 
up in the labour market sectorial conference, 
which will examine, among other things, the 
relevance of education and training curricula 
to labour market needs. However, the efforts 
to enhance cooperation of higher education 
institutions with employers are lagging 
behind. There are plans for an extension of the 
dual vocational training in 2015, but there are 
still substantial divergences in the 
implementation across the regions.  
CSR 5: Implement the 2013-2016 National Action Spain has made limited progress in 
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Plan on Social Inclusion and assess its effectiveness 
covering the full range of its objectives. Strengthen 
administrative capacity and coordination between 
employment and social services in order to provide 
integrated pathways to support those at risk, and 
boost, among the Public Administrations responsible 
for the minimum income schemes, streamlined 
procedures to support transitions between minimum 
income schemes and the labour market. Improve the 
targeting of family support schemes and quality 
services favouring low-income households with 
children, to ensure the progressivity and effectiveness 
of social transfers. 
 
addressing CSR 5 of the Council 
recommendation. 
Limited progress was done in implementing 
the 2013-2016 National Action Plan on Social 
Inclusion. 
Limited progress was achieved in 
strengthening administrative capacity and 
coordination between employment and social 
services. The July 2014 agreement signed by 
the government and social partners includes 
specific measures to assess, together with the 
regions, the various income schemes in Spain, 
in terms of coverage and link to 
employability. (See CSR 3 as regards the new 
temporary programme of support and 
activation for the long-term unemployed). 
Limited progress is recorded in improving the 
targeting of family support schemes and 
quality services favouring low-income 
households with children, to ensure the 
progressiveness and effectiveness of social 
transfers. The Action Plan on the Spanish 
Strategy on Disability, Action Plan on 
Equality in the Information Society and Youth 
Strategy 2020 were adopted on 12/09/2014. 
The Integrated Family Support Plan (PIAF) is 
still under negotiation. A special allocation of 
EU 17 million was included in the 2014 
national budget to tackle severe material 
deprivation of families with dependent 
children, including Roma. The allocation was 
increased to EU 32 million in the 2015 budget. 
CSR 6: Ensure an ambitious and swift 
implementation of Law No 20/2013 on Market Unity 
at all levels of administration. Adopt an ambitious 
reform of professional services and of professional 
associations by the end of 2014, defining the 
professions requiring registration in a professional 
organisation, and the transparency and accountability 
of professional bodies, opening up unjustifiably 
reserved activities and safeguarding market unity in 
the access to and exercise of professional services in 
Spain. Further reduce the time, cost and number of 
procedures required for setting up an operating 
business. Address unjustified restrictions to the 
establishment of large-scale retail premises, in 
particular through a revision of existing regional 
planning regulations. Identify sources of financing 
Spain has made some progress in addressing 
CSR 6 of the Council recommendation. 
Some progress is achieved on the 
implementation of Law No 20/2013 on 
Market Unity, which is lagging behind, mostly 
due to delays at sub-central government level. 
No progress has been done as regards the 
adoption of the reform of professional services 
and professional associations. 
Some progress has been done in further 
reducing the time, cost and number of 
procedures required for setting up an 
operating business. Implementation of Law 
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for the new national strategy for science, technology 
and innovation and make operational the new State 
Research Agency. 
 
14/2013 on entrepreneurship continues, 
although the law on environmental 
assessment, adopted in December 2013, is not 
yet being fully implemented by various 
regions. Despite progress, the most recent 
indicators measuring ease to start-up a 
business show that it is more cumbersome to 
start-up a business in Spain than in other 
European countries sharing similar legal 
systems.  
Substantial progress is recorded in addressing 
unjustified restrictions to the establishment of 
large-scale retail premises, following the 
adoption on 4/07/2014 of Royal Decree-Law 
8/2014, which facilitates licensing procedures 
for the establishment, sale and expansion of 
retail outlets. Smooth implementation at sub-
central government level of this reform is 
however needed for the amendments to 
deliver the expected results.  
Limited progress is achieved in identifying 
sources of financing for the new national 
strategy for science, technology and 
innovation. The Royal Decree 475/2014, 
adopted on 13/06/14, allows businesses to 
deduct 40 % from their social security 
contributions if they employ full time workers 
to carry out R&D and innovation activities. 
The 2015 national budget increases public 
spending on research and innovation by 4.8 %. 
However, this is partly due to a high rise in 
military research and innovation spending. 
Moreover, a substantial part of the increase is 
earmarked to reimburse multiannual research 
and innovation project grants committed in 
previous exercises. In practice, this leaves 
only a small portion of the public research and 
innovation budget increase to support the 
national strategy for science, technology and 
innovation.  
No progress has been done in setting up a new 
State Research Agency.  
CSR 7: Following the reform of 2013, ensure the 
effective elimination of deficit in the electricity 
system as of 2014, including by taking further 
structural measures if needed. Address the problem 
of insolvent toll motorways so as to minimise costs 
for the State. Set up an independent body to 
Spain has made some progress in addressing 
CSR 7 of the Council recommendation. 
Some progress was achieved in ensuring the 
effective elimination of deficit in the 
electricity system as of 2014. On 06/06/2014, 
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contribute to the assessment of future major 
infrastructure projects by the end of 2014. Take 
measures to ensure effective competition in freight 
and passenger rail services. 
 
the government adopted a new remuneration 
system for existing and new renewable power 
plants, affecting revenues for already 
operating plants. On 4/07/2014, the Council of 
Ministers adopted Royal Decree-Law 8/2014 
to tackle the increasing gas tariff deficit. On 
12/12/2014, the government approved Royal 
Decree 1054/2014, to finance the 2013 tariff 
deficit by the five major electric utilities, 
estimated at EUR 3 540 million, and to 
address the ‘cyclical imbalances’ for future 
years. 
Some progress was achieved in addressing the 
problem of insolvent toll motorways so as to 
minimise costs for the state. In March 2014, 
the authorities proposed to set up a public 
company taking over the motorways and 
presented a restructuring plan to creditors. On 
17/10/2014, the authorities initiated the 
insolvency procedure by presenting an official 
proposal to bail out the motorways, requiring 
the negotiating parties to reach an agreement, 
which should subsequently be approved in 
court. 
Limited progress is recorded in setting up an 
independent body to contribute to the 
assessment of future major infrastructure 
projects. On 30/06/2014, a Ministerial Order 
was adopted to set up an advisory council on 
infrastructure projects. 
Some progress was made in taking measures 
to ensure effective competition in freight and 
passenger rail services. On 4/07/2014, the 
Council of Ministers adopted Royal Decree-
Law 8/2014, creating a fund to improve land 
accessibility of seaports. On 13/06/2014, the 
Council of Ministers announced that a licence 
(to be operational in 2015) will be provided to 
compete with the incumbent Renfe on the rail 
network between Madrid, Valencia, Alicante, 
Murcia, and Castellón. After seven years 
under this licence, the corridor will be fully 
opened to competition. 
CSR 8: Implement at all government levels the 
recommendations of the committee for the reform of 
the public administration. Strengthen control 
mechanisms and increase the transparency of 
administrative decisions, in particular at regional and 
Spain has made some progress in addressing 
CSR 8 of the Council recommendation. 
Some progress is achieved in implementing at 
all government levels the recommendations of 
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local levels. Complete and monitor closely the 
ongoing measures to fight against the shadow 
economy and undeclared work. Adopt pending 
reforms on the structure of the judiciary and on the 
judicial map and ensure implementation of adopted 
reforms. 
 
the committee for the reform of public 
administration. As at end-December 2014, 129 
of 222 public administration reform measures 
had already been implemented (58.1 % of the 
total number of measures) while 61 others 
were at an advanced stage of implementation.  
Spain has done some progress in 
strengthening transparency of administrative 
decisions. The provisions on transparency and 
public access to information became effective 
in December 2014 at central government 
level; they will enter into force in December 
2015 at sub-central government level. The 
following draft laws were in parliament at the 
time of writing: a draft organic law on the 
control of political parties' economic and 
financial activities, a draft law on the exercise 
of duties of senior officials in Spain's central 
administration and amendments to the Penal 
Code to criminalise illegal party funding and 
extend the statute of limitations for 
corruption-related crimes.  
No progress was recorded in strengthening 
control mechanisms in particular at regional 
and local levels. There have been no 
initiatives to enhance these powers in the 
public procurement and urban planning areas.  
Some progress was done in completing and 
monitoring closely the ongoing measures to 
fight against the hidden economy and 
undeclared work. 
Limited progress was achieved as regards the 
adoption of pending judicial reforms: a first 
draft of a law on the structure of the judiciary 
was approved by the government on 
14/04/2014; the draft is being reviewed in the 
first quarter of 2015 to limit its scope. Draft 
bills on legal aid and on voluntary jurisdiction 
were submitted to parliament on 21/02/2014 
and on 1/08/2014, respectively. 
Some progress was achieved in implementing 
adopted reforms –i.e., the so-called Oficina 
Judicial and improving interoperability 
between regions' electronic case management 
systems.  
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Europe 2020 (national targets and progress) 
Employment rate target set in the 2013 NRP: 74 % of 
those aged 20-64 
The employment rate (for 20-64 year-olds) 
went from     59.6 % in 2012 to 58.6 % in 
2013 and 60.4 in Q3-2014. The Spanish 
economy gathered pace during the course of 
2014, and job creation responded positively. 
This was in part due to the increased 
flexibility introduced by labour market 
reforms enacted in recent years, and to wage 
moderation.  
R&D target set in the 2013 NRP: 3 % Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (as a 
percentage of GDP) stood at 1.27 % in 2012 
and 1.24 % in 2013.  
National greenhouse gas emissions target: -10 % 
below 2005 levels in 2020 in the non-emission 
trading system (non-ETS) sectors 
According to the latest national projections 
submitted to the Commission and taking into 
account existing measures, it is expected that 
the target will be missed: -2 % in 2020 as 
compared with 2005 (i.e. a projected shortfall 
of 8 percentage points). 
Renewable energy target set in the 2013 NRP: 20 % The share of renewable energy in gross final 
energy consumption in 2011, 2012, and 2013 
was respectively 13.2 %, 14.3 % and 15.5 % 
(Eur'Observ'ER). Spain has been on track in 
increasing the share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption, but due to 
recent policy changes, there is a risk the 2020 
target will be missed. 
Energy efficiency: Spain’s 2020 target is to consume 
121.6 Mtoe in terms of primary energy (82.9 Mtoe in 
terms of final energy consumption) 
Primary and final energy consumption have 
been decreasing in 2012-15 and Spain is on 
track to meet its national energy efficiency 
target. However, there are risks when 
economic growth picks up. 
Early school leaving target: 15 % Although decreasing, the share of early 
leavers from education and training 
(percentage of the population aged 18-24 with 
at most lower secondary education and not in 
further education or training) decreased from 
27.7 % in 2012 to 23.6 % in 2013 and 22.3 % 
in Q3-2014, albeit with substantial regional 
differentiation. Good progress on reducing 
early school-leaving can be partly attributed to 
the effectiveness of specific programmes and 
their implementation in the regions. 
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Tertiary education target: 44 % Spain’s tertiary educational attainment rate is 
well above the EU average, having reached 
41.5 % in 2012 and 42.3 % in 2013, but the 
quality and labour market relevance of the 
higher education system shows shortcomings.  
Target on the reduction of population at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion in number of persons: - 
1.4 / 1.5 million 
The number of people at-risk-of-poverty or 
social exclusion (AROPE) reached 12.6 
million in 2013. (Note: Due to a change in the 
methodology used to calculate income-based 
indicators in Spain, the data of people at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion in 2013 is not 
comparable with previous years). Two of the 
three components of the AROPE, however, 
(people living in households with very low 
work intensity and severely materially 
deprived people) have shown a sharp increase 
since 2011. The number of the severely 
materially deprived people has risen by 
762000 since 2011, affecting more than 2.8 
million in 2013 (3.2 million in the provisional 
data for 2014). Similarly, the number of 
people living in households with very low 
work intensity has increased by 794 000 
people from 2011 to 2013, reaching 5.6 
million people. 
ANNEX B 
Standard Tables 
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Table B.1: Macroeconomic indicators 
1996-
2000
2001-
2005
2006-
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Core indicators
GDP growth rate 4.1 3.4 1.1 -0.6 -2.1 -1.2 1.4 2.3 2.5
Output gap 1 0.1 2.7 0.0 -5.5 -7.2 -7.7 -6.1 -3.9 -1.9
HICP (annual % change) 2.6 3.2 2.5 3.1 2.4 1.5 -0.2 -1.0 1.1
Domestic demand (annual % change) 2 4.5 4.2 0.5 -2.7 -4.2 -2.7 2.3 2.6 2.6
Unemployment rate (% of labour force) 3 16.0 10.8 13.2 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.3 22.5 20.7
Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) 23.7 27.8 27.7 21.4 19.7 18.5 18.7 19.2 19.7
Gross national saving (% of GDP) 22.1 23.0 20.9 18.7 19.8 20.4 19.2 20.5 20.8
General government (% of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -2.9 0.0 -4.1 -9.4 -10.3 -6.8 -5.6 -4.5 -3.7
Gross debt 62.3 48.1 45.3 69.2 84.4 92.1 98.3 101.5 102.5
Net financial assets -50.0 -35.5 -26.6 -46.9 -58.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total revenue 38.0 38.4 37.8 36.0 37.0 37.5 38.2 38.4 38.3
Total expenditure 40.9 38.5 41.9 45.4 47.3 44.3 43.8 42.9 42.0
  of which: Interest 4.0 2.3 1.7 2.4 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2
Corporations (% of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -1.0 -3.9 -1.9 3.6 8.1 5.3 3.6 3.0 2.0
Net financial assets; non-financial corporations -92.4 -106.7 -140.3 -129.6 -129.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Net financial assets; financial corporations 0.7 3.0 7.1 14.1 14.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Gross capital formation 14.0 15.6 15.5 13.2 13.7 13.6 13.5 14.1 14.7
Gross operating surplus 20.1 19.7 22.1 22.2 23.1 23.1 22.7 22.1 21.8
Households and NPISH (% of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) 3.0 -0.3 -0.8 3.0 2.3 3.6 2.3 2.6 2.6
Net financial assets 113.4 95.7 81.5 77.0 84.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Gross wages and salaries n.a. 36.7 37.0 37.1 35.4 34.5 34.7 34.8 34.6
Net property income 3.9 4.1 3.3 3.5 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7
Current transfers received 20.0 19.0 20.0 22.6 23.5 23.8 23.2 22.9 22.6
Gross saving 8.1 7.3 6.5 7.8 6.1 6.8 5.8 6.0 6.1
Rest of the world (% of GDP)
Net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) -1.0 -4.2 -6.8 -2.9 0.1 2.1 0.3 1.0 0.9
Net financial assets 28.9 44.3 79.1 86.7 89.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Net exports of goods and services -1.1 -3.1 -3.9 -0.2 1.6 3.4 2.4 2.6 2.4
Net primary income from the rest of the world -0.7 -1.1 -2.0 -1.7 -0.8 -0.7 -1.4 -0.8 -0.6
Net capital transactions 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.4
Tradable sector 49.3 46.1 42.7 43.5 44.0 44.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Non-tradable sector 42.1 44.4 48.5 48.5 47.8 47.2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
  of which: Building and construction sector 8.6 9.9 9.7 6.9 5.8 5.2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(1) The output gap constitutes the gap between the actual and potential gross domestic product at 2010 market prices. 
(2) The indicator of domestic demand includes stocks. 
(3) Unemployed persons are all those who were not employed, had actively sought work and were ready to begin working 
immediately or within two weeks. The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. The 
unemployment rate covers the age group 15-74. 
Source: European Commission 2015 winter forecast; Commission calculations 
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Table B.2: Financial market indicators 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Total assets of the banking sector (% of GDP)1) 329.2 332.0 346.1 347.9 308.1 297.5
Share of assets of the five largest banks (% of total assets) 43.3 44.3 48.1 51.4 56.2 n.a.
Foreign ownership of banking system (% of total assets) 10.1 9.6 9.5 9.1 8.0 n.a.
Financial soundness indicators:
              - non-performing loans (% of total loans)2)3) 4.1 4.7 6.0 7.5 9.4 n.a.
              - capital adequacy ratio (%)2) 12.2 11.9 12.1 11.6 13.3 n.a.
              - return on equity (%)2)4) 9.2 8.0 1.5 -21.0 5.3 n.a.
Bank loans to the private sector (year-on-year % change)1) -1.0 1.3 -1.9 -7.4 -8.6 -6.0
Lending for house purchase (year-on-year % change)1) 0.1 0.9 -1.2 -3.3 -4.1 -4.0
Loan to deposit ratio1) 110.8 108.8 108.7 108.1 98.7 94.1
Central Bank liquidity as % of liabilities5) 3.1 2.1 5.8 12.8 8.0 6.8
Private debt (% of GDP) 202.4 201.5 195.3 184.8 172.1 n.a.
Gross external debt (% of GDP)6)           - public 28.8 27.5 26.2 25.2 41.7 45.0
            - private 60.7 58.6 55.7 39.6 50.1 51.4
Long-term interest rate spread versus Bund (basis points)* 75.7 150.8 283.3 435.1 299.2 156.0
Credit default swap spreads for sovereign securities (5-year)* 87.2 168.9 250.0 325.7 185.5 71.4
(1) Latest data November 2014. 
(2) Latest data Q4 2013. Basel II. 
(3) Includes loans to private sector, public administration, other credit institutions, and nonresidents. 
(4) After extraordinary items and taxes. Includes only the net income attributable to the group. 
(5) Latest data September 2014. 
(6) Latest data June 2014. Monetary authorities, monetary and financial institutions are not included. 
* Measured in basis points. 
Source: IMF (financial soundness indicators); European Commission (long-term interest rates); World Bank (gross external 
debt); ECB (all other indicators). 
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Table B.3: Taxation indicators 
2002 2006 2008 2010 2011 2012
Total tax revenues (incl. actual compulsory social contributions, % of GDP) 34.1 36.8 32.9 32.2 31.8 32.5
Breakdown by economic function (% of GDP)1
     Consumption 9.5 9.9 8.2 8.8 8.5 8.6
              of which:
              - VAT 5.8 6.5 5.1 5.6 5.4 5.5
              - excise duties on tobacco and alcohol 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
             - energy 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3
             - other (residual) 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9
     Labour employed 15.7 15.6 16.0 16.0 16.0 15.7
     Labour non-employed 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.5
     Capital and business income 5.9 7.1 5.5 4.3 4.2 4.6
     Stocks of capital/wealth 2.9 3.8 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.8
     p.m.  Environmental taxes2 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6
VAT efficiency3
     Actual VAT revenues as % of theoretical revenues at standard rate 52.4 59.2 44.5 42.1 40.6 41.6
(1) Tax revenues are broken down by economic function, i.e. according to whether taxes are raised on consumption, labour 
or capital. See European Commission (2014), Taxation trends in the European Union, for a more detailed explanation.  
(2) This category comprises taxes on energy, transport and pollution and resources included in taxes on consumption and 
capital.  
(3) VAT efficiency is measured via the VAT revenue ratio. It is defined as the ratio between the actual VAT revenue collected 
and the revenue that would be raised if VAT was applied at the standard rate to all final (domestic) consumption 
expenditures, which is an imperfect measure of the theoretical pure VAT base. A low ratio can indicate a reduction of the 
tax base due to large exemptions or the application of reduced rates to a wide range of goods and services (‘policy gap’) 
or a failure to collect all tax due to e.g. fraud (‘collection gap’). It should be noted that the relative scale of cross-border 
shopping (including trade in financial services) compared to domestic consumption also influences the value of the ratio, 
notably for smaller economies. For a more detailed discussion, see European Commission (2012), Tax Reforms in EU Member 
States, and OECD (2014), Consumption tax trends.  
 
Source: European Commission 
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Table B.4: Labour market and social indicators 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Employment rate
(% of population aged 20-64) 68.5 64.0 62.8 62.0 59.6 58.6 59.9
Employment growth 
(% change from previous year) 0.2 -6.3 -1.7 -2.5 -3.7 -2.6 0.7
Employment rate of women
(% of female population aged 20-64) 58.9 56.8 56.3 56.1 54.6 53.8 54.8
Employment rate of men 
(% of male population aged 20-64) 77.9 71.0 69.2 67.7 64.6 63.4 65.0
Employment rate of older workers 
(% of population aged 55-64) 45.5 44.0 43.5 44.5 43.9 43.2 44.3
Part-time employment (% of total employment, 
age 15 years and over) 11.8 12.5 13.0 13.6 14.5 15.8 15.9
Part-time employment of women  (% of women employment, 
age 15 years and over) 22.0 22.4 22.7 22.9 23.9 25.3 25.4
Part-time employment of men  (% of men employment, age 15 
years and over) 4.2 4.9 5.3 5.9 6.6 7.8 7.9
Fixed term employment (% of employees with a fixed term 
contract, age 15 years and over) 29.1 25.2 24.7 25.1 23.4 23.1 23.9
Transitions from temporary to permanent employment 20.1 17.8 15.9 10.8 14.4 14.4 n.a.
Unemployment rate1 (% of labour force, 
age group 15-74)
11.3 17.9 19.9 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5
Long-term unemployment rate2 (% of labour force) 2.0 4.3 7.3 8.9 11.0 13.0 13.0
Youth unemployment rate 
(% of youth labour force aged 15-24) 24.5 37.7 41.5 46.2 52.9 55.5 53.2
Youth NEET rate (% of population aged 15-24) 14.3 18.1 17.8 18.2 18.6 18.6 n.a.
Early leavers from education and training (% of pop. aged 18-24 
with at most lower sec. educ. and not in further education or 
training)
31.7 30.9 28.2 26.3 24.7 23.6 n.a.
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30-34 
having successfully completed tertiary education) 41.3 40.7 42.0 41.9 41.5 42.3 n.a.
Formal childcare (from 1 to 29 hours; % over the population 
aged less than 3 years) 22.0 18.0 20.0 20.0 21.0 n.a. n.a.
Formal childcare (30 hours or over; % over the population aged 
less than 3 years) 16.0 18.0 18.0 19.0 15.0 n.a. n.a.
Labour productivity per person employed (annual % change) 0.9 2.7 2.7 2.0 2.4 2.1 0.7
Hours worked per person employed (annual % change) 0.5 0.4 -0.5 0.4 -0.7 -0.3 0.2
Labour productivity per hour worked (annual % change; 
constant prices) 0.4 2.5 2.3 1.6 2.5 1.7 -0.3
Compensation per employee (annual % change; constant prices) 4.6 4.1 0.9 0.8 -0.8 1.0 1.2
Nominal unit labour cost growth (annual % change) 5.6 1.4 -1.8 -1.0 -3.0 -1.7 n.a.
Real unit labour cost growth (annual % change) 3.2 1.3 -1.8 -1.0 -3.0 -2.3 n.a.
(1) Unemployed persons are all those who were not employed, but had actively sought work and were ready to begin 
working immediately or within two weeks. The labour force is the total number of people employed and unemployed. Data 
on the unemployment rate of 2014 includes the last release by Eurostat in early February 2015.  
(2) Long-term unemployed are persons who have been unemployed for at least 12 months.  
 
Source: European Commission (EU Labour Force Survey and European National Accounts)  
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Table B.5: Labour market and social indicators (continued) 
Expenditure on social protection benefits (% of GDP) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Sickness/healthcare 6.4 6.8 7.3 7.2 7.1 6.7
Invalidity 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8
Old age and survivors 8.7 9.1 10.1 10.7 11.1 11.6
Family/children 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4
Unemployment 2.0 2.3 3.6 3.4 3.7 3.6
Housing and social exclusion n.e.c. 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Total 20.3 21.5 24.7 25.0 25.5 25.4
of which: means-tested benefits 2.7 2.9 3.4 3.7 4.1 3.7
Social inclusion indicators 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion1 
(% of total population)
24.5 24.7 26.1 26.7 27.2 27.3
Children at risk of poverty or social exclusion  
(% of people aged 0-17) 30.6 32.0 33.3 32.2 32.4 32.6
Elderly at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
(% of people aged 65+) 27.7 24.9 22.9 21.2 16.5 14.5
At-risk-of-poverty  rate2 (% of total population) 20.8 20.4 20.7 20.6 20.8 20.4
Severe material deprivation rate3  (% of total population) 3.6 4.5 4.9 4.5 5.8 6.2
Proportion of people living in low work intensity households4 
(% of people aged 0-59)
6.6 7.6 10.8 13.4 14.3 15.7
In-work at-risk-of-poverty rate (% of persons employed) 11.2 11.7 10.9 10.9 10.8 10.5
Impact of social transfers (excluding pensions) on reducing 
poverty 17.5 24.2 28.1 31.3 28.5 32.0
Poverty thresholds, expressed in national currency at constant 
prices5
7367.1 8288.7 8202.2 7666.6 7406.3 7050.6
Gross disposable income (households) 717149.0 720999.0 702619.0 702336.0 682498.0 n.a.
Relative median poverty risk gap (60% of median equivalised 
income, age: total) 24.4 25.7 26.8 27.4 30.6 30.9
Inequality of income distribution (S80/S20 income quintile 
share ratio) 5.7 5.9 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.3
(1) People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (AROPE): individuals who are at risk of poverty (AROP) and/or suffering from 
severe material deprivation (SMD) and/or living in households with zero or very low work intensity (LWI).  
(2) At-risk-of-poverty rate (AROP): proportion of people with an equivalised disposable income below 60 % of the national 
equivalised median income.  
(3) Proportion of people who experience at least four of the following forms of deprivation: not being able to afford to i) pay 
their rent or utility bills, ii) keep their home adequately warm, iii) face unexpected expenses, iv) eat meat, fish or a protein 
equivalent every second day, v) enjoy a week of holiday away from home once a year, vi) have a car, vii) have a washing 
machine, viii) have a colour TV, or ix) have a telephone.  
(4) People living in households with very low work intensity: proportion of people aged 0-59 living in households where the 
adults (excluding dependent children) worked less than 20 % of their total work-time potential in the previous 12 months.  
(5) For EE, CY, MT, SI and SK, thresholds in nominal values in euros; harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) = 100 in 2006 
(2007 survey refers to 2006 incomes)  
(6) 2014 data refer to the average of the first three quarters.  
 
Source: For expenditure for social protection benefits ESSPROS; for social inclusion EU-SILC. 
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Table B.6: Product market performance and policy indicators 
2004-08 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Labour productivity1 in total economy (annual growth in %) 0.1 3.1 1.8 2.4 1.9 1.5 n.a.
Labour productivity1 in manufacturing (annual growth in %) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Labour productivity1 in electricity, gas (annual growth in %) -0.1 -8.7 12.8 2.4 -6.8 -2.4 n.a.
Labour productivity1 in the construction sector (annual growth in %) -1.1 19.4 -2.0 2.8 4.0 4.3 n.a.
Labour productivity1 in the wholesale and retail sector (annual growth 
in %)
-0.2 3.6 3.0 0.7 3.1 0.6 n.a.
Labour productivity1 in the information and communication sector 
(annual growth in %)
0.1 1.3 5.0 -1.6 4.7 -0.5 n.a.
Patent intensity in manufacturing2 (EPO patent applications divided 
by gross value added of the sector)
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Policy indicators 2004-08 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Enforcing contracts3 (days) 515 515 515 515 510 510 510
Time to start a business3 (days) 77.6 61 52 29 29 23 13
R&D expenditure (% of GDP) 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 n.a.
Total public expenditure on education (% of GDP) 4.3 5.0 5.0 4.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
(Index: 0=not regulated; 6=most regulated) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Product market regulation4, overall 1.59 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.44 n.a.
Product market regulation4, retail 3.48 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.88 n.a.
Product market regulation4, professional services 2.74 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.43 n.a.
Product market regulation4, network industries5 1.65 1.65 1.68 1.63 1.60 1.59 n.a.
(1) Labour productivity is defined as gross value added (in constant prices) divided by the number of persons employed.  
(2) Patent data refer to applications to the European Patent Office (EPO). They are counted according to the year in which 
they were filed at the EPO. They are broken down according to the inventor’s place of residence, using fractional counting 
if multiple inventors or IPC classes are provided to avoid double counting.  
(3) The methodologies, including the assumptions, for this indicator are presented in detail here:  HYPERLINK 
"http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology"   
(4) Index: 0 = not regulated; 6 = most regulated. The methodologies of the OECD product market regulation indicators are 
presented in detail here:  HYPERLINK 
"http://www.oecd.org/competition/reform/indicatorsofproductmarketregulationhomepage.htm"   
(5) Aggregate OECD indicators of regulation in energy, transport and communications (ETCR).  
 
Source: European Commission; World Bank — Doing Business (for enforcing contracts and time to start a business); OECD (for 
the product market regulation indicators) 
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Table B.7: Green growth 
Green growth performance 2003-2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Macroeconomic
Energy intensity kgoe / € 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Carbon intensity kg / € 0.46 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.37
Resource intensity (reciprocal of resource productivity) kg / € 0.96 0.82 0.69 0.62 0.54 n.a.
Waste intensity kg / € n.a. 0.15 n.a. 0.15 n.a. 0.13
Energy balance of trade % GDP -2.6 -3.7 -2.4 -3.0 -3.8 -3.8
Energy weight in HICP % 9.3 9.9 10.4 10.2 10.8 11.6
Difference between energy price change and inflation % 1.0 6.3 -1.6 4.3 12.6 7.4
Ratio of environmental taxes to labour taxes ratio 11.9% 9.8% 9.8% 9.6% 9.1% 9.1%
Ratio of environmental taxes to total taxes ratio 5.5% 5.1% 5.4% 5.2% 5.0% 4.8%
Sectoral 
Industry energy intensity kgoe / € 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.14
Share of energy-intensive industries in the economy % GDP 9.6 8.7 7.7 8.4 8.6 8.6
Electricity prices for medium-sized industrial users** € / kWh n.a. 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
Gas prices for medium-sized industrial users*** € / kWh n.a. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
Public R&D for energy % GDP n.a. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01
Public R&D for the environment % GDP n.a. 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02
Recycling rate of municipal waste ratio 37.6% 48.3% 42.1% 37.8% 37.0% 36.7%
Share of GHG emissions covered by ETS* % n.a. 41.0 38.1 35.0 38.3 39.7
Transport energy intensity kgoe / € 1.07 1.06 1.04 0.96 0.90 0.78
Transport carbon intensity kg / € 2.79 2.69 2.61 2.39 2.18 1.88
Security of energy supply
Energy import dependency % 79.3 81.3 79.1 76.8 76.4 73.3
Diversification of oil import sources HHI 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06
Diversification of energy mix HHI n.a. 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.27
Renewable energy share of energy mix % 6.4 7.4 9.5 11.5 11.5 12.6
Country-specific notes: 2013 is not included in the table due to lack of data.  
General explanation of the table items:  
All macro intensity indicators are expressed as a ratio of a physical quantity to GDP (in 2000 prices)  
 Energy intensity: gross inland energy consumption (in kgoe) divided by GDP (in EUR)  
 Carbon intensity: Greenhouse gas emissions (in kg CO2 equivalents) divided by GDP (in EUR)  
 Resource intensity: Domestic material consumption (in kg) divided by GDP (in EUR)  
 Waste intensity: waste (in kg) divided by GDP (in EUR)  
Energy balance of trade: the balance of energy exports and imports, expressed as % of GDP  
Energy weight in HICP: the proportion of "energy" items in the consumption basket used for the construction of the HICP  
Difference between energy price change and inflation: energy component of HICP, and total HICP inflation (annual % 
change)  
Environmental taxes over labour or total taxes: from DG TAXUD’s database ‘Taxation trends in the European Union’  
Industry energy intensity: final energy consumption of industry (in kgoe) divided by gross value added of industry (in 2005 
EUR)  
Share of energy-intensive industries in the economy: share of gross value added of the energy-intensive industries in GDP  
Electricity and gas prices for medium-sized industrial users: consumption band 500–2000MWh and 10000–100000 GJ; figures 
excl. VAT.  
Recycling rate of municipal waste: ratio of recycled municipal waste to total municipal waste  
Public R&D for energy or for the environment: government spending on R&D (GBAORD) for these categories as % of GDP  
Proportion of GHG emissions covered by ETS: based on greenhouse gas emissions (excl LULUCF) as reported by Member 
States to the European Environment Agency  
Transport energy intensity: final energy consumption of transport activity (kgoe) divided by transport industry gross value 
added (in 2005 EUR)  
Transport carbon intensity: greenhouse gas emissions in transport activity divided by gross value added of the transport 
sector  
Energy import dependency: net energy imports divided by gross inland energy consumption incl. consumption of 
international bunker fuels  
Diversification of oil import sources: Herfindahl index (HHI), calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of countries 
of origin  
Diversification of the energy mix: Herfindahl index over natural gas, total petrol products, nuclear heat, renewable energies 
and solid fuels  
Renewable energy share of energy mix: %-share of gross inland energy consumption, expressed in tonne oil equivalents  
* European Commission and European Environment Agency  
** For 2007 average of S1 & S2 for DE, HR, LU, NL, FI, SE & UK. Other countries only have S2.  
*** For 2007 average of S1 & S2 for HR, IT, NL, FI, SE & UK. Other countries only have S2.  
  
Source:  European Commission, unless indicated otherwise. European Commission Calculation 
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